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PREFACE 
 
To a great extent the work that constitutes this thesis has been published or is in the process 
of being published. Therefore the work is presented as a series of individual and relatively 
independent chapters formed largely from published papers drawn together with a general 
discussion in Chapter 10. The sections of this thesis are organised to reflect both the progress 
over time of my work as a graduate student and to reflect the increasing layers of complexity 
that the modelling techniques I used are capable of considering. Section 1 contains models of 
the evolution of social learning and social learning mechanisms, Section 2 considers the 
evolution of social learning strategies and the implications of these strategies for cultural 
evolution and Section 3 contains three models of human cultural evolution.  
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ABSTRACT 
Humans are unique in the extent and complexity of their cultures. As a species, we generate 
extensive knowledge and innumerable norms, attitudes, traditions, skills, beliefs and 
technologies that we share with those around us through teaching, imitation and language. 
These cultural practices have their roots in our uniquely potent ability for social learning. 
This thesis sets out to elucidate the process of cultural evolution using a series of 
mathematical and computational models. These models first investigate the evolution of the 
capacity for social learning, the rare ability to teach, and the evolution of the smart and 
strategic use of social learning, in the animal lineage. They go on to investigate the 
implications of these strategies and mechanisms for culture and find that the form human 
culture takes is dependant on the amount and nature of social learning as well as on the 
underlying learning strategies deployed. The thesis also investigates the effect that culture has 
had on the human evolutionary niche. Cultural practices fundamentally change the selection 
pressures to which humans are subject and these in turn change both our cultures and our 
genes through gene-culture coevolution. Finally, a demographic cultural niche construction 
model is presented, which investigates the application of cultural evolution modelling, 
cultural niche construction theory and demographic models to the growing problem of sex-
ratio imbalance in modern China and considers the implications for policy-making. The 
analyses presented in this thesis support the argument that the uniquely potent human ability 
to transmit acquired information through teaching, imitation and other forms of social 
learning, and through this to shape our cultural and ecological environments, has played and 
continues to play a central role in human evolution.    
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INTRODUCTION: 
FROM SOCIAL LEARNING TO CULTURE 
 
 
Material from this chapter has been published as: 
 
Fogarty, L, Rendell, L.E. & Laland, K.N. 2011, The importance of space in models of social 
learning, cultural evolution and niche construction, Advances in Complex Systems, vol 15, 
nos. 1 & 2 pp. 1-17 
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There is a clear conceptual link between the ability to learn strategically and efficiently from 
other individuals and the human ability to generate vast, complex and diverse cultures (Boyd 
and Richerson 1985, Rogers 1988, Mesoudi 2011). The ability to acquire cultural norms, 
beliefs, skills and technology through social learning is a cornerstone of the human species’ 
ecological and demographic success and an undeniable part of what makes us unique as a 
species. This thesis seeks to understand how humans in particular could have evolved the 
capacity for extremely efficient social learning and, following from that, how human culture 
evolved from its simple origins to the vast, varied and pervasive cultural environments we all 
inhabit now. 
Many definitions of the terms ‘social learning’ and ‘culture’ exist. Throughout the 
chapters that form this thesis, I will use a simple definition of social learning, from Hoppitt 
and Laland (in press), adapted from Heyes (1994): ‘social learning is learning that is 
facilitated by observation of, or interaction with, another individual or its products’. Social 
learning can occur by a number of psychological mechanisms including enhancement effects, 
imitation and emulation (Whiten and Ham 1992; Heyes 1994; Hoppitt and Laland 2008). 
Conversely, asocial or individual learning refers to learning that occurs independently of any 
social influence.  
Generating an acceptable definition of culture has long been a bone of contention 
between researchers investigating the phenomenon from different perspectives (Durham 
1991; Brown 2008; Laland and Galef 2009). The definition proposed by Laland and Hoppitt 
(2003) states that cultures are ‘group-typical behaviour patterns shared by members of a 
community that rely on socially learned and transmitted information’. This definition is 
useful here as it allows culture to be viewed on a continuum from social learning and group 
specific behaviour, such as that seen in Chimpanzee populations (Whiten et al. 1999), to 
more complex human shared beliefs and norms, although these need not be viewed as 
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consanguineous or even, in many cases, as similar at the mechanistic level. In section 3 we 
consider human culture almost exclusively and move towards a more narrow conception of 
culture including more human-specific traits like the use of language, cultural norms, 
institutions and population-specific moral beliefs.   
Culture as a phenomenon has had, and continues to have, a profound effect on human 
evolution (Boyd and Richerson 1985; Richerson and Boyd 2005; Richerson et al. 2010; 
Laland et al. 2010). The effect of learning on evolution and evolutionary outcomes has been 
debated since 1896 when Baldwin proposed that learning might change the speed and 
outcomes of evolution. Baldwin (1896) suggested that learning ‘keeps alive a series of 
functions’ that are not genetic in nature, but that were capable of directly influencing physical 
heredity. The idea that learned behaviours can influence the outcomes of evolution is now 
explored in great detail in the cultural evolution, gene-culture coevolution and cultural niche 
construction literature, each rich in formal theoretical models (Cavalli-Sforza and Feldman 
1981, Boyd and Richerson 1985, Odling-Smee et al. 2003, Richerson and Boyd 2005; 
Richerson et al. 2010).  
 
Modelling Cultural Evolution 
Cultural evolution is the application of Darwinian evolutionary principles to patterns of 
cultural change and diversity, wherein ‘…individuals characterised by alternative cultural 
variants differ in their probability of surviving and becoming effective models’ (Boyd and 
Richerson 1985). In 1973 Cavalli-Sforza and Feldman published what was probably the first 
rigorous mathematical treatment of cultural evolution. They showed that, borrowing from 
classical genetic models of inheritance, cultural traits could be treated as generally analogous 
to genes, and could be modelled as evolving through Darwinian processes (with some 
important modifications accounting for the unique characteristics of cultural transmission 
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such as horizontal and oblique transmission of traits). Cavalli-Sforza and Feldman (1973) 
suggested that the phenotypes of offspring were in fact interactions between the child’s 
genotype, developmental processes and vertical and horizontal learning. The model they 
presented formed the basis of an emerging cultural evolution literature and was followed by 
two influential works: Cultural Evolution and Transmission (Cavalli-Sforza and Feldman 
1981) and Culture and the Evolutionary Process (Boyd and Richerson 1985). These works 
laid the foundations of cultural evolution and established the field as a mathematically 
rigorous investigation of cultural patterns and change. The models presented in these books 
again borrowed their basic structure from traditional genetic models of evolution, extending 
this structure to include more features of cultural transmission that do not appear in genetic 
systems (for example transmission biases, one-to-many transmission, guided variation and 
copy error).  
 As the field of cultural evolution grew, criticisms of it began to appear (Gould 1991; 
Pinker 1997; Bloch 2000; Sperber 1996). Some differences between biological and cultural 
evolution, for example that cultural evolution, unlike biological evolution, allowed for a kind 
of Lamarkian inheritance (Maynard Smith 1986; Mesoudi 2011) were solved through 
modifications to genetic models allowing these extra processes to occur (for example through 
the inclusion of horizontal transfer of traits). However other objections proved more 
challenging to address. In particular, the use of genetic analogies and methods in modelling 
cultural change was challenged, as 1) researchers were unable to characterise the exact nature 
of a unit of cultural transmission that could be directly analogous to the gene in genetic 
evolution and 2) cultural transmission was not considered accurate enough to allow 
transmission of intact traits (Sperber 1996; Atran 2001).  
Parallel to this formal theory, in 1976 Dawkins suggested that cultural traits could be 
conceptualised as ‘memes’ that could be retained, inherited and mutated by means that were 
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directly analogous to genetic inheritance. Memes were self-propagating entities selected for 
features like ‘stickiness’ (propensity to remain in the mind) and ‘catchiness’ (the propensity 
to be passed from one mind to another) (Dawkins 1976; Blackmore 1999). In this 
characterisation, the human mind was a meme-machine shaped by the memes to allow their 
propagation and evolution. The field of memetics relied on rhetorical answers to the problem 
of particulate cultural evolution and waned quickly (Laland and Brown 2011). Conversely, 
cultural evolution responded with mathematical investigations. Henrich and Boyd (2002) 
answered the critics of cultural evolution through a series of models showing that a discrete 
‘substrate’ and error-free transmission were not in fact necessary for Darwinian evolution to 
occur. They showed that features unique to cultural transmission like conformity and prestige 
bias could compensate for high error rates in transmission and allow the propagation of 
favourable traits, even in the absence of high-fidelity copying. Deploying another model that 
assumed continuous rather than discrete mental representations of culture, Henrich and Boyd 
(2002) showed that a continuous-trait model with strong ‘attractors’ (individual cognitive 
transformation of cultural traits) and weak selection reduced to a discrete-trait model with 
weak selection. Henrich and Boyd (2002) succeeded in showing that, at least with respect to 
the problem of particulate evolution and copy error, the field of cultural evolution was on 
solid ground in using modified genetic models to reconstruct human cultural lineages, much 
as geneticists had done for genetic lineages. 
To date, social learning and cultural evolution has mainly been modelled using mean-
field approaches, for example population genetic models (Boyd & Richerson 1985; Cavalli-
Sforza & Feldman 1981) and non-spatial evolutionary game theory (Maynard Smith 1982). 
However, recently a number of new and borrowed modelling techniques have been brought 
to bear on cultural systems. These include reaction-diffusion systems that assume infinite 
populations (Cavalli-Sforza & Feldman 1981; Kandler & Steele 2009), phylogenetic and 
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cladistics methods (e.g. O’Brien et al. 2001; Mace and Holden 2005; Gray and Jordan 200; 
Gray and Atkinson 2003), interacting particle systems (Hauert 2001; Nowak & May 1992), 
network-based models (Watts 1999; Franz and Nunn 2009) and cultural demographic models 
(Powell et al. 2009; Li et al. 2000). These various methods are useful in different 
circumstances, depending on the scale and level of detail required in answering specific 
questions (Levins 1966). They may also give different results when applied to the same 
problem (Durrett and Levin 1994). Thus, the choice of method goes deeper than pure 
mathematical or computational convenience.  
The choice of model type forms a theme running through a number of chapters in this 
thesis. In particular, I explore how factors like the inclusion of assortment, spatial structure or 
population structure in cellular automaton models and population genetic models ultimately 
influences the outcome of the models and their explanatory power. Of course the technical 
problems involved in implementing spatial, cellular automata-based simulation models were 
in the past prohibitive but have been greatly reduced as more powerful computers have 
become available. The availability of simulation software like NetLogo makes spatially 
explicit cellular automata models easy to construct and analyse, while more flexible 
programming environments like Python, Wolfram Mathematica and MATLAB (used 
throughout this thesis) facilitate the construction of complex and bespoke models.  
Partially as a result of these technical limitations, early spatial models were largely 
analytical. Cavalli-Sforza & Feldman (1981) briefly considered the effects of spatial structure 
on cultural transmission systems. They examined the spread of information across a spatially 
stratified population, rather than the effects of space on the evolution of traits. Nonetheless, 
this analysis gave valid insight into the dynamics of the invasion of social learning and 
innovation (or defection and cooperation), allowing them to characterise the invasions as 
waves spreading in fronts, following reaction-diffusion dynamics.  
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The ‘interacting particle’ or agent-based approaches used in Chapters 2, 4, 5, 6 and 7 
are simulations in which computer agents are free to interact, reproduce, and, in this case, 
learn under strict conditions in controlled environments. In Chapters 4, 5 and 6 (covering the 
Social Learning Strategies Tournament), interactions are free and random between any two 
(or more if the parameters allow learning from many role models) individual members of the 
population. This type of model is a close parallel to the agent-based modelling framework 
(but not the strategic game) used by Axlerod (1980), which gave important insights into the 
population dynamics and evolution of cooperation. In Chapters 2 and 7 (models of the 
evolution of social learning and cultural niche construction respectively), this agent-based 
approach is extended to include spatial structure with a cellular automaton grid structure and 
imposing Moore neighbourhood (closest eight neighbour) interactions. This modelling 
framework is applied to the evolution of social learning in the first spatially explicit model of 
Rogers’ paradox presented in Chapter 2. 
 
Social Learning Strategies and Rogers’ Paradox 
A simple model proposed by anthropologist Alan Rogers (1988) is often used as a tool for 
investigating the evolution of social learning in general and of social learning strategies in 
particular (Rogers 1988; Boyd and Richerson 1995; Enquist et al. 2007). The model assumed 
that there were two behavioural traits available to learn, matching two possible environmental 
states. For each of the individuals in his population, choosing the correct behaviour for the 
current environment yielded a fitness payoff. Rogers’ model was a simple thought 
experiment resting on a series of basic assumptions and lent itself well to spatial extensions 
(Chapter 2) as well as extensions dealing specifically with different transmission biases and 
social learning strategies (Boyd and Richerson 1995; Enquist et al. 2006).  
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This model led to one of the most influential ideas in the study of the evolution of 
social learning to date, known as Rogers’ Paradox. Rogers (1988) found that when social 
learners (who copy the behaviour of a randomly selected member of the population) are in a 
minority, their fitness is higher than that of the asocial learners who directly sample the 
environment and who thus have a constant fitness. However, the fitness of social learners is 
frequency dependent and declines as the proportion of social learners increases (Figure 1.1A). 
This happens because as asocial learners decline in number there are fewer individuals 
producing accurate information about the appropriate behaviour to perform in the current 
environmental state (Figure 1.1B). Eventually, the population evolves to a mixed equilibrium 
where the fitness of social learners equals the fitness of asocial learners. In other words, 
contrary to the notion that copying increases absolute fitness, the average fitness in a mixed 
population at equilibrium is the same as it would be in a population of solely asocial learners. 
(Giraldeau et al. 2003; Henrich & McElreath 2003). 
 
Figure 1.1. Results from Rogers (1988): (A) As the frequency of social learners increases in the population, the 
fitness of social learners declines while the fitness of asocial learners remains constant and (B) as the frequency 
of social learners in the population increases and the number of asocial learners decreases, the frequency of 
social learners with correct information declines.  
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It is a testament to the surprise with which this result was met, that the effect Rogers 
detected was called a paradox, when strictly it is a non-paradoxical consequence of the 
frequency dependence of social learning in a population. While it was widely assumed that, 
as the basis of culture, social learning must be adaptive, Rogers showed that this need not be 
the case and that our understanding of the evolution of social learning was incomplete.  
In 1995 Boyd and Richerson attempted to recover Rogers’ original finding using 
models with a number of different sets of assumptions to ensure that the paradox was not an 
artefact of the model’s simplicity. Boyd and Richerson introduced spatial variation in the 
environment, allowed asocial learning errors to occur, allowed strategic choice of high-fitness 
role models and thus what they termed ‘biased transmission’, and extended the model to 
include more than two behavioural traits. Each of these extensions led to the same robust 
result: social learning did not increase the mean fitness of the population. This finding 
resembles the producer-scrounger frequency dependence observed in social foraging models 
with social learners acting as information parasites (Barnard and Sibly 1981; Giraldeau and 
Caraco 2000; Giraldeau et al. 2002). Boyd and Richerson (1995) reasoned that Rogers’ result 
would arise in any evolutionary game where social and asocial learners played against each 
other and the value of the learned information remained frequency independent. They 
suggested that cumulative culture or strategic combinations of social and asocial learning 
would solve the paradox, allowing culture to be fitness enhancing.  
There have now been many proposed solutions to Rogers’ paradox (discussed at 
length in Chapters 2, 4 and 10). One of the most important and general of these solutions is 
the selective use of social and asocial learning embodied in the concept of ‘social learning 
strategies’ (Aoki & Nakahashi 2008; Boyd & Richerson 1985; Henrich & McElreath 2003; 
Laland 2004; Kendal et al. 2009). The key idea is that natural selection is expected to fashion 
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evolved psychological rules that specify when an individual should copy others and from 
whom they should learn.  
According to this argument, the blind, random social learning that was assumed in 
Rogers’ original model is replaced by more strategic copying, which combines interaction 
with, and learning directly from, the environment with the use of social information (‘when’ 
strategies or direct biases e.g. Table 1.1A). Directed social learning where individuals learn 
strategically from carefully chosen role models like those who are older or more successful 
(‘who’ strategies/indirect biases e.g. Table 1.1B) or where individuals attend to the frequency 
of traits within populations (frequency dependent biases Table 1.1C) have also been explored 
both theoretically and experimentally and many have been shown to confer fitness benefits 
(Boyd and Richerson 1988; Boyd and Richerson 1995).  
 
Table 1.1 Example social learning strategies/ biases 
 
(A) Direct biases and ‘when’ 
strategies 
Theoretical support Empirical evidence  
Copy when dissatisfied  Schlag 1998 Galef et al. 2008 
Copy when asocial learning is 
costly 
Boyd and Richerson 1985 Templeton and Giraldeau 1996  
Copy when uncertain Boyd and Richerson 1985 Galef et al. 2008; McElreath et al. 
2005 
Copy when payoffs drop Chapters 4, 5 and 6, this 
thesis 
Grüter et al. 2010; Seeley and Town 
1992; Biesmeijer and Seeley 2005 
(B) Indirect bias   
Copy successful individuals Laland 2004; Henrich and 
Gil-White 2001 
Coolen et al. 2003; Hewlett and 
Cavalli-Sforza 1986; Mesoudi and 
O’Brien 2008 
Copy kin Boyd and Richerson 1985; 
Boyd and Richerson 1988 
Griffiths 2003; Franks and Richardson 
2006; Von Frisch 1967 
(C) Frequency-dependent 
bias 
  
Copy the majority Henrich and Boyd 1998 Chou & Richerson 1992; Lefebvre & 
Giraldeau 1994 
Conformity bias Boyd and Richerson 1985 Morgan et al. 2012 
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Enquist et al. (2007) extended the Rogers model to allow a social learning strategy 
‘critical social learning’ to play the evolutionary game outlined by Rogers with social 
learners and asocial learners. Critical social learners would use social learning first and 
would use asocial learning only if social learning failed to give the right answer. Enquist et 
al. also adjusted the regime of environmental change ensuring that changes in the 
environment could not reverse previous changes. Rogers’ model assumed that those partaking 
in individual learning always found the correct solution for the environment at that time. 
Enquist et al. (2007) relaxed this assumption too, by introducing a parameter describing the 
efficacy of asocial learning, which varied between 0 and 1. This more general model found 
that the combination of adaptation and inventiveness offered by critical social learning led to 
a solution of Rogers’ paradox in which critical social learners always out-competed pure 
social learners and under most circumstances, asocial learners as well.  
Enquist et al. claimed that the success of critical social learning, was due to the 
adaptive evaluation and filtering of information. The individuals deploying the critical social 
learning strategy necessarily evaluated the adaptiveness of the solution they had obtained and, 
using this information, they then decided whether to learn again (this time through asocial 
learning). Whether or not their results hold when individual learners, for example, were given 
a similar capacity for evaluation and a second chance to learn individually was not examined 
even though the importance of the filtering effect itself was repeatedly stressed. The real 
advantage to conditional strategies like critical social learning and its converse ‘conditional 
social learning’ where individuals first try asocial learning and use social learning only if this 
fails, is that they do not lead to the fitness depression associated with pure social learning. 
Conditional social learning was also found to be a similar solution to Rogers’ paradox (see 
Chapter 2; Enquist et al. 2007). A potentially contentious feature of these two strategies is that 
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they effectively get an extra round of learning for free, relative to pure strategies as well as 
having a sense of the optimality of their behaviour before deciding to learn again. 
Chapters 2, 4, 5 and 6 investigate the circumstances under which one would expect 
social learning strategies to be favoured by natural selection and what forms these strategies 
might take. 
Chapter 2 is a cellular automaton model of the evolution of social learning strategies 
that pays particular attention to the effect of space on the results and implications of Rogers’ 
paradox. This model shows that the presence of space, while providing one possible solution 
to the original paradox, also introduces another counterintuitive finding that the original 
Rogers model failed to detect: that space can allow social learners to increase in frequency, 
even as they reduce overall fitness.  
Enquist et al. (2007) assumed that the fitness functions associated with behavioural 
traits were discrete, meaning that a solution matching the environment gets the maximum 
fitness payoff and any other solution gets no fitness payoff at all. The simulation model 
presented in Chapter 2 replaces this binary fitness payoff with a payoff distribution in which 
the best solution is rewarded with a maximum payoff while others getting progressively 
further away from the ideal are rewarded with a lower payoff tending towards zero. In other 
words, the model assumes that behaviour can be aligned on a continuous distribution that 
specifies its degree of match to the environmental context. This payoff distribution allows the 
model to capture the ‘harshness’ of an environment, with a harsher environment giving a 
steeper decline in payoffs when moving away from the best solution (Figure 1.2). 
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Figure 1.2: The ‘harshness’ of an environment as modelled in Chapter 2. A harsher environment penalises 
behavioural distance from the optimal behaviour more harshly than a milder environment.  
 
Chapter 2 compares the relative effectiveness of asocial learning, random social 
learning and the two aforementioned strategic forms of social learning -conditional social 
learning and critical social learning. The analysis shows that while social learning strategies 
provided solutions to Rogers’ paradox there were conditions under which it is reasonable to 
expect random social learning to be favoured, such as a high cost of asocial learning in a 
relatively harsh environment with few behavioural traits to choose from. As discussed in 
Chapter 2, this is similar to the idea of neutral drift in practices like pottery making, where 
the chances of producing something aesthetically pleasing may be low, but there are a range 
of examples available to copy, all of which have previously been selected because they are, to 
some degree, pleasing.  
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The Social Learning Strategies Tournament 
As described above, much recent empirical and theoretical work now supports the idea of 
selective and strategic use of social learning (Boyd and Richerson 1985; van Bergen et al. 
2004; Kendel et al. 2009). This has led to the question of which strategies are best to use and 
when is best to use them. This would have been intractable to address as an analytical 
problem and difficult to address using standard simulation approaches. The Social Learning 
Strategies Tournament provided a means to compare the effectiveness of a large number of 
strategies in a standard environment.  
The tournament was a large-scale, computer-based, open competition run and 
analysed between 2008 and 2009. It invited participants to submit learning strategies that they 
thought would best enable hypothetical agents to survive in a complex and changing 
simulation environment. Agents using different strategies competed in a virtual environment, 
first in a round-robin competition and finally in a melee with a series of changing 
environmental parameters (full details are given in Chapter 4). Chapter 4 presents the original 
tournament analysis and examines what features of the strategies contributed to their success 
(such as timing of learning moves, level of environment estimation and amount of social 
learning), and what mixture of social learning, asocial learning and exploiting those acts to 
gain fitness benefits was optimal.  
Chapter 5 goes on to examine what types of cultures different strategies generate, in 
terms of how many cultural traits the population could innovate and maintain, how long these 
cultural traits remained in the population and how evenly spread those traits were among 
individuals. The analysis showed that strategies relying on social learning to different extents 
could create cultures with different characteristics and importantly that (as discussed in 
Chapters 5 and 10) an increased reliance on social learning alone could generate cultures that 
mimicked some key characteristics of human culture such as large amounts of cultural 
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knowledge persisting for long periods of time, some semblance of conformity and rapid 
turnover in behaviour.  
The effects of the use of memory and future planning in the ultimate success or failure 
of the strategies in round 1 of the tournament are examined in Chapter 6. Here the analysis 
focussed on the first (round -robin) round in order to consider the types of memory and future 
planning used by successful as well as less successful strategies. The top ten strategies from 
stage 1 made generally made good use of their access to memory where lower ranking 
strategies did not. Although the tournament did not specifically hard-code the ability to use 
mental time travel, some strategies engaged in behaviour that was similar to mental time 
travel as defined in animal research (Clayton et al. 2003), with aspects of discounted memory 
and future planning. The agents used their memories of past returns on behaviour to predict 
future changes in the environment, relating these predictions to their future moves.  
 
The Evolution of Teaching 
Certain high-fidelity forms of social learning (such as teaching and imitation) are thought to 
contribute to the particular success of human social learning (Boyd and Richerson 1985; 
Dean et al. 2012; Enquist et al. 2010) and are useful to investigate in close detail. Chapter 3 
presents a mathematical model of the evolution of teaching, a uniquely cooperative form of 
social learning. Unlike other social learning mechanisms, when teaching, demonstrators pay a 
cost to impart information to their pupils. This cost raises the interesting question of when it 
pays to engage in costly information donation and when the costs outweigh the inclusive 
fitness benefits. Caro and Hauser (1992) proposed a functional definition of ‘teaching’ 
applicable to animals, in which a tutor is said to teach if it 1) modifies its behaviour in the 
presence of a pupil, 2) suffers some cost, and 3) promotes the pupil’s learning. Using this 
definition, researchers have reported putative cases of teaching in species including ants, 
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bees, pied babblers, meerkats, and cats (Franks and Richardson 2006; Leadbeater et al. 2006; 
Thornton and McAuliffe 2006; Raihani and Ridley 2008; Rapaport and Brown 2008).  
Perhaps the most compelling example of animal teaching occurs in the meerkats of 
the Kalahari (Suricata suricatta) (Thornton and McAuliffe 2006). Meerkats are obligate 
cooperative breeders and their groups contain one breeding pair and between 2 and 40 
‘helpers’ who provision young pups with food. Some of the prey items available to the 
meerkats, for example scorpions, are dangerous and information on how to safely process and 
eat them must be learned. Meerkat helpers kill these dangerous prey items before presenting 
them to pups when these pups are very young. As the pups grow, the helpers provide 
progressively more mobile and dangerous prey items (for example an immobilised scorpion 
with the sting removed, followed by a mobile scorpion with no sting, followed by a full live 
scorpion). In this way meerkat pups are shaped to learn how to deal with this prey 
demonstrably faster than if they were provided with live scorpions from birth (Thornton and 
McAuliffe 2006). Thornton and McAuliffe showed that meerkat helpers were attentive to the 
age of the pups being provisioned and showed, through playback experiments, that more 
intact food items were delivered to older pups and more attenuated food items were brought 
to younger pups. When the begging calls of young meerkats were played to the helpers they 
processed the food significantly more than when the begging calls of older pups were played. 
Overall, the behaviour satisfies the three conditions for teaching specified by Caro and 
Hauser (1992) since the authors show through a series of experiments that the teachers 
modify their behaviour in the presence of naïve conspecifics, that providing the pups with 
processed food and later with mobile prey is considerably more costly to meerkat helpers in 
terms of time than providing only dead prey and finally, that meerkats taught in this way 
were significantly more likely to safely process a live scorpion as compared to their untaught 
companions (Thornton and McAuliffe 2006).  
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Other cases of animal teaching include the tandem running behaviour of the ant 
Temnothorax albipennis (Franks and Richardson 2006). These social insects use tandem 
running to guide their conspecifics to new nesting sites when their current site is no longer 
inhabitable or to new sources of food. Although the guide ants can (and sometimes do) carry 
their naïve conspecifics to the new location, this inhibits learning as the naïve ants are carried 
upside down and facing backwards, unable to orientate themselves or attend to landmarks. 
When tandem running, the naïve ant is in contact with the guide ant’s abdomen at all times, 
when contact is lost the guide ant stops and waits until contact is re-established before 
continuing on the journey allowing time for the pupil to attend to landmarks and learn the 
route. This was shown to quadruple the time taken to reach the new location, representing a 
considerable time cost in comparison to carrying, and satisfying Caro and Hauser’s condition 
that a costly change in behaviour must occur in the presence of a naïve conspecific. Caro and 
Hauser’s final condition for teaching was that the change in behaviour must enhance the 
pupil’s learning. In the case of tandem running ants, ants that were guided to a new location 
certainly learned the route they should take, although it was not demonstrated experimentally 
that they could find the location more quickly than naïve individuals. The case of tandem 
running ants led Franks and Richardson (2006) to propose an addition to the definition of 
teaching. As well as demanding a costly change in behaviour and enhanced learning, they 
proposed that feedback between teacher and pupil (such as the abdomen tapping and contact 
seen between teacher and pupil ants) was also a necessary condition for teaching.  
A putative case of animal teaching was also reported in another social insect, the 
honeybee (Apis mellifera). The bees engage in a ‘waggle dance’, which has been decoded by 
researchers and contains geographic information on the distance, direction and quality of 
nearby food sources and nesting sites (vonFrisch 1967; Seeley et al. 2000). This dance occurs 
in view of naïve workers who then gain information about the location of the food source. 
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More recently, it has been shown that the bees may also engage in a kind of feedback in some 
circumstances, giving ‘stop signals’ to the dancing bees when a sufficient number of naïve 
bees have witnessed dances, gained information and moved to a new nesting site (Seeley and 
Visscher 2004). 
While cases of animal teaching remain controversial, and their relationship with 
human teaching is unclear (Csibra 2007; Leadbeater et al. 2006; Premack 2007), these cases 
of teaching raise a number of questions that Chapter 3 endeavours to answer: ‘What do these 
species have in common that led to the evolution of teaching?’; ‘Why is teaching not more 
widespread in animals?’; ‘Why is it that intelligent animals such as chimpanzees seemingly 
do not teach if ants and bees are capable of doing so?’, and finally ‘How did a very general 
capability for teaching evolve in the human lineage?’. 
The model presented in Chapter 3 is an investigation of the evolution of teaching 
using analytical population genetic models, which may have implications not only for our 
understanding of the evolution of social learning but also for the search for the evolutionary 
roots of human cooperation and cumulative culture. While most teaching meets current 
definitions of cooperation (West et al. 2007), it being favoured in the tutor because it 
promotes the acquisition of fitness-enhancing information in the pupil, certain unique features 
specific to teaching render a specialised treatment necessary. These include the fact that 
taught information can be acquired through means other than teaching (e.g. through trial-and-
error learning or inadvertent social learning), and that the dynamics of information transfer 
differ considerably from the dynamics of the spread and accumulation of physical resources. 
These differences mean that the evolution of teaching is not explained by contemporary 
theory of the evolution of cooperation (Sachs et al. 2004; Lehmann & Keller 2006; West et 
al. 2007).  
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While there has been extensive research into topics such as the evolution of social 
learning (Cavalli-Sforza and Feldman 1981; Boyd and Richerson 1985; Feldman and 
Zhivotovsky 1992), learned communication (Boyd, Gintis and Bowles 2010; Kirby, Cornish 
and Smith 2008; Kirby, Dowman and Griffiths 2007), and learned cooperation (Boyd and 
Richerson 1985; Fehr and Fischbacher 2003; Gintis 2003; Boyd et al. 2003, Peck and 
Feldman, 1986), Chapter 3 represents the first step towards a formal theory of the evolution 
of teaching.  
 
Cultural Niche Construction 
Finally, Chapters 7, 8 and 9 make the transition from the evolution of social learning to 
cultural niche construction. Niche construction is a process by which an organism alters the 
environment in which it exists and thereby modifies the selection pressures to which it, and 
other species, are subject (Lewontin 1983; Odling Smee et al. 2003; Laland et al. 1999). This 
encompasses both ecosystem engineering in which the organism alters its environment - a 
beaver building a dam for instance, or a bird building a nest - and the evolutionary feedback 
from the changed environment to the constructor, its descendants, and other organisms that 
cohabit its environment. Niche construction theory, unlike more traditional models of 
evolution, considers both ecological and genetic inheritance.   
Humans are particularly potent niche constructors, not least because the 
transformations that they bring about in environmental states are reliant on cultural 
knowledge (Odling-Smee et al. 2003, Smith 2007, Laland et al. 2000, Laland et al. 2010, 
Laland and O’Brien 2010). Even in the absence of culture, analytical genetic models of niche 
construction (Laland et al. 1996; Laland et al. 1999; Kylafis and Loreau 2008) were 
successful in showing that organisms could, through their own actions, alter the course of 
their evolution. Such models showed that niche construction could allow accumulation of 
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beneficial resources which could favour costly niche constructing traits through inclusive 
fitness effects (Lehmann 2008), allow organisms to alter their environments rendering harsh 
environments habitable in the long term through resource creation (Kylafis and Loreau 2008) 
and alter the ability of species to coexist in one ecological niche either by driving niche 
constructors to extinction through a ‘tragedy of the commons’ in resource creation and use, or 
by promoting polymorphic, specialised niche constructors (Krakauer et al. 2009).  
Although, generally, niche construction is considered to be ecological in nature, it is 
also true that much human niche construction is uniquely reliant on cultural traits. Where 
cultural practices alter the selection pressures on the human genome they may thereby be 
regarded as cases of niche construction. It is important to understand the impact that these 
changes have on human evolution and genetic variation. The details of this interaction are 
also of relevance. For example, if cultural traits are transmitted through vertical transmission 
will this generate genetic variation that is qualitatively different to that produced by 
horizontal transmission? What difference if any does the inclusion of realistic assumptions 
about spatial interactions make?  
Early niche construction models adopted a two-locus population genetic approach 
(Laland et al. 1996; Laland et al. 1999), with each individual genotype having two loci, a 
niche-constructing locus, E, and a resource-dependent ‘recipient’ locus, A. Each of these, in 
turn, had two possible alleles: at the E locus E, a niche constructing allele and e a non-niche 
constructing allele, and at the A locus A, an allele that increased in fitness with a change in 
resource frequency (thus affected by local niche constructing activity) or a, an allele that 
decreased in fitness. These models, however, rested on strict assumptions of infinite 
population size and lack of stochastic processes.  
Silver and DiPaolo (2006) developed a spatial version of these models. They assumed 
finite populations in a simulation framework, allowing a certain amount of stochasticity to 
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affect the population dynamics. They also situated the populations in a spatially stratified, 
cellular automaton framework. These alterations actually increased the parameter space 
across which niche construction and recipient alleles could survive and become fixed in a 
population. Silver and DiPaolo (2006) suggested two reasons why the effects of space made 
such a profound difference to the outcome of the model in terms of both likelihood of alleles 
fixing in the population and the range of parameter values over which fixation was possible. 
Firstly, clustering buffered costly alleles for a time, allowing them to become established in 
the population and to spread when conditions improved through their own niche construction 
(Chapters 7 and 10). Secondly, a localized resource distribution allowed strong linkage 
disequilibrium (a non-random association of independent alleles) to form between niche 
constructing traits and recipient alleles. In other words, niche-constructing traits can spread 
by creating conditions that favour their own hitchhiking. The models presented in Chapter 7 
extend Silver and DiPaolo’s analysis using spatially explicit gene-culture co-evolutionary 
models to investigate whether, and under what circumstances, cultural niche-constructing 
practices can run away with genetic variation. The models also ask to what extent this 
dynamic is affected by cultural transmission biases operating against the niche-constructing 
trait, a viability cost to the genotype favoured by cultural niche construction, and the cost of 
cultural niche construction, modelled as a viability deficit to the cultural practice. 
 
Cultural evolution and society 
The insights into gene-culture coevolution driven by niche construction are of potential 
importance to the understanding of recent human evolution. However the processes that 
underlie cultural change itself are also of interest. Cultural niche construction can drive 
culture-culture interactions where the frequency of one trait in a population can alter the 
frequency of another. Chapter 8 is a general model of cultural niche construction capable of 
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considering both the kind of gene-culture process discussed in Chapter 7 and these culture-
culture interactions. The model can be used, as described in the discussion of the chapter, to 
examine the cultural evolution of such diverse systems as religion and fertility, the evolution 
of large-scale conflict and the evolution of sex ratio bias in Asia and North Africa. Although 
spatial effects are not explicitly modelled here, it is important to note that the effect of space 
is to restrict free and random association and interaction between individuals. Here this is 
achieved through the introduction of assortative mating. This implies a kind of population 
structure resting on the assumption that similar individuals may be more likely to interact 
with each other than with less similar individuals (Cavalli-Sforza and Feldman 1981). The 
effects of positive assortative mating are similar to the effects of local reproduction and 
dispersal in an agent-based model: individuals are more likely to reproduce with those 
sharing their traits.  
Through the lens of cultural evolution we can examine both human evolution in the 
recent past and the evolutionary trajectory we find ourselves taking now. It is easy to see 
every-day examples of how culture has altered the selective pressures to which we, as a 
species, are subject. For example it is clear from both empirical and theoretical work that 
genes for lactase persistence coevolved with human dairy farming practices in the recent past 
(Simoons 1970; Aoki 1986; Feldman and Cavalli-Sforza 1989; Durham 1991). The evolution 
of cooperation has also been modelled using cultural evolutionary approaches showing that 
the current high levels of human pro-sociality may be the result of gene-culture co-evolution 
between genetic predispositions toward cooperation and cultural norms enforcing it (Boyd et 
al. 2003; Fehr and Fischbacher 2003; Gintis 2003). This has led to the emergence of the idea 
of ‘cultural group selection’ where populations maintain cultural boundaries through 
transmission of norms and beliefs among its members and through strong reciprocity (a 
combination of indirect reciprocity and punishment that maintains cooperation), and groups 
 32 
displaying advantageous cultural traits outgrow other groups (Boyd and Richerson 1985). In 
this way in-group cooperation is fostered along with out-group conflict.  
Cultural group selection can potentially favour what Richerson and Boyd (1998) 
termed ‘tribal instincts’ such as hostility to out-group members and in-group altruism. This 
raises the possibility that cultural evolution and gene-culture coevolution may also allow us 
to examine some of the more harmful aspects of human culture like the human propensity to 
wage large-scale, highly organised war, which is unequalled in the animal kingdom (Choi 
and Bowles 2007; Richerson and Boyd 1998; Bowles 2009). The evolution of in-group 
altruism and parochialism in the human lineage was investigated using an agent-based 
simulation model by Choi and Bowles (2007), who found that under conditions present in the 
late Pleistocene, the coevolution of altruism and parochialism was plausible. Bowles (2009) 
shows with archaeological evidence from early humans that the levels of inter-group conflict 
seen in hunter-gathers of the Pleistocene was sufficient to allow the evolution of in-group 
altruism through cultural group selection. This analysis was extended in an analytical 
framework to include life history features of populations (such as group size, migration rates 
and division of labour between sexes in society) by Lehmann and Feldman (2008) who 
showed that the selection pressures on traits such as belligerence and increased fighting 
ability, which they termed ‘bravery’, which endowed combatants with a higher probability of 
success in conflicts, could be substantial. The analysis showed that tribal warfare was a 
response to a lack of resources for both combatant and non-combatant members of society 
since the resources gained through warfare benefitted all of society and did not increase 
conflict within a society.  
However as Hinde (1997) points out, the evolutionary forces that supported small-
scale conflict in tribal societies are unlikely to be the same in the large-scale industrial 
conflicts we see today. Rather it is the culturally driven exploitation of genetic 
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predispositions towards self-defense that leads to modern large-scale conflicts. The model in 
Chapter 8 briefly investigates paramaterisations of a cultural niche construction model 
designed to reflect modern, as opposed to ancestral, warfare. Under these conditions, the 
model shows that a predisposition toward warfare alone cannot fix in the population and that 
for a given set of parameters there is just one polymorphic equilibrium between peaceable 
and warlike traits.  
As discussed in Chapter 10, cultural niche construction modelling has the potential to 
become a useful tool in guiding cultural policy makers. Chapter 9 again addresses the 
problem of sex-ratio skew in Asia and North Africa, concentrating especially on the 
implications of changes in policy governing reproduction in China. The sex-ratio at birth 
(SRB) is the ratio of live male births to live female births. This has been found to be about 
1.05 for most large human populations (Coale 1991). The SRB can be dramatically elevated 
by practices reflecting a cultural bias toward preferences for male children. These practices 
include widespread gender-based infanticide of girls or sex-selective abortion of female 
foetuses. The human cost of these practices is estimated to range from 60 million (Coale 
1991) to 107 million (Sen 1990) worldwide and this skew in SRB has been reported in India, 
Bangladesh, China, Pakistan, Nepal, South Korea, Afghanistan, and across parts of North 
Africa (Croll 2000; Das Gupta et al. 2003; Klasen and Wink 2003). Although the results are 
similar, the root causes of the skew in SRB in each of these regions are different. While India 
and China have two of the worst sex ratio problems globally, the societies in which the 
problems arose are substantially different in terms of governmental structures, enforced 
restrictions on reproduction and marriage practices, but are somewhat similar in the status of 
women in society or access to education (Croll 2000). The wide differences between societies 
sharing similar problems means that models of the skew in sex-ratio need to be specifically 
targeted to a particular societal structure. Chapter 9 concentrates on the sex-ratio skew in 
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China, investigating the interaction between marriage practices, patriarchy and government 
mandated restrictions on reproduction. The model uses cultural niche construction, coupled 
with traditional two-locus cultural evolution models and demographic Leslie matrix 
modelling to estimate the possible impact of policy intervention (such as advertising 
campaigns or reducing reproductive restrictions) on the sex ratio skew and resulting social 
problems (see Chapter 9; Ebenstein and Sharygin 2009; Li et al. 2000; Tuljapakur et al. 
1995) in China.  
Overall, I aim to show that human society, with its complex institutions, regulations 
and norms can be understood and perhaps even altered for the better when researchers 
understand what aspects of humanity and its evolutionary past have allowed us to become 
masters of social learning. Humans have accumulated enough knowledge to go to the moon 
and back, build vast cooperative cities, move food and water from areas of plenty to areas of 
deprivation, irrigate deserts and otherwise alter our environment, at times beyond recognition. 
Understanding how we alone are capable of generating and maintaining this knowledge over 
centuries can ultimately help us to understand how culture can lead us, on one hand, to 
cooperative acts on a scale unprecedented in evolutionary time, and on the other, to the 
depths of self-made humanitarian disasters. Examining how Darwinian processes at a genetic 
and cultural level shape humanity is a challenge of increasing importance. We need to know 
where our culture has come from in order to help determine where it will go next.  
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SECTION 1, CHAPTER 2: 
ROGERS’ PARADOX RECAST AND RESOLVED: 
POPULATION STRUCTURE AND THE EVOLUTION OF SOCIAL LEARNING STRATEGIES 
 
 
Material from this chapter is published as: 
 
 
Rendell, L, Fogarty, L & Laland, KN 2010, Rogers' paradox recast and resolved: population 
structure and the evolution of social learning strategies, Evolution, vol 64, no. 2, pp. 534-548. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Anthropologist Alan Rogers (1988) first pointed out the ‘paradox’ inherent in the 
observation that the expected fitness of social learners at equilibrium would be no 
greater than the average individual fitness in a population of asocial learners. When 
rare, the fitness of social learners exceeds that of asocial learners but declines with 
frequency as there are fewer asocial learners producing adaptive information in a 
changing environment. The population evolves to a mixed evolutionarily stable 
strategy (ESS) where, by definition, the fitness of social learners equals that of 
asocial learners (Giraldeau et al. 2003; Henrich and McElreath 2003). This finding is 
now commonly known as Rogers’ paradox (Boyd and Richerson 1985), so called 
because it contrasts with a commonly held assertion that culture enhances fitness. 
Although Rogers’ result is not inherently paradoxical, it appears to conflict with the 
observation that social learning underlies the effect of human culture on our 
ecological success and population growth.  
One resolution to this conundrum is to recognise that in a changing 
environment selection ought to have fashioned in our minds specific evolved rules 
(Boyd and Richerson 1985), or social learning strategies (Laland 2004), that specify 
the circumstances under which individuals should exploit information from others, 
and from whom they should learn. Previous theoretical studies have established that 
the average individual fitness at equilibrium can be enhanced if individuals switch 
between reliance on asocial and social learning (Boyd and Richerson 1995; Kameda 
and Nakanishi 2003). For instance, Enquist et al. (2007) showed that a strategy of 
‘critical social learning’, where individuals only adopt asocial learning if social 
learning proves unsatisfactory, out-competes pure asocial and social learning 
strategies. Boyd and Richerson (1995) also showed that average fitness is higher than 
 38 
that in a population of asocial learners if social learners can improve their learned 
behaviour so that there is cumulative cultural evolution. 
 This study extended the above analyses in three important respects. First, it 
investigates the effects of social and asocial learning in a spatially explicit context. 
There are several reasons why a spatial framework is appropriate for such analyses 
(see Chapter 10 for a more thorough discussion). Studies in other contexts have 
shown that spatial factors can profoundly affect evolutionary outcomes (Nowak and 
May 1992; Kerr et al. 2006; Silver and Di Paolo 2006). Some human cultural 
phenomena, such as agricultural practices, are physically grounded in space (Durham 
1991). Moreover, social learning is now known to be widespread in vertebrates and 
even some invertebrates (Heyes and Galef Jr. 1996; Leadbeater and Chittka 2007), 
many of which are sedentary and/or territorial. In such cases, an analysis that 
recognizes that individuals are often more likely to learn from their near neighbours 
is appropriate. More generally, by comparing well-mixed and spatially structured 
populations, the analyses presented here allow us to characterize the extremities of a 
range of unstructured to structured populations. Learning in a structured population 
is a special case of bias in social learning, where nearby individuals are preferred as 
models to distant ones, and in this respect spatially explicit analyses are more 
generally instructive with respect to the effects of bias (Kameda and Nakanishi 
2002).  
 Second, previous analyses have been generally reliant on deterministic 
models (in the sense that they ignore random events), although one recent exception 
is Whitehead and Richerson (2009) who incorporated Brownian noise or ‘red noise’, 
allowing the environment to vary in large but rare events. However, stochasticity 
could play an important role in affecting the balance of social and asocial learning, 
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and the nature of the equilibria reached. This analysis utilises a stochastic model that 
allows individuals to disperse and to learn either locally or globally, thereby allowing 
us to tease apart the effects of drift and space.  
 Third, and finally, this analysis investigates the impact of a number of 
parameters that potentially affect reliance on social and asocial sources of 
information, but which hitherto have either not been explored, or not been 
investigated in combination. These parameters include the degree of temporal and 
spatial variation in the environment, environmental harshness (the extent to which 
suboptimal behaviour reaps fitness benefits), the number of environmental states 
(which equates to the number of different ways of performing a suboptimal 
behaviour), and the relative costs of social and asocial learning. 
This analysis shows that spatial structure reinforces Rogers’ paradox, because 
social learning can spread even when it decreases the average fitness of individuals 
below that of asocial learners. It also shows that there are circumstances under which 
the strategy of pure, unbiased, social learning increases the average fitness of 
individuals above that of asocial learners (unbiased here means choosing a model to 
copy at random). Analysis of the model finds that two conditional strategies, the 
critical social learner (learn asocially only when copying fails) and conditional social 
learner (copy only when asocial learning fails), can both provide solutions to the 
aforementioned paradoxes, however some conditions where pure social learning out-
competes both conditional strategies exist, and thus where the paradox remains. 
Finally, the relative merits of critical and conditional social learning across a range of 
conditions are considered. This extends the findings of Enquist et al. (2007) to a 
stochastic, spatially explicit framework, and across a broader set of conditions.  
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THE MODEL 
The model runs on a square, x × x, toroidal environment, where each cell is occupied 
by a single individual, such that n = x2 is the population size. Each cell has an 
associated environmental state which can change over time, and environmental states 
can vary in space (i.e. between cells). In each time step, all individuals exhibit a 
behaviour (phenotype), which can change over time, according to the dictates of an 
evolved learning strategy (their genotype), which is fixed, and governs whether and 
when individuals learn asocially or socially. The neighbourhood of an individual 
consists of the eight surrounding cells (the Moore neighbourhood). For mathematical 
convenience, haploid asexual reproduction is assumed, such that individuals have 
only one parent. 
 
Environmental variability 
Each cell has a value representing its environmental state s, which takes an integer 
value between 1 and Ns, with adjacent integers representing similar environmental 
states. A ring structure made it possible for environments to step from Ns to 1, and 
vice-versa, such that there were no environmental ‘end states’. There were two types 
of environmental variation: (i) temporal only, where all cells have the same 
environmental state (s value) but this value can change over time, and (ii) spatio-
temporal, where, in addition, different cells can possess different s values. In the 
temporal-only condition, all cells switch simultaneously to a new, randomly chosen, 
value in the range [1, Ns] with probability ps. In the spatio-temporal condition, 
environmental variation occurs in two ways – perturbation of patches and single-cell 
changes. These two types of variation allowed control of the level of spatial auto-
correlation while also maintaining a reasonable degree of ecological validity. 
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Perturbation events convert all the cells in a randomly placed square to a single 
environmental state in the range [1, Ns], with each state having equal likelihood, and 
with a single perturbation event in each iteration (a single event per iteration was 
chosen for computational convenience; increasing the number of perturbations would 
have the simple effect of increasing the rate of environmental change, a parameter 
which was varied systematically in the simulations). The size of the perturbed square 
followed a power law distribution with the side length given by 8R-1/6 where R is 
uniform random in the interval [0, 1]. This perturbation regime was chosen for 
ecological validity as it produces relatively many small perturbations and occasionally 
large ones, as observed in real-world ecosystems (Langmead 2004). The use of a 
toroidal environment ensured that all cells had an equal probability of being affected 
by a perturbation event. Each individual cell subsequently switches state by a single 
step (i.e. from state 3 to state 2 or 4) with probability ps. Two conditions were 
implemented for these single step changes: cells change either (i) towards the average 
of their neighbours, if that average is different from its current state (spatially 
correlated condition) or (ii) in a random direction (random condition). These 
conditions produce variation in the level of spatial auto-correlation, measured as the 
probability of a cell’s neighbour being in the same environmental state as itself 
(henceforth pn). In the temporal-only condition, pn = 1, while in the spatio-temporal 
condition, spatially correlated change gives higher values of pn than random change.  
 
Behaviour, payoff and fitness 
Each individual is characterised by behaviour, b, which can take any integer value in 
the same range as the environment, 1 to Ns, and can change in each model iteration. 
Each individual’s genotype specifies a learning strategy. Two pure strategies were 
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considered, asocial learners (a) and random social learners (s), as well as two 
conditional strategies, conditional social learner and critical social learner (described 
above). An individual’s fitness, W, is defined by the difference between the 
environmental state (s) in the cell it occupies and the behaviour it currently shows, 
minus the cost of the learning strategy it uses: 
 
W = h!S ! cstrat      (2.1) 
 
where S is the number of steps between b and s implemented as a ring, 
 
S(b,s ) =
s ! b
Ns ! s ! b
"
#
$
%$
if
if
s ! b & Ns 2'( )*
s ! b > Ns 2'( )*
, 
 
h-S is the payoff associated with being S steps away from the ideal behaviour, and cstrat 
is the cost of the learning strategy (ca or cs for the costs of asocial or social learning, 
respectively, and some additive combination of these in the case of the two 
conditional strategies). In the case that cstrat >h-S, W is given a lower bound of zero. 
The parameter h can be interpreted as the ‘harshness’ of the environment, as 
increasing values increment the fitness penalty of behaviour not matching the 
environment. Higher h values also result in an increasingly non-linear payoff 
function, while as h→1 the payoff function approaches a linear, or ‘risk-neutral’ form.  
Note that this incremental fitness structure differs from previous models (e.g. Rogers 
1988; Enquist et al. 2007), which assumed a fitness payoff for learning the correct 
behaviour only, with any other behaviour receiving no payoff. In each model 
iteration, each individual reproduces with probability W, and the resultant offspring 
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always replaces an existing individual such that the population size remains constant 
across iterations (see Dispersal below). 
 
Mutation 
In general, offspring carry the same learning strategy as their parent, but at every 
reproduction event there is a fixed probability, m, of mutation, which results in an 
offspring with an alternative strategy. This mutation is how new strategies are 
introduced.  
 
Dispersal 
A juvenile developmental period exists during which offspring acquire their parent’s 
behaviour prior to dispersal. This occurs by asocial learning in the same environment 
as the parent in the case of asocial learners, and by observing the parent in the case of 
social learners. There are two simulated dispersal conditions. Local dispersal results 
in offspring replacing a randomly chosen neighbour of the parent. In contrast, global 
dispersal results in offspring replacing an individual chosen at random from the entire 
habitat, excluding the parent. In both conditions, individuals are chosen to be replaced 
irrespective of their fitness and age. Reproduction is synchronous, such that it is not 
possible for offspring to be replaced in the iteration in which they are born. 
 
Learning 
Asocial learners sample their environment and learn the appropriate behaviour, such 
that S = 0, with probability piOK, and acquire a random behaviour with probability 1–
piOK. Asocial learners pay a fixed cost ca irrespective of the learning outcome, such 
that if piOK = 1 then their fitness is constant at 1–ca. Social learners, in contrast, match 
 44 
the behaviour of a randomly chosen demonstrator individual at each iteration, with 
fixed cost cs, with demonstrators either chosen from the neighbourhood (local 
copying) or the entire population (global copying). Consistent with earlier theory 
(Boyd and Richerson 1985; Rogers 1988) ca >> cs. Initially the analysis is restricted to 
these two pure strategies and set piOK = 1, but subsequently the two conditional 
strategies, critical social learner and conditional social learner (Enquist et al. 2007) 
are introduced. Critical social learners first use social learning, at cost cs, but if this 
fails to produce a match to the environment, they then switch to asocial learning, at 
cost ca. Conditional social learners first try asocial learning, at cost ca, and only if this 
fails to produce a match, use social learning at cost cs. As conditional social learning 
only differs from asocial learning if there is a chance that asocial learning will not 
work, following Enquist et al. (2007) this analysis specifies  0 < piOK <1  when 
considering the conditional strategies. Thus with probability 1–piOK, asocial learners 
acquire a random behaviour. For these strategies it is assumed that individuals can 
know a candidate behaviour does not match the environment, without knowing the 
exact state of the environment. Individuals using these conditional strategies are 
forced to accept the final learning outcome they receive. For example, if a critical 
social learner switches to asocial learning it will acquire a random behaviour with 
probability piOK and is forced to accept that behaviour even if it returns a lower fitness 
than the behaviour it originally learned socially and rejected.  
 
Spatial population structure 
This analysis principally considered two conditions, termed local and global. In the 
local condition, both dispersal and copying were local – offspring disperse only to the 
neighbourhood and social learners copy only neighbours. In the global condition, 
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dispersal and copying were with respect to the entire population, as described above. 
These two conditions represent a maximum and minimum level of population 
structure within the model. Intermediate levels can be represented by simulations in 
which only learning is local (local learning) or only dispersal is local (local dispersal) 
and both these cases were considered in the initial exploration of spatial effects, 
however, the latter condition (local dispersal with global learning) is biologically 
rather less plausible than the other three. In this way the effect of population structure 
could be explored without altering other conditions. 
 
Demography 
In the general model, increasing or decreasing average individual fitness affects only 
the rate of population turnover, as the model specifies a fixed population size. While 
this assumption has utility in helping to understand the relative efficacy of alternative 
learning strategies, it does not allow the model to investigate the demographic 
consequences of changes in individual fitness. Therefore a variant of the model was 
constructed that did allow for demographic effects, by making the simple assumption 
that the probability of any individual surviving to the next iteration (psurvive) is related 
to their fitness by the equation psurvive= psurviveMin+ (1– psurviveMin)W, where psurviveMin is a 
parameter that defines the minimum probability an individual survives a model 
iteration and thus sets the strength of viability selection in the model. Thus it is 
possible for the population to vary in size between zero (extinction) and the maximum 
n, the latter representing the carrying capacity of the environment. In this case empty 
cells provide no model for social learners to copy, but are no more likely to be 
occupied by new offspring than cells that are already occupied. 
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Simulation details 
Each model iteration consisted of the following sequence of events: learning, 
followed by reproduction and dispersal, and then environmental change. For most 
simulations x is set at x = 80, giving a population size, n, of 6400 individuals. This 
value of n was chosen so as to be broadly representative of human populations (6400 
is close to the median for horticultural and herding societies, and intermediate 
between hunter-gatherer and agrarian societies, Lenski 1974). Mutation was set at m = 
0.0008, equating to five individuals per complete generation when n = 6400. While 
this is obviously high relative to natural rates of mutation in eukaryotes, reducing this 
rate does not qualitatively affect the outcomes, and the higher rate offers significant 
computational advantages in terms of time to equilibrium. All individuals were 
behaviourally naïve at the start of each simulation (i.e. b = 0). Below the results of 
sensitivity analyses investigating the extent to which the conclusions are robust across 
a range of biologically plausible values of n and m  are discussed. 
The effects of spatial variation in environmental conditions were explored by 
producing three spatial auto-correlation conditions, where the auto-correlation is 
expressed as the probability (pn) that two randomly chosen but neighbouring cells 
have the same environmental state (which is effectively the auto-correlation but with 
a ‘spatial lag’ of one cell). The three conditions were pn = 1 (no spatial variation at 
all), pn ≈ 0.44 and pn ≈ 0.2. The latter two values are approximate as they result from 
stochastic simulation runs, thus the actual realised value in each simulation varied 
around these values; the actual values were recorded during simulation runs. These 
simulations were run with Ns = 10, and local learning and dispersal, in order to 
explore conditions where Rogers’ paradox may not exist. Environmental harshness 
(h) was in the range 1.1≤ h ≤ 5. 
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Simulations were run for 2000 iterations, with 20 replications per parameter 
value, and from each simulation the mean proportion of each strategy over the final 
250 iterations of the run was recorded. Sensitivity analyses established that either 
increasing the number of iterations over which each simulation was run to 10,000, or 
increasing the number of runs per parameter set to 200, produced no change in the 
results. 
 First the performance of a pure unbiased social learning strategy invading a 
population of pure asocial learners was investigated and, unless otherwise specified, it 
was assumed that ps = 0.1, cs = 0, piOK = 1, with ca increasing from 0.01 to 0.7 in steps 
of 0.01. Subsequently the evolution of conditional strategies, again starting from a 
population of asocial learners was examined. All four genotypes (the two pure and 
two conditional strategies) were examined simultaneously, by considering the 
dynamics of a population of asocial learners capable of mutating to the other three 
genotypes. As conditional social learning only makes sense when there is a 
possibility of individual learning not working (i.e. piOK < 1), this comparison was 
made with piOK = 0.5. These analyses introduced spatial variation in the environment 
by setting pn ≈ 0.44. 
 
RESULTS 
Analysis of pure strategies 
Effect of local dispersal and learning 
First, the relative performance of the pure asocial and social learning strategies was 
examined in a spatially homogenous environment (pn = 1). Note that the global 
condition produced a qualitatively good fit to analytical expectations (Rogers 1988; 
Enquist et al. 2007) with respect to the magnitude of ca at which social learners will 
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invade, the resultant average final frequency of social learners, and the mean 
individual fitness in the population at run termination (Figure 2.1). Similar to Rogers’ 
(1988) model, in the global condition the mean individual fitness approximates that 
expected in a population of entirely asocial learners, although it is marginally higher 
than expected for large ca (Figure 2.1b), whilst social learning frequencies were 
slightly lower than the analytical prediction (Figure 2.1a). These discrepancies can be 
attributed to minor differences in the assumptions of this model compared with the 
cited analytical treatments (see discussion in this chapter). 
 
Figure 2.1. The effect of spatial population structure: global versus local dispersal and learning, 
showing (a) the proportion of social learners, and (b) mean individual fitness, at run termination, 
plotted against the cost of asocial learning (ca). In both, Ns = 1000, h = 2, and pn = 1. Points are means 
from 20 runs ± 95% confidence intervals. The vertical dashed line in the upper panel shows where 
analytical models (Enquist et al. 2007) predict non-zero equilibrium levels of social learners, with the 
curved dashed line giving the analytical prediction for the frequency of the social learning strategy. The 
dashed line in the lower panel shows the expected mean individual fitness in a population of asocial 
learners only.  
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Local dispersal and learning typically generates higher average final frequencies of 
social learners than global dispersal and learning, particularly for larger values of ca, 
and can lead to social learners reaching effective fixation (with an expected frequency 
of 1 – m). Moreover, under local conditions the mean individual fitness in the 
population is predicted to be less than that expected for a population consisting of 
asocial learners, under conditions where the frequency of social learners exceeds the 
analytical prediction. Thus, when population structure is imposed, not only does 
social learning invade and fail to increase mean individual fitness, it may actually 
invade to fixation and reduce fitness relative to a population containing only asocial 
learners. 
The observation that social learning spreads to near fixation in spite of the fact 
that it reduces average individual fitness introduces a new dimension to the debate 
surrounding Rogers’ paradox. This observation can be explained by comparing the 
fitness of social learners that have at least one asocial learner in their neighbourhood 
with those that do not (Figure 2.2). When learning and dispersal are local, social 
learners with at least one asocial learner in their neighbourhood have greater fitness 
than both social learners with no asocial learner in their neighbourhood (Figure 2.2a) 
and asocial learners (Figure 2.2b). This creates an edge effect in the contact zones 
between genotypes, and since social learners have greater fitness in these zones they 
can continue to increase in frequency even when, on average, social learners have 
lower fitness than asocial learners. Asocial learners cannot invade the regions 
dominated by social learners because their social learning neighbours will have a 
higher fitness immediately after an asocial learner mutates into their midst.  
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Figure 2.2. (a) Snapshot of a running simulation with local learning and dispersal and a spatially 
uniform environment, taken within a few iterations of an environmental state change. Left panel shows 
spatial distribution of learning strategies (black = asocial learner, white = social learner). Right panel 
shows the fitness of each individual; the lighter the cell, the higher the fitness value. Asocial learners 
have a fixed fitness (1-ca), which appears as grey. Social learners in the border regions have the highest 
fitness (appearing white in the right panel) even though most of the social learners have much lower 
fitness (appearing black). (b) Mean fitness of social learners plotted against the number of asocial 
learners in their neighbourhood over the same simulation (error bars show 95% CI). Dashed line shows 
fitness of asocial learners.  
 
In local learning and local dispersal conditions, where only one of learning or 
dispersal were local, local learning alone produced identical results to global learning 
and dispersal. In contrast, local dispersal with global learning gave intermediate 
!Number of asocial learners in neighbourhood 
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results, where some fixation of social learning was observed, but in a restricted 
parameter range compared to the global case. 
Thus far in the analysis, increasing or decreasing average individual fitness 
affects only the rate of population turnover because the model specifies a fixed 
population size. While helping to understand the relative efficacy of various learning 
strategies, this feature means it is not straightforward to understand the demographic 
consequences of changes in average individual fitness. Therefore the above 
simulations were run with a modified version of the model which allowed for 
demographic effects by making the simple assumption that the probability of any 
individual surviving to the next iteration is related to their fitness. When this model 
was run under the local conditions specified above, analysis obtained identical results 
in terms of social learner frequency and mean individual fitness, but with the 
confirmation that reduced mean individual fitness results in decreased population size, 
culminating in extinction when the average probability of reproduction approaches 
zero (W→0; Figure 2.3). When viability selection was relatively weak (i.e. the 
minimum survival probability, psurviveMin, was close to 1), there was a significant 
portion of the parameter space where social learning would approach fixation, 
resulting in a stable population with reduced size compared to one containing only 
asocial learners.  Stronger viability selection (psurviveMin << 1) under local conditions 
does not prevent the spread of social learners in spite of the fact that they reduce mean 
individual fitness to sufficiently high frequency that the population goes extinct 
(Figure 2.3). These results did not change whether the simulations started with 
populations size set to 1 (i.e. at carrying capacity) or 0.5 (half carrying capacity). 
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Figure 2.3. Demographic consequences of social learner invasion.  Results are from simulations run 
under identical conditions to the local condition in Figure 2.1 with the exception that the probability an 
individual survives a model iteration is proportional to its fitness. Top panel shows the proportion of 
social learners, middle mean individual fitness, and bottom panel population size at run termination, 
plotted against the cost of asocial learning (ca). Points are means from 20 runs ± 95% confidence 
intervals, and the dashed lines in the top and middle panels are identical to those in Figure 2.1. 
 
The above findings are generally robust across values of Ns (the number of possible 
environmental states) between 10 and 1000 and values of h (controlling the harshness 
of the penalty for sub-optimal behaviour) from 1.1 to 5, with one important exception. 
For small Ns (e.g. Ns = 10), and in the local condition only, it was seen that for large 
ca (e.g. ca ≥ ~0.5), the mean fitness of individuals in the population was elevated 
compared to that expected for a population of only asocial learners (Figure 2.4a). 
 53 
Since under these conditions random copying does increase mean individual fitness, 
this represents a set of conditions under which Rogers’ original paradox does not 
exist. This fitness advantage of social over asocial learning is due to the assumption 
that offspring acquire the behaviour of their parents during maturation – if offspring 
are assigned a random behaviour at birth, high frequencies of social learners do not 
increase fitness (Figure 2.4a). Note that the acquisition of parental behaviour has no 
direct effect on offspring fitness, because offspring must undergo an independent 
learning round after dispersal before selection occurs. It does however increase the 
pool of potential models for social learners to copy. Since these models are offspring 
of individuals with relatively high fitness, on average, they will be performing locally 
adaptive behaviour patterns, making them available for social learners in the 
neighbourhood to copy. Thus, acquisition of parental behaviour provides indirect 
fitness benefits to social learners. As these effects are reliant on the learning of locally 
adaptive behaviour, low levels of spatial autocorrelation in the environment reduce 
the magnitude of this fitness increment (see below). 
The simulations reported here had the same mutation rate (m = 0.0008) and 
population size (n = 6400). Exploration of the effects of varying these parameters 
showed that the results were largely robust to such variation. Note that because m is a 
rate, changing the population size (n) alters the absolute number of mutations per 
generation, and therefore these two parameters are intimately related. Changes in m or 
n have an intuitive effect on genotype frequencies: as expected, increasing mutation 
rate (or decreasing population size) increases the frequency of the less common 
genotype, and vice-versa. Accordingly, when social learning is common, mutation 
will tend to introduce asocial learners, and since the latter acquire adaptive behaviour 
this means that the amount of correct information entering the population each 
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generation co-varies with the mutation rate. Increased mutation rates (or reduced 
population sizes) are therefore associated with increases in the mean fitness of 
individuals in the population. The reverse holds when the asocial learners dominate. 
In contrast, decreased mutation rates accentuate the fitness reductions associated with 
the local condition (e.g. Figure 2.1), because new, correct, information enters the 
population less frequently. 
 
Spatial variation in the environment 
The level of spatial auto-correlation in the environment greatly affected the frequency 
of social learners in the population (Figure 2.4a). Typically, spatial environmental 
variation reduces the benefits of social learning, since it reduces the probability that 
copied individuals will have experienced the same environment as the copier. This 
means that social learning requires higher costs of asocial learning to invade a 
spatially variable environment, compared with a uniform one. When dispersal and 
learning are global, small values of pn mean that social learning never becomes 
established. However, local learning partly negates these effects. In the local 
condition, at intermediate levels of spatial autocorrelation (pn ≈ 0.44) social learning 
can only become established at higher levels of ca than the pn = 1 case, although the 
subsequent transition to fixation occurs over a smaller range of ca values. This effect 
is exaggerated at pn ≈ 0.2, with social learners unable to invade until ca is very large, 
since social learning has to be considerably cheaper than asocial if it is to have an 
advantage, even when copying an asocial learner directly only returns good 
information 20% of the time. Provided spatial autocorrelation is sufficiently high, 
local learning results in an increase in mean individual fitness above that expected for 
asocial learners, even when social learning reaches near fixation. This establishes 
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further conditions for which Rogers’ paradox does not apply. Conversely, low spatial 
autocorrelation leaves mean individual fitness at or near that expected for a purely 
asocial learning population, even with local learning.  
In contrast to uniform environments, changes in environmental harshness (h) 
have major effects on the frequency of social learning in spatially varying 
environments (Figure 2.4b). Increasing h has the effect of reducing the fitness payoff 
to social learners performing sub-optimal behaviour, the frequency of which increases 
with spatial variation. However small Ns values ameliorate the impact of increased h, 
since proportionally more behaviour patterns will reap higher fitness dividends. This 
also means that lower values of h result in an escape from Rogers’ paradox at 
relatively low levels of ca, when Ns is low. 
 
Predicting when social learning will invade 
Here an analytical approximation for the conditions under which a pure social 
learning strategy will invade a population of asocial learners under local learning 
conditions is derived. Near the asocial learning fixation boundary, the social learning 
genotype will increase when its expected fitness (WS) exceeds 1–ca, which is the 
constant fitness of asocial learners (assuming piOK = 1). In the invasion condition of a 
single social learner mutating into a neighbourhood of asocial learners, the probability 
of that social learner copying correct behaviour from a neighbour is given by the 
probability that the neighbouring cell has the same environmental state multiplied by 
the probability that the neighbouring cell has not changed state in the iteration since 
its occupant learned the correct behaviour. This can be written as pn(1–pc), where pc is 
the probability of a cell changing environmental state per iteration. When the 
environment is spatially uniform, pc equals the model parameter ps, and when it is not, 
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pc ≈ ps+80/n (the second term being the probability of a cell being included in a 
perturbation event of area (8R-1/6)2 where the expectation of R is 0.5). When learning 
is correct, then the payoff is 1. When learning is not correct, with probability 1–pn(1–
pc), then the expected payoff Es approximates a weighted average of the payoffs when 
S (from Equation 2.1) is greater than zero, as it must be when environment and 
behaviour do not match. Here the weights are the probabilities of neighbouring cells 
being a given number of environmental state steps apart. These considerations allow 
us to derive an expression for the expected fitness of an invading social learner (WS) 
surrounded by asocial learners, or 
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As successful invasion requires that WS > 1 – ca, the condition for invasion can be 
written as 
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and w is a vector of the probabilities that two neighbouring cells will be 
[1,2,…,⎣Ns/2⎦] environmental state steps apart. Because of the stochastic nature of the 
simulations and the complex spatial variation that resulted, w must be calculated 
directly from the simulation runs. Note however that any behaviour-payoff function 
can be used to calculate Es for Equation 2.2 provided it generates an expectation when 
behaviour is sub-optimal. 
The predictions generated by this inequality conform reasonably well to the 
simulations (Figure 2.4). Note that when there is no spatial variation (pn = 1), no cost 
to social learning (cs = 0), and an infinite sequence of possible environmental states 
(Ns = ∞), as posited by Rogers (1988) and Enquist et al. (2007), then Es = 0, and (2.2) 
simplifies to ca > pc, as in their models. Equation 2.3 specifies that whether a strategy 
of pure social learning will invade depends not only on the relative costs of social and 
asocial learning and the rate of environmental variation, but also on the level of 
spatial auto-correlation in the environment and the expected payoff of choosing a sub-
optimal behaviour at random.  
 
Analysis of conditional strategies. 
Here the merits of two conditional strategies, conditional social learning (where 
asocial learning is attempted first followed by social learning if asocial learning fails) 
and critical social learning (where social learning is attempted first followed by 
asocial learning if a correct result is not obtained) are considered. In order to directly 
compare the model presented here to the analytical results of Enquist et al. (2007),   
pn = 1. This analysis found that critical social learning was able to both invade a 
population of pure asocial learners and increase individual mean fitness under the 
same conditions predicted by Enquist et al. (2007). Local learning and dispersal made 
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very little difference to this pattern of results. All four genotypes (the two pure and 
two conditional strategies) were also examined simultaneously by considering the 
dynamics of a population of asocial learners capable of mutating to any the other 
three genotypes. When piOK < 1, the expected fitness of asocial learners (Wa) is given 
by 
 
 Wa = piOK + (1! piOK )Ea ! ca       (2.4) 
  
where Ea is the expected payoff when asocial learning fails (i.e. the expected payoff 
of a randomly chosen behaviour), given by 
 
 
Ea =
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Again, the results are virtually identical to Enquist et al.’s (2007) 
consideration of three strategies (asocial plus the two conditional strategies) under 
similar conditions (Figure 2.5a). Pure social learning never attained frequencies above 
the mutation rate in any of the simulations, which is explained by the observation that 
social learners never had fitness higher than either asocial learning or either 
conditional strategy when surrounded by those strategies (Figure 2.6). Results for the 
local and global conditions were comparable.  
 
 59 
 
Figure 2.4. The effect of (a) spatial variation in the environment, and (b) the harshness of the fitness 
penalty for sub-optimal behaviour, on the proportion of social learners and mean individual fitness in 
simulated populations. Spatial variation is represented by the parameter pn, the probability that two 
neighbouring cells have the same environmental state, and harshness by the parameter h (see Equation 
2.1). In all cases learning and dispersal are local, and if not otherwise specified Ns = 10, h = 2, and pn ≈ 
0.44. Note that the data labelled ‘random’ in (a) come from simulations where there was no acquisition 
of parent’s behaviour by offspring. Points are means from 20 runs, error bars are omitted for clarity. 
Dashed lines are as in Figure 2.1. Arrows indicate where an invading social learner has equal fitness to 
surrounding asocial learners according to Equation 2.3. In the case pn ≈ 0.2 in (a), note that when ca is 
high (>0.5), fitness, reproductive rate, and thus selection strength is low, such that drift effects are able 
to maintain low levels of social learners in the population even when their fitness is slightly lower than 
asocial learners.  
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Conditional and critical social learning in spatially heterogeneous environments  
However, the results of this model differ markedly from earlier theory (Rogers 1988; 
Enquist et al. 2007) when spatial variation was introduced to the environment. In the 
local condition, it was found that the parameter space where conditional social 
learning was favoured over critical social learning was significantly expanded, such 
that critical social learning only dominated at higher levels of ca (Figure 2.5b-d). In 
spatially heterogeneous environments, social learning is less effective than in uniform 
environments, since individuals are more likely to pick up inappropriate information 
from others. (This is illustrated by the fitness of social learners in Figure 2.6). This 
has the effect of decreasing the probability that critical social learners will find an 
optimum behaviour through social learning, which they attempt first, and 
consequently increases the likelihood that they will also pay the cost of asocial 
learning. Figure 2.6 illustrates how the fitness advantage of critical social learning 
over conditional social learners observed in a spatially homogeneous environment is 
reversed in a spatially heterogeneous environment, since the comparative 
ineffectiveness of social learning means that critical social learners more frequently 
pay the cost of both forms of learning than do the conditional social learners.  
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Figure 2.5. Frequencies of asocial (a, red), social (s, black), critical social (cs, green) and conditional 
social (ci, blue) learning strategies (left panel), and population fitness increment over that expected of a 
purely asocial learning population (right panel), with the cost of asocial learning plotted against 
environmental stability. Solid lines are estimates of the analytical predictions of Enquist et al. (2007) 
for a perfectly mixed population. Unless otherwise specified Ns = 1000, h = 2, piOK = 0.5, cs = 0.02, and 
learning and dispersal are local. (a) No spatial variation, pn =1. (b) Effect of spatial environmental 
variation; pn ≈ 0.44. (c) Effect of reducing Ns; Ns = 10 and pn ≈ 0.44. (d) Effect of reducing h; h = 1.1 
and pn ≈ 0.44. (e) Effect of global learning and dispersal, in a spatially variable environment, pn ≈ 0.44.  
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Figure 2.6. Mean fitness of social learners (s), critical social learners (cs) and conditional social 
learners (ci) when surrounded entirely by individuals of other strategies, in simulations under the same 
conditions as those in Figure 2.5a (spatially uniform environment, Pn = 1) and 2.5b (spatially 
heterogeneous environment, Pn = 0.44), with ca = 0.2 and pc = 0.5. Errorbars show standard errors of 
the means. No data are shown for any strategy surrounded entirely by social learners, as pure social 
learners never attained sufficient frequency in these simulations to completely surround any cell. 
Dashed line shows fitness of asocial learners calculated using Equation 2.4. 
 
In the global condition, in general, no strategy involving social learning reached high 
frequency, except in the region where asocial learning is relatively cheap and the 
environment is highly stable (Figure 2.5e). Under these conditions, conditional social 
learning can reach relatively high frequency, but even then any increase in mean 
individual fitness is negligible. Surprisingly, this leads to the counter-intuitive 
prediction that a social learning strategy will be favoured when asocial learning is 
cheap (see the discussion in this chapter).  
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Once again, these qualitative findings are robust to variations in both the 
number of environmental states (Ns) and the harshness of the environment (h). Note, 
however, that where Ns is small and ca is high, there are broad circumstances under 
which the pure strategy of random social learning is favoured over both conditional 
strategies (e.g. Figure 2.5c, where Ns = 10). Here the high probability of acquiring 
high fitness behaviour by chance renders the additional cost of sometimes, or always 
paying the cost of asocial learning, unprofitable. Reducing the harshness of the 
environment increases the range of parameter space over which the conditional social 
learning strategy out-competes the critical social learning strategy (Figure 2.5d). 
These results can be better understood with reference to expressions for the 
expected fitness of the conditional strategies, Wcrit and Wcond for critical social learner 
and conditional social learner, respectively, given by 
 
 Wcrit = psOK + (1! psOK )(piOK + (1! piOK )Ea )! (cs + (1! psOK )ca )   (2.5) 
 
and 
 
 Wcond = piOK + (1! piOK )(psOK + (1! psOK )Es )! (ca + (1! piOK )cs ) ,  (2.6) 
 
where the term psOK represents the probability that social learning returns the optimum 
behaviour. Critical social learners outcompete conditional social learners when Wcrit 
> Wcond, which simplifies to 
 
 Ea (1! piOK )(1! psOK )+ ca psOK > Es (1! piOK )(1! psOK )+ cs piOK . 
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By denoting Es = Ea + α, we can simplify this expression further to give 
 
ca psOK ! cs piOK >" (1! piOK )(1! psOK ) .     (2.7) 
 
This inequality illustrates how high values of the cost of asocial learning (ca) and of 
the probability that social learning returns optimal behaviour (psOK) will favour 
critical social learning. Environmental homogeneity (high pn, low pc) typically 
generates high values of psOK, since it makes it more likely that the copied individual 
will exhibit the correct behaviour for the observer, giving critical social learners the 
advantage. Conversely, environmental heterogeneity (low pn, high pc) reduces the 
efficacy of social learning (reduces psOK), allowing conditional social learners to 
invade. The inequality also shows how the greater the magnitude of the expected 
payoff from sub-optimal copied behaviour over randomly chosen behaviour (a), the 
more likely that conditional social learning invades. Any such increase in α will be 
affected by environmental autocorrelation and also the parameter h. 
  
DISCUSSION 
This analysis has explored the evolution of different forms of learning using a 
spatially explicit stochastic model that incorporates a number of factors that have 
previously been absent or rare in theoretical literature on the evolution of social 
learning. This model was first validated by comparison to earlier analytical treatments 
(Rogers 1988; Enquist et al. 2007) and it was seen to behave comparably. There were 
nonetheless small, but notable, discrepancies in some cases. For example in the global 
condition shown in Figure 2.1, frequencies of social learning were lower, and mean 
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individual fitness was slightly higher, than the analytical prediction. These minor 
differences can be attributed to two factors.  
Firstly, in the model of Enquist et al. (2007), cultural evolution (the spread of 
information by social learning) and genetic evolution (the change in strategy 
genotypes over time) were strictly separated, largely for reasons of analytical 
tractability, under the assumption that the former was rapid compared to the latter and 
thus likely to reach equilibrium before the next biological generation. In contrast, 
these processes occur concurrently in the models presented here, such that selection 
could act against social learners to whom correct information had not yet diffused 
following environmental change, disfavouring social learners relative to the analytical 
case.  
Secondly, the models here assume that offspring acquire the same behaviour 
as their parent, either directly because of vertical cultural transmission, or indirectly 
because through asocial learning each is exposed to the same environmental 
contingencies. Given that those parents with correct behaviour are disproportionately 
more likely to reproduce, this factor would tend to increase mean individual fitness 
slightly. While vertical transmission does not directly increment offspring fitness, it 
increases the pool of potential ‘demonstrators’ performing high-fitness behaviour 
patterns that are available to be copied, and hence provides peripheral fitness benefits 
to social learners. Despite this, the behaviour of these models is qualitatively similar 
to those of Rogers (1988) and Enquist et al. (2007), which lends confidence that the 
extensions into analytically intractable contexts are well-founded in existing theory.  
 The most striking finding here is that, when learning and dispersal are 
confined to local neighbourhoods, social learning can invade to effective fixation and 
yet result in a population with lower mean individual fitness than would be expected 
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with asocial learning alone. This can be explained by examining the fitness of 
different segments of the social learner population as the simulation runs. The most 
useful comparison is between those social learners that have at least one asocial 
learner in their neighbourhood and those that do not. In the condition where learning 
and dispersal are global, both these sub-populations have identical fitness. However, 
when learning and dispersal are local, social learners with at least one asocial learner 
in their neighbourhood have greater fitness than both other social learners, and those 
asocial learners that have at least one social learner in their neighbourhood. In other 
words, there is an edge effect wherever social learners are in contact with asocial 
learners (social learners can acquire useful information from nearby asocial learners at 
low cost) and as dispersal is local, then the strategies can only replace each other in 
these edge zones. Since the social learning genotype has greater fitness in these 
contact zones, social learners increase in frequency even though on average they have 
lower fitness than asocial learners (Figure 2.2). This perpetuates even though 
mutations can give rise to asocial learners within the social learner population because 
as soon as an asocial learner arises through mutation, the social learners surrounding 
it jump in fitness as they now have a useful source of information available, 
generating selection against the mutants. In contrast, social learners surrounded only 
by other social learners are isolated from such useful information, and are forced to 
become part of an information cascade relying on increasingly out-dated information 
with well understood detrimental consequences when the environment changes 
(Bikhchandani et al. 1992; Giraldeau et al. 2003). By this process, the ability of the 
population to track a changing environment is lost, so mean individual fitness falls 
almost to zero.  
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 The fitness associated with differential learning strategies in the model can be 
considered in two ways. The first is to consider the fitness associated with learning to 
be just one component of an individual’s fitness, and hence having a mean individual 
fitness of zero need not correspond to population shrinkage if a baseline fitness level 
is assumed that maintains the population. The second is to consider the fitness in these 
models as representing the entire fitness of the individuals concerned. Under this 
interpretation, the way this analyses artificially holds population size constant can 
make it difficult to interpret the results in term of demographic consequences. The 
extension to incorporate viability selection (Figure 2.3) helps in this regard by 
showing that reductions in average individual fitness due to high levels of social 
learning in a population do indeed reduce population size, and can lead to extinction. 
Here, the results are very similar to those obtained by Whitehead and Richerson 
(2009). While the risks associated with over-reliance on social learning producing 
information cascades are well understood (Bikhchandani et al. 1992; Giraldeau et al. 
2003), the role that population structure could play in producing cascade-like effects, 
and their population level evolutionary effects, has not been previously appreciated. 
 While no real-world population would be as rigidly structured as those in 
these simulations, the local condition in the analysis represents one bound of the 
spectrum of possible structural constraints, with the equally unrealistic perfect mixing 
assumed by analytical models (and the global condition in this model) representing 
the other. Real populations would be found somewhere between these two bounds, 
which means that any invasion of a pure strategy of social learning may reduce 
fitness. It is not hard to find examples of population structure with regard to 
information flow. One example is the Landga people of New Guinea, where 
‘craftsmen report that, because of the great value of the skill [of stone adze 
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construction], they will instruct only close relatives’ (Stout 2002). Futhermore, spatial 
structure can be thought of as equivalent to any social learning bias which results in 
copying from only a select few behavioural models (Kameda and Nakanishi 2002). 
Thus this analysis suggests that Rogers’ paradox is even stronger than originally 
thought; pure social learning doesn’t just fail to increase fitness, it may even 
frequently reduce it. 
 This model, however, can also show some conditions where this paradox need 
not apply. Under the specified behaviour and payoff structure, increasing the number 
of environmental states effectively increases the number of ways an individual can 
generate sub-optimal solutions and thus have low relative fitness. The parameter h, 
which can be interpreted as representing the ‘harshness’ of a particular environment, 
sets the size of the relative fitness increment (∆W ) available to organisms that 
perform the correct behaviour compared with alternatives (as h→1, then ∆W→0). 
Intuitively, it makes sense that as the fitness cost of acquiring a sub-optimal behaviour 
through copying decreases then that cost will become less significant relative to the 
cost of asocial learning, and so social learners will be favoured. This pattern was 
observed in those simulations where h and Ns were manipulated. Under conditions 
when h and/or Ns are low and ca sufficiently high, random social learning can increase 
the mean fitness of individuals. These conditions represent relatively benign 
ecological contexts, where almost any realistic behaviour leads to some fitness 
benefit.  
 The analysis of conditional strategies presented here endorses the conclusions 
of Enquist et al. (2007) that the critical social learner and conditional social learner 
strategies resolve Rogers’ paradox. Enquist et al. suggested that critical social 
learners out-compete conditional social learners over a broad area of the parameter 
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space defined by the cost of asocial learning, ca, and environmental stability (1 – pc), 
and under the conditions they explored, the models here generate the same findings 
(Figure 2.5a). However, the introduction of a spatially varying environment in 
simulations significantly alters these conclusions (Figure 2.5b-e) by revealing 
conditions under which the conditional social learning strategy is favoured over the 
critical social learning strategy. This analysis suggests that the cost of asocial 
learning is the more important factor in determining the switch between conditional 
social learning and critical social learning, with environmental stability having a 
relatively weak influence. The switch typically happens when the cost of asocial 
learning is around an order of magnitude higher than the cost of social learning. In 
circumstances in which social learning is effective, then critical social learning will 
be at an advantage, because it will tend to pay the cost of asocial learning less than 
conditional social learning. Conversely, if social learning is ineffective, the reverse is 
true. Since increased environmental spatial variation decreases the effectiveness of 
social learning, it will broadly favour conditional social learning (see Figure 2.6 and 
Equation 2.7).  
 When learning and dispersal are global but the environment varies in space, it 
is very difficult to obtain an appropriate behaviour through social learning. However, 
conditional social learning can invade when asocial learning is relatively unreliable, 
the environment is highly stable, and, counter-intuitively (since prior theory has found 
that social learning is favoured when the cost of asocial learning is high, e.g. Boyd 
and Richerson 1985), when the cost of asocial learning is low. Under these 
conditions, conditional social learners will have an advantage over asocial learners 
when asocial learning fails, and when there is a chance of learning something useful 
by social learning, which is higher when the environment is stable. However, the 
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payoff advantage is small, and so will only have an effect when overall learning costs 
are low, hence the counter-intuitive result of a social learning strategy invading a 
population of asocial learners when the cost of asocial learning is low. This is also the 
region where conditional social learners outperform critical social learners. The 
latter cannot become established in stable environments because it is difficult for the 
benefits of social learning to outweigh the low costs of asocial learning. 
 In some cases pure random social learning could out-compete either of the 
conditional genotypes for example, when asocial learning was relatively unreliable, Ns 
was low and ca was high (Figure 2.5c). This was because a low number of possible 
environmental states means that even sub-optimal payoffs from pure social learning 
can be better than more optimal payoffs associated with high learning costs. Here the 
high probability of acquiring high fitness behaviour means the additional burden of 
sometimes or always paying the cost of asocial learning carried by the conditional 
strategies renders them unprofitable. This finding suggests that random copying may 
be a good strategy in contexts where it is difficult to produce something effective 
alone, but there is a range of viable alternatives available to copy, all of which may 
produce something reasonably effective. Aesthetic craft production, such as pottery 
decoration or rug weaving, may fit these conditions, where the chances of producing 
something pleasing to the eye oneself may be relatively low, but there are a range of 
examples available to copy, all of which have previously been selected because they 
are to some degree, if not equally, pleasing to the eye. Recent evidence reveals that 
for such traits, neutral drift models provide a good fit. For example, Bentley et al. 
(2004) describe some specific examples of such cultural traits that appear to fit 
models of random drift that would be expected from random copying. These analyses 
suggest that these contexts may favour adopting a random copying strategy. 
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 Increasing environmental harshness (h) favours the critical social learning 
strategy, and reduced harshness the conditional social learning strategy (Figure 2.5d; 
Equation 2.7). The formulation of Enquist et al. (2007), in which only one in an 
infinite number of behaviour patterns confers any fitness benefit, represents an 
extreme in the possible distribution of h which favours the critical social learning 
strategy. The effect of harshness occurs because both conditional strategies deploy a 
combination of asocial and social learning, but when critical social learners learn 
asocially, and fail to produce the correct solution, they are allotted a random 
behaviour. In contrast, when conditional social learners learn asocially, and fail to 
produce the correct solution, they receive the expected payoff of a social learner. 
Since offspring acquire their parent’s behaviour, selection ensures that social learning 
is likely to acquire behaviour closer, on average, to optimal than random. By 
magnifying the expected returns to a social learner performing a sub-optimal 
behaviour (increasing α in Equation 2.7), reduced harshness benefits conditional 
social learners, since critical social learners switch to asocial learning if social 
learning returns sub-optimal behaviour, and therefore risk acquiring a random 
behaviour rather than satisficing with ‘near misses’ from social learning. 
 In summary, using a simple spatially explicit stochastic model, this analysis 
has shown that spatial structure, including local learning and dispersal, can affect the 
evolution of social learning in ways that would be difficult to explore and predict 
using an analytical approach. The simulation framework presented here is potentially 
a useful vehicle for exploring more complex social learning strategies, such as ‘copy-
in-proportion’, or ‘copy-if-better’ (Schlag 1998; Laland 2004), which would also be 
difficult to specify analytically. 
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INTRODUCTION 
The demographic and ecological success of humanity is widely attributed to our 
capacity for the high-fidelity information transmission necessary for cumulative 
culture (Boyd and Richerson 1985; Tomasello 1994). Alongside imitation, teaching is 
the primary mechanism through which humans pass acquired knowledge, skills and 
technology between individuals and between generations. Teaching is widespread in 
human societies, and is a key human psychological adaptation, vital for normative 
forms of human cooperation to be tenable (Boyd and Richerson 1985; Tomasello 
1994; Fehr and Fischbacher 2003; Csibra 2007; Csibra and Gergely 2006), and central 
to technological development (Boyd and Richerson 1985). Yet if teaching is so 
effective, it remains a mystery why it should be either absent or exceedingly rare in 
virtually all other animals. 
Countless animals acquire skills and information from others (Heyes and 
Galef 1996; Laland and Galef 2009), however experienced individuals are not 
generally thought to actively facilitate learning in others (Danchin et al. 2004). Caro 
and Hauser (1992) proposed a functional definition of ‘teaching’ applicable to 
animals, in which a tutor is said to teach if it modifies its behaviour in the presence of 
a pupil, at some cost, thereby promoting the pupil’s learning. Refinements of this 
definition impose additional criteria, such as feedback from pupil to tutor, or restrict 
teaching to the transfer of skills, concepts and rules (Franks and Richerson 2006; 
Leadbeater et al. 2006; Hoppitt et al. 2008). Deploying such definitions, researchers 
report putative cases of costly information donation (henceforth ‘animal teaching’) in 
diverse species, including ants, bees, pied babblers, meerkats, and cats (Franks and 
Richerson 2006; Leadbeater et al. 2006; Thornton and McAuliffe 2006; Raihani and 
Ridley 2008; Rapaport and Brown 2008 see Hoppitt et al. 2008; Rapaport and Brown 
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2008 for reviews). While cases of animal teaching remain controversial, and their 
consanguinity with human teaching is contested (Csibra 2007; Leadbeater et al. 2006; 
Premack 2007), these observations nonetheless raise a challenging question: why 
should the costly donation of information exhibit such a curious taxonomic 
distribution? 
 Any functional similarities should not obscure the fact that mechanistically, 
cases of animal teaching are entirely different from human teaching, and are not 
reliant on homologous characters (Csibra and Gergely 2006; Hoppitt et al. 2008). 
Indeed, current thinking suggests that instances of animal teaching function to 
enhance the fidelity of information transmission through adaptive refinements of 
forms of learning present in the animal, leading to distinct teaching mechanisms in 
different species (Hoppitt et al. 2008). Nonetheless, it is germane to ask why 
convergent selection should favour investment in costly mechanisms of information 
transfer in some species and not others. The fact that functionally similar behaviour is 
reported in diverse animals, leads us to ask: ‘What do these species have in common 
that led to the evolution of teaching?’; ‘Why is teaching not more widespread in 
animals?;’ and ‘Why is it that intelligent animals such as chimpanzees seemingly do 
not teach if ants and bees are capable of doing so?’ As animal teaching appears 
restricted to isolated traits, this raises the further question of: ‘How did a very general 
capability for teaching evolve in the human lineage?’ 
 These questions are of widespread interest to multiple academic disciplines, 
including Evolutionary and Behavioural Biology, Psychology, Anthropology, 
Archaeology, Economics and Education. Yet while there has been extensive research 
into related topics such as the evolution of social learning (Cavalli-Sforza and 
Feldman 1981; Boyd and Richerson 1985; Feldman and Zhivotovsky 1992), learned 
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communication (Boyd, Gintis and Bowles 2010; Kirby, Cornish and Smith 2008; 
Kirby, Dowman and Griffiths 2007), and learned cooperation (Boyd and Richerson 
1985; Fehr and Fischbacher 2003; Gintis 2003; Boyd et al. 2003, Peck and Feldman, 
1986), currently there is no formal theory of the evolution of teaching.  
Here simple and accessible mathematical models are presented, exploring 
under what circumstances teaching might be expected to evolve. This analysis helps 
to explain the observed distribution of teaching behaviour, the absence of teaching in 
other taxa, and the widespread use of teaching in humans. 
 
THE MODEL 
First a simple model with haploid genetics is presented but this is later extended to 
diploid and haplodiploid cases, which give qualitatively similar results. The model 
assumes a single, infinite-sized, well-mixed population with two genotypes, teacher 
and non-teacher. This assumption corresponds to adopting the phenotypic gambit 
(Grafen, 1984), and in reality it is likely that teaching behaviour will result from an 
interaction between many genes and experiential factors. Individual fitness is a 
function of baseline fitness (w0), costs associated with genotype (ct, cc), and a viability 
benefit (wi, where wi>1) associated with possessing valuable learned information i. 
Teaching is costly, with cc representing a fixed cognitive cost paid by teachers (e.g. 
representing the neural hardware necessary to teach) and ct representing a time (or 
energy) cost paid when teaching. As the cognitive cost of teaching is a cost paid by all 
teachers independent of their individual fitness, the most appropriate formulation is 
one in which this cost cc is additive. Conversely, the time cost, ct, is dependent on 
possession of the information, so it is more realistic to view this as multiplicative. 
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Thus, teachers with and without the information have fitness wt=w0wict-cc and wt=w0 -
cc, respectively. 
 Individuals can acquire the information asocially, with probability A, for 
instance, through trial-and-error learning. However each individual also has a cultural 
role model, or tutor, from whom they can learn the information, and to whom they are 
related with relatedness r. Consistent with Grafen’s statistical definition (Grafen, 
1985, Hamilton, 1970), relatedness is treated as a ‘measure of the genetical similarity 
between social partners, relative to the rest of the population’ (West et al. 2010). 
From this role model the individual can acquire the information through inadvertent 
social learning (e.g. imitation, emulation, enhancement effects), with probability S, or 
teaching (provided their cultural role model is a teacher), with probability T, where 
T>S and T>A. Pupil and cultural role model combinations form with a probability 
proportional to their genetic similarity (r). This assumption is consistent with any one 
of three biologically plausible processes: (i) active choice by pupils, who adopt 
cultural role models with a likelihood that increases with relatedness, (ii) active 
choice by cultural role models, who adopt pupils with a likelihood that increases with 
relatedness, or (iii) spatial structure or population viscosity, leading to related 
individuals being more likely to assort, and thereby generating pupil/cultural role 
model pairings, with high compared to low relatedness. Thus while this assortment 
could result from kin discrimination or a greenbeard mechanism (West et al. 2007), it 
need not do so. A further assumption that each genotype assorts with relatives to a 
similar degree is also made. This is assumed largely for mathematical convenience 
and, while it is a defensible first approximation, it may not be met in some natural 
populations. However, it is possible that there are likely to be greater fitness benefits 
for assortment amongst teachers than non-teachers, the assumption is likely to 
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translate into conservative estimates of the likelihood of the evolution of teaching. In 
the terminology of Gardner and West (2006), this treatment of relatedness is more 
akin to the ‘open’ models of social evolution developed by Frank (1998), than to the 
explicit ‘closed’ models derived by Taylor (1992) which incorporate levels of 
dispersal and other demographic assumptions that impact on assortment according to 
kinship. The frequency of teachers and non-teachers are designated to be t and nt 
(t+nt=1), the proportion of teachers and non-teachers possessing the information to be 
it and int, and the proportion of teachers and non-teachers that do not possess the 
information to be nit and nint (int+nint=1, it+nit=1), respectively.  
 First, expressions for the probability that teachers and non-teachers acquire the 
fitness-enhancing information are developed. As pupil/cultural role model pairings 
form non-randomly, a focal individual with the teaching genotype shares its genotype 
through common descent with its cultural role model with probability kr, where k is a 
scaling constant, thereby acquiring the information through teaching with probability 
itT. Alternatively, with probability 1-kr, the role model’s genotype is not a related 
teacher and is randomly drawn from the rest of the (infinite) population, giving 
probabilities that it is an unrelated teacher and non-teacher of t and 1-t, respectively. 
If the cultural role model is a teacher the focal individual learns through teaching with 
probability itT, whilst if it is not a teacher the probability that the focal individual 
acquires the information from the role model is intS. Note that a pupil’s ability to learn 
from a cultural role model depends critically on the probability that their role model 
has acquired the information themselves, (it  and int for teachers and non-teachers 
respectively). This means that individuals may fail to acquire the information with a 
certain probability regardless of the genotype of their role model. In addition, the 
focal individual may learn asocially with probability A no matter the genotype of its 
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cultural role model. It follows that an individual with the teaching genotype acquires 
the information with probability 
 
P l | t( ) = rkitT + (1! rk)(titT + (1! t)intS)+ A ,   (3.1a) 
 
and, by similar reasoning, a non-teacher acquires the information with probability 
 
P l | nt( ) = rkintS + (1! rk)(titT + (1! t)intS)+ A .    (3.1b) 
 
The average fitness of teachers and non-teachers is now given by 
  
Wt = P(l | t)(w0wict )+ (1! P(l | t))(w0 )! cc ,    (3.2a) 
 Wnt = P(l | nt)(w0wi )+ (1! P(l | nt))(w0 ) .    (3.2b) 
 
The fitness difference between teachers and non-teachers can then be defined as Wd = 
Wt - Wnt, such that Wd >0 is the condition for the proportion of teachers to increase in 
the population. Using expressions (3.1) and (3.2), the model can be specified as a 
dynamic haploid system in terms of three recursive equations, representing the 
generational change in frequency of teachers (3.3a), the proportion of teachers with 
the information (3.3b), and the proportion of non-teachers with the information (3.3c), 
in the population: 
 
 !t = tWttWt + (1" t)Wnt
,       (3.3a) 
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 !it =
P(l | t)(w0wict " cc )
P(l | t)(w0wict " cc )+ (1" P(l | t))(w0 " cc )
,   (3.3b) 
 !int =
P(l | nt)(w0wi )
P(l | nt)(w0wi )+ (1" P(l | nt))(w0 )
.    (3.3c) 
 
Invasion analysis 
It is then possible to consider the invasion of teachers into a population of non-
teachers. This requires computing the equilibrium frequency of the information 
amongst non-teachers. Setting t = 0 and k = 1, simplifying Equation (3.1b), and 
inserting into Equation (3.3c), generates a simplified recursion in int, which can be 
solved to give 
 
 int =
1! A ! Swi + Awi ± Q
2S(1!wi )
,      (3.4) 
 
where Q=4AwiS(wi-1)+(1-A-Swi+Awi)2. 
The invasion of teachers at this equilibrium is then explored, assuming that the 
proportion of teachers with the information is roughly equal to the proportion of non-
teachers with the information when teachers are very rare (i.e. it = int). Again Wd >0 is 
the condition for teaching to invade. Thus, in more detail, the condition for the 
invasion of teaching is  
 
w0 (Awi (ct !1)+ intSwi (ct !1)! rint (S !T )(ctwi !1))! cc > 0 .                     (3.5) 
For all following analyses the baseline fitness is set to w0=1. 
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 To investigate the dynamics of the system after invasion by a teaching 
genotype the equation  
 
 t = tWttWt + (1! t )Wnt
       (3.6) 
 
is solved for t  , the equilibrium value of the proportion of teachers in a population. 
Inspecting equation 3.6, it is clear that the only two biologically possible solutions are 
t =1 or t =0. This means that teachers will either fail to invade or, once they have 
invaded, will invade to fixation. 
  
Diploid and haplodiploid models 
While a model of teaching using haploid genetics is mathematically convenient, the 
fact remains that teaching animals are perhaps exclusively diploid or haplodiploid in 
their reproductive systems. The haploid model can be usefully extended to take 
account of these differences. The model can be reformulated, for example, as a 
diploid system in which each allele is a teaching allele, t, or a non-teaching allele, nt. 
This is achieved by first assuming a heterozygous individual is a teacher with 
probability a and a non-teacher with probability 1- a. It is then possible to examine 
the criteria for teachers invading a population of non-teachers, assuming a negligible 
number of homozygous teachers (with genotype tt) are present, and that all teaching is 
done by heterozygotes. The probability that a heterozygote (with genotype tnt) 
expresses the teaching gene, and thereby pays the extra time cost (ct) associated with 
teaching, is a. It follows that the probability that an individual's cultural role model 
expresses a teaching gene is ra.  Incorporating this into equation (3.2a) gives 
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 Wt = (!rTint + (1"!r)Sint + A)(wi (1"! +!ct )"1)+1"!cc ,  (3.7) 
          
for a rare teaching mutant in a population of non-teachers. The fitness of the common 
genotype is the same as in the haploid case, since the probability of a non-teacher 
encountering a teacher is negligible. Note that when the teaching allele is completely 
dominant (! =1), equation (3.7) reduces to the haploid expression for Wt (equation 
3.2a) with t=0. 
 To investigate teaching in social insects with haplodiploid reproductive 
systems, the population is divided into equal male (haploid) and female (diploid) 
sections. Although a proper treatment of the haplodiploid case may require more 
direct accounting for the reproductive value of the individuals benefiting from 
teaching and others who do not, this approximation is a good starting point. In this 
case, it is assumed that males do not learn the information because the workers (who 
can use the information) are female. The males, however, may still incur the inherent 
cognitive cost associated with teaching (cc) if they carry the teaching allele. They 
incur this cost despite there being no value to males having the information i.e. wi = 1 
for the male section of the population. However these males do not teach and so pay 
no time cost i.e. ct=1.  
The effects of the individual parameters, discussed above in relation to the 
haploid model are the same for the diploid model. This similarity occurs because 
moving from the diploid to the haploid model is a linear transformation and all results 
from the haploid model hold for the diploid model. These results also hold for a 
haplodiploid system, where analysis of the invasion criteria for teaching requires 
consideration of both haploid and diploid offspring. Here it is assumed that the 
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contribution of each sex to fitness is equal, in which case the fitness difference 
between teachers and non-teachers is  
 
 wd =
(wt ,dip +wt ,hap !wnt ,dip !wnt ,hap )
2 .     (3.8) 
 
Assuming males neither teach nor benefit from teaching (wi=1 and ct=1), this reduces 
to  
 wd,hap =
wd,dip ! cc
2 .       (3.9) 
 
Which reproductive system favours teaching? 
From the above, teaching is more likely to invade a haplodiploid than diploid 
populations if wd,haplodip > wd,dip . Assuming that wi is the same for each reproductive 
system, this inequality can be written as 
 
wd ,hap +wd ,dip
2 > wd ,dip       (3.10a) 
which in turn simplifies to  
 wd,hap > wd,dip .        (3.10b) 
This means that it is easier for teaching to invade a population of haplodiploid than 
diploid non-teachers in the same circumstances as it is easier for teaching to invade 
haploid than diploid non-teachers. Accordingly, using equation (3.2a) for haploids 
and (3.2b) and (3.7) for diploids,  
 
wd ,dip = Sintwi + (1! Sint )!"rDit (S !T )(wi (1!" +"ctD )!1)!"ccD ,  (3.11a) 
wd,hap = Sintwi + (1! Sint )! rHit (S !T )(wictH !1)! ccH .   (3.11b) 
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Inserting these into inequality (3.10b), re-labelling the relatedness parameters rH for 
haploids and rD for diploids and the costs ctD and ctH, and simplifying, gives the 
condition under which it is easier for teaching to invade in haplodiploid (and haploid) 
than in diploid populations 
 
!rDit (S "T )(wi (1"! +!ctD )"1)+!ccD > rHit (S "T )(wictH "1)+ ccH ,           (3.12) 
 
which if ccD = ccH = 0 simplifies to 
 
 !rD (1"! +!ctD "
1
wi
) < rH (ctH "
1
wi
) .    (3.13) 
 
From this it is clear that where teaching is most likely to evolve depends critically on 
the dominance of the teaching allele !  and the average relatedness of tutor and pupil 
in diploids and haplodiploids. If wi is equivalent in the two systems, with complete 
dominance (!  =1) teaching will be more likely in haplodiploids than diploids when 
rH > rD, provided that the costs ctD and ctH are comparable. 
 
RESULTS 
The relatedness of tutor and pupil 
By inspection of Equation 3.5 it is found that teaching will evolve where its costs are 
outweighed by the inclusive fitness benefits that result from the tutor's relatives being 
more likely to acquire the valuable information. This effect echoes both recent and 
traditional formulations of inclusive fitness models first proposed by Hamilton 
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(1964). The impact of relatedness in this model follows more closely the inclusive 
fitness formulation described by Hamilton (1964) and examined by Taylor et al. 
(2007), concentrating on the fitness effects of an individual’s behaviour on kin and 
the population as a whole. The benefit to possessing the teacher genotype comes from 
an increased chance that the individual's cultural role model will also be a teacher, 
which leads to a greater probability of acquiring the information. As might be 
expected, the benefits of teaching are sensitive to the relatedness of tutor and pupil. 
Any fitness advantage to teaching depends critically on teachers having a higher than 
average probability of learning from their cultural role model. The change in fitness 
associated with r when teachers invade is !rint (T ! S)(wict !1)  and when non-
teachers invade is !rit (T ! S)(wi !1) . The more related an average individual is to its 
role model the greater the benefit of teaching (Figure 3.1a), a finding consistent with 
both existing kin selection theory and recent verbal arguments concerning the 
evolution of teaching (Hoppitt et al. 2008; Thornton and Raihani 2008).  
 
The effects of asocial and inadvertent social learning 
The effects of asocial and inadvertent social learning (A and S) on equation 3.5 are 
similar and can be dealt with together. Of particular significance is the finding of n-
shaped functions representing how the utility of teaching is affected by other means of 
acquiring the information (Figure 3.1b). Effective asocial or social learning, 
represented by high values of A or S relative to T, reduces the benefits of teaching, 
rendering it uneconomical. As asocial learning and inadvertent social learning are less 
costly than teaching, non-teachers have a fitness advantage over teachers when the 
information is easy to acquire. These observations explain why the incidence of 
teaching does not appear to co-vary with brain size or intelligence in animals.  
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Teaching will not be favoured where the pupil can easily acquire the information on 
its own, or through copying others (Hoppitt et al. 2008; Thornton and Raihani 2008). 
This is apparent in primates such as chimpanzees, which are very efficient learners 
and are thought to be particularly adept at social learning and imitation (Whiten et al. 
2003; Whiten 2005). Paradoxically, the models in this chapter also establish that 
teaching is not generally favoured for difficult to learn traits (low A and S), as 
teachers typically do not possess the information to pass on to their relatives. 
Accordingly, teaching is most likely to be favoured by mid-range A and S values, with 
the breadth of the window within which teaching invades dependent on the fitness 
benefits of the information (wi). However, unless wi is very high, there will typically 
be an extremely narrow range of traits for which teaching would be efficacious, which 
helps to explain both the rarity of teaching in nature and the highly specific nature of 
animal teaching. For example, meerkat helpers teach pups to process scorpions and 
other food items, but not what to eat, nor any non-foraging behaviour (Thornton and 
McAuliffe 2006). Similarly ants, social bees and babblers also teach a single highly 
specific piece of information (Franks and Richardson 2006; Leadbeater et al. 2006; 
Hoppitt et al. 2008; Raihani and Ridley 2008). 
 When considering the invasion of teachers into a population of non-teachers A 
and S have two conflicting effects. Firstly, increasing both A and S relative to T 
reduces the value of teaching by increasing the probability of learning by other 
means. Since asocial learning and inadvertent social learning are less costly than 
teaching, non-teachers have a fitness advantage over teachers when the information is 
easy to acquire. Intuitively, as the gap between S and T closes the benefits to teaching 
diminish. High values of A and S, corresponding to cases where the information is 
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easy to acquire through other means (i.e. without teaching), thus do not favour 
teaching. 
 Secondly, the indirect effect of increasing A and S is to increase the amount of 
information in the population, which increases the benefit of being a teacher over that 
of being a non-teacher (see below). Conversely, very low values of A and S do not 
favour teaching, since teachers typically do not possess the information to pass on to 
their relatives. Teaching is most likely to be favoured by mid-range A and S values, 
while very easy and very difficult to learn traits do not promote teaching (see Figure 
3.1b). The effect of asocial learning (A) also depends on the relative values of social 
learning (S) and teaching efficacy (T). As the gap between S and T closes, an increase 
in A favours non-teachers. In other words, under these circumstances the advantage 
for a teacher diminishes. This occurs because non-teachers can pass the information 
on at no cost. One ramification of these observations is that there is little incentive for 
otherwise effective learners to teach. This is discussed by Whiten (1999) in relation to 
the great apes who are extremely effective learners but appear to display little or no 
teaching behaviour.  
 
The value of information 
Any benefit to being a teacher comes from an increased chance that the individual's 
cultural role model will also be a teacher, which leads to a greater probability of 
acquiring the information. It follows that this benefit increases with the proportion of 
individuals in the population possessing the information. To be explicit 
P(l | t)! P(l | nt) = r(Tit ! Sint ) , thus if both it and int are increased by ! , the difference 
in probability of learning as a teacher and as a non-teacher, P(l|t) - P(l|nt), is 
increased by !r(T " S) , which is positive. However, as the information in the 
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population increases, the fitness of both genotypes increases because, since T > S, 
teachers bring more information into the population than non-teachers. This leads to 
the counter-intuitive result that the fitness of non-teachers Wnt can increase when the 
cost of teaching is decreased.  
 
Cumulative culture model 
Compared to animal teaching, human teaching is a very general capability, reliant on 
high-fidelity mechanisms such as speech, instruction, and direct shaping, and it allows 
the transmission of complex information that could not be devised by a single 
individual (Hoppitt et al. 2008). Humans have undergone cumulative cultural 
evolution, which has in essence reduced our reliance on information acquired 
asocially, and allowed the transfer of knowledge and skills that would be difficult to 
learn without direct guidance and instruction. Valuable information concerning, for 
instance, industrial practices or technological manufacture has become available to 
teach through the accumulated efforts of many individuals.  
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Figure 3.1. (A) Fitness difference between teachers and non-teachers (wd), plotted against the average 
degree of relatedness between an individual and its cultural role model, for different values of ct. 
Above the dashed horizontal line teachers are more fit than non-teachers and can invade. T=0.9, 
cc=0.001, wi=2, S=0.5, A=0.1, w0=1. (B) wd plotted against the probability of learning through means 
other than teaching, for three values of wi. T=0.9, r=0.5, ct=0.915, cc=0.01, w0=1. (C) wd plotted against 
teaching efficacy, T, for a cumulative and a non-cumulative model. A1=A2=S1=S2=0.05, cc=0.0001, 
w1=2, w2=6, r=0.5, w0=1, ct=0.99. Note the difference in scale of effects on the y-axes of the three 
plots. 
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It is possible, using this model, to explore whether teaching and cumulative 
culture might have coevolved, extending the simple model presented above to allow 
for cumulative knowledge gain by allowing individuals that have acquired the 
information to gather further knowledge, building on and improving the information, 
simultaneously making it more fitness enhancing but more difficult to learn. The 
model assumes two pieces of information (1 and 2), the latter refining the former, 
where individuals with both pieces of information gain fitness increment w1w2 with 
w
2
>1 . The evolution of teaching in humans can be investigated by exploring how 
cumulative learning affects the sensitivity of the invasion conditions to the fidelity of 
teaching, T, and the value of the information wi. Including a second round of learning 
where the pupils who learnt in the first round get a chance to learn the second trait 
from a new cultural parent captures the essence of cumulative knowledge gain. It is 
then possible to rebuild the model using equations 3.1a and 3.1b. 
An expression describing the likelihood that any teacher will teach twice is 
generated, this is the likelihood that their new pupil has already acquired information 
1 and so is capable of learning information 2, given that they themselves have both 
pieces of information available to teach. An expression for this is given by the sum of 
the probability that the teacher’s second student is a teacher itself, multiplied by the 
probability that a teacher picked up information 1, and the probability that the student 
is a non-teacher multiplied by the probability that a non-teacher could have picked up 
information 1: 
 
LT = (r + (1! r)t)P(l1 | t)+ (1! r)(1! t)P(l1 | nt) .                                                 (3.7) 
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Using this it is possible to calculate the equilibrium frequency of information 2 in the 
population when teachers are very rare: 
 
iˆnt2 =
P(l1 | nt)P(l2 | nt)(w0w1w2 )
P(l1 | nt)P(l2 | nt)(w0w1w2 )+ P(l1 | nt)(1! P(l2 | nt))(w0w1)+ (1! P(l1 | nt))w0
. 
(3.8) 
The fitness functions for teachers and non-teachers are the calculated for individuals 
in a population where teaching is rare, these are: 
  
Wt = (P(l1 | t)! P(l1 | t)P(l2 | t))(w0w1ct )+ (P(l1 | t)P(l2 | t))
(w0w1w2ct (1! LT + ct(LT )))+ (1! P(l1 | t))(w0 )! cc
   (3.9a) 
 
Wnt = (P(l1 | nt)! P(l1 | nt)P(l2 | nt))(w0w1)+
(P(l1 | nt)P(l2 | nt))(w0w1w2 )+ (1! P(l1 | nt))(w0 )
                                            (3.9b)  
 
Using these it is possible to analyse the difference in fitness between teachers and 
non-teachers in a population of mostly non-teachers in three different conditions: a 
cumulative culture where the second trait is a refinement of the first (i.e. 1 <w2); a 
non-cumulative culture (1=w2); and the original model with no second trait. The 
presence of a second trait that does not refine the first is similar to having two 
independent traits that give the same fitness benefit which can be picked up in 
sequence.  
 Numerical analysis of these three conditions shows that the fitness advantage 
of teachers over non-teachers is greater in a cumulative culture context than a non-
cumulative context, and that this fitness difference increases with the fidelity of 
teaching (as T increases) (see figure 3.1c). Writing Wdc for the fitness difference 
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between teachers and non-teachers in the cumulative setting, and retaining Wd for the 
non-cumulative setting, figure 3.2 shows that Wdc - Wd is positive across most 
biologically plausible conditions. This means that the relative fitness of the teaching 
compared to the non-teaching genotype is always the same or higher in a cumulative 
setting compared to a non-cumulative setting, and this conclusion holds across an 
extremely wide range of parameter values. Furthermore, numerical analysis has 
established that, for biologically plausible values of the relevant parameters (T, A, S, 
wi, ct), the equilibrium frequency of information in the population prior to the 
invasion of teaching is always higher in a cumulative setting than in a non-cumulative 
one (see Figure 3.2d). Naturally, additional cumulative learning episodes would 
further increase Wdc - Wd. Conversely, a second learning opportunity when w1 !  w1 w2 
does not increase a teacher’s fitness. Thus the difference between the cumulative and 
non-cumulative model is not explained by the fact that there are two learning 
opportunities in the cumulative setting. 
Figure 3.1c illustrates how cumulative knowledge gain increases the 
difference in fitness between teachers and non-teachers, broadening the range of 
conditions under which teaching evolves, and figure 3.2 reveals that this pattern is 
robust across all biologically plausible parameter space. The fitness advantage of 
teaching over non-teaching increases with the fidelity of teaching (T), and does so 
more sharply in a cumulative compared with a non-cumulative setting.  
 
 92 
 
Figure 3.2. The fitness advantage of teaching over non-teaching is greater in a cumulative compared to 
a non-cumulative setting (i.e. Wdc - Wd > 0), across a broad range of parameter space. Contour plots 
show Wdc - Wd, with teaching efficacy, T (0.5<T<1) plotted against (a) the relative ease of learning 
information 2 compared to information 1 (henceforth b, where A1=bA2 and S1=bS2. As b approaches 1, 
information 2 becomes as easy to learn as information 1, through asocial and inadvertent social 
learning), (b) the time cost of teaching, ct, and (c) the fitness value of information 2, w2. (d) The 
equilibrium frequency of information 1 is higher in a cumulative than a non-cumulative setting. In all 
plots A1=A2=S1=S2=0.05, cc=0.0001, w1=1.5, w2=6, r=1/2, w0=1, ct=0.99 except where otherwise 
stated.  
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Data collection for model testing. 
It may be possible for researchers to collect data with which to parameterise and test 
the predictions of the models described above. The generation of values for the 
efficacy of asocial and inadvertent social learning (A and S) parameters is relatively 
straightforward and useful values have already been generated by Thornton and 
McAuliffe (2006) regarding meerkats (although not in sufficiently high numbers to 
allow their use here). Patterns of relatedness (r) for tutors and pupils could feasibly be 
extracted from patterns of social interaction, using Grafen’s (1985) statistical 
approach. In order to generate a relative likelihood of the invasion of teaching 
between two species, a reasonable approximation would be to assume that the 
parameters describing the absolute worth of the information (wi) and the baseline 
fitness value (w0) were equal across species. Since in most cases it is possible to set 
the cognitive cost of teaching to be zero (cc =0), the only remaining parameters relate 
to the value of the time cost to each individual teacher, ct . In cases where teaching has 
been observed, for example in meerkats, this data may readily be estimated. In cases 
where teaching has not been previously seen, different values of ct within a sensible 
range could be used to compare the likelihood of teaching under different 
circumstances. Accordingly, the above analyses provide opportunities for the 
emergence of a theory driven empirical science of animal teaching. 
 
DISCUSSION 
The evolution of teaching has been explored here using simple mathematical models 
in which a single tutor transmits adaptive information to a related pupil at a cost. 
Teaching is expected to evolve where its costs are outweighed by the inclusive fitness 
benefits that result from the tutor's relatives being more likely to acquire the valuable 
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information. The models show that teaching is not favoured where the pupil can 
easily acquire the information on its own or through copying others, nor for difficult 
to learn traits where teachers typically do not possess the information to pass on to 
their relatives. This leads to a narrow range of traits for which teaching would be 
efficacious which helps to explain the rarity of teaching in nature, its unusual 
distribution, and its highly specific nature. Further models that allow for cumulative 
cultural knowledge gain suggest that teaching evolved in humans despite, rather than 
because of, our strong imitative capabilities, and primarily because cumulative culture 
renders otherwise difficult-to-acquire valuable information available to teach. 
 Although the extent of animal teaching may, as yet, have been underestimated 
(Hoppitt et al. 2008; Thornton and Raihani 2008; Laland and Hoppitt 2003), 
nonetheless the generality and pervasiveness of human teaching offers a striking 
contrast to teaching in other animals. This analysis suggests that this follows from two 
factors unique to our species. First, by virtue of our capacity for language, 
pedagogical cueing, teaching through imitation, manual shaping, and mental state 
attribution (which allows tutors to adjust their teaching to the state of knowledge of 
the pupil) (Premack 2007; Tomasello and Call 1997), the fidelity of human teaching 
(T) is likely to be unusually high relative to teaching in other animals (Tomasello 
1994; Csibra 2007; Csibra and Gergely 2006). Second, cumulative cultural evolution 
allows complex, high fitness (Boyd and Richerson 1985; Henrich and McElreath 
2003) traits that no individual could acquire on his or her own or through inadvertent 
social learning ranging from ancestral lithic technology, tools, and weaponry through 
to contemporary technology, to be present and available to teach in human 
populations.  
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The analysis here implies that teaching and cumulative culture reinforce each 
other, and may have coevolved, because teaching is more advantageous in a 
cumulative culture setting, whilst cumulative knowledge gain is frequently reliant on 
teaching. This may be why teaching is observed in humans but is rare or absent in old 
world primates (Rapaport and Brown 2008), which by most accounts do not possess 
cumulative culture (Tomasello 1994). In populations that lack cumulative culture, 
difficult to acquire information would not reach sufficiently high frequency to 
promote teaching. While there are reports that teaching is not common in some 
hunter-gatherer societies (e.g. Whiten et al. 2003), such reports refer to an absence of 
direct instruction and neglect the prevalence of more subtle forms of teaching, such as 
pedagogical cueing (Csibra and Gergely 2006). 
 A small subset of animals do appear to satisfy the stringent conditions for 
teaching to evolve, and the findings presented here may also shed light on the 
taxonomic distribution of teaching. For instance, the possibility of higher relatedness 
amongst female workers in the social insects than amongst diploid relatives may help 
to explain why teaching is observed in some tandem running ants and some social 
bees (Franks and Richardson 2006; Leadbeater et al. 2006; Hoppitt et al. 2008; 
Thornton and McAuliffe 2006), but rarely in vertebrates (although strong conclusions 
over the frequency of teaching are difficult in the absence of experimental 
confirmation of teaching in a number of cases (e.g. cats) where circumstantial 
evidence for teaching exists). Formal analyses of diploid and haplodiploid systems 
presented in this chapter establish the precise conditions under which teaching will 
evolve in these genetic systems. This suggests that there are likely to be 
circumstances in which teaching evolves more readily among haplodiploid workers 
than in diploids, other factors being equal, because of the possibility of higher levels 
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of relatedness between workers in relatively monogamous haplodiploid colonies 
(Cornwallis et al. 2010; see Craig 1979 and Foster et al. 2006 for discussion of 
relatedness in haplodiploids). 
 It also seems to be the case that the most compelling cases of animal teaching 
occur in cooperatively breeding species (ants, bees, meerkats, pied babblers) - indeed 
humans too have been characterised as cooperative breeders (Hrdy 1999). Relative to 
non-cooperative breeders, cooperative-breeding helpers engage in costly (Thornton 
and McAuliffe 2006), and prolonged (Langen 2000), provisioning of the young, 
providing a selective environment for adaptations that would speed up the transition 
to independent feeding. It is possible that in cooperative breeders, the alleviation of 
heavy provisioning costs, or sharing of costs amongst multiple tutors, corresponds to 
a significantly lower per capita cost (ct) to an individual teacher, which Figure 3.1a 
shows helps render teaching economical. Teaching may be favoured only where the 
tutor’s operational costs are low (Thornton and Raihani 2008). Moreover, cooperative 
breeders often exhibit high levels of relatedness (Cornwallis et al. 2010), further 
enhancing the likelihood of teaching evolving. The obvious counter-examples are 
felids, where teaching of young by mothers may perhaps be favoured because hunting 
skills, or the opportunities to gain them, are difficult to get through asocial or 
inadvertent social learning (corresponding to low A and S but high T in this model). 
 In cases where teaching does evolve, the average fitness of all individuals in 
the population increases, implying that teaching may have group beneficial properties. 
This analysis could usefully be extended to multiple competing populations where 
growth in populations capable of teaching, with group augmentation which favours 
cooperative breeding (Kokko et al. 2001), potentially further promoting teaching 
could be seen. The models presented here could usefully be extended to include direct 
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benefits, and it is plausible that if such direct benefits are high and the costs are low, 
the likelihood of teaching amongst non-relatives may increase.  
 Cooperation is defined as behaviour that provides a benefit to another 
individual (recipient), and that is selected for because of its beneficial effect on the 
recipient (West et al. 2007). Whilst in humans it is possible for an individual to be 
taught non-beneficial traits (e.g. to take Class A drugs, or become a suicide bomber), 
the overwhelming majority of cases of teaching in humans, and all known cases of 
teaching in other animals, meet this definition of cooperation. One might ask, if most 
instances of teaching are also acts of cooperation, given the extensive literature on the 
evolution of cooperation (Sachs et al. 2004; Lehmann & Keller 2006; West et al. 
2007), is a specialized treatment of the evolution of teaching necessary? This question 
must be answered in the affirmative because teaching is a special case of cooperation, 
with unique properties that need to be incorporated into formal models in order to 
generate accurate predictions.  
One property of teaching is that an individual’s fitness depends not only on 
whether or not they possess the teaching genotype, but also whether or not they 
possess the acquired information or skill. In this respect, teachers resemble the 
‘phenotypic defectors’ incorporated into some cooperation models (Lotem et al. 1999; 
Sherratt & Roberts, 2001), who are unable to cooperate through lack of physical 
resources (i.e. if sick or young). Central to the teaching model is the assumption that 
individuals can acquire information through means other than being taught (for 
instance, through individual learning or inadvertent social learning). For example, 
individuals can be taught to capture scorpions, to fashion a hand-axe or to solve 
differential equations, but with varying probabilities they can also acquire this 
knowledge on their own through trial-and-error learning, or through imitation and 
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other forms of copying. This would be analogous to individuals receiving the fitness 
benefits of cooperation without cooperation taking place. However, at least in 
principle, individuals could acquire physical resources either through their own efforts 
(analogous to asocial learning), through scrounging (analogous to inadvertent social 
learning), or as recipients of cooperative acts (analogous to being taught). An 
important consequence of these alternative means of knowledge gain is that they 
potentially disconnect the frequency of teachers from the frequency of individuals 
with the relevant information or skill. Moreover, the frequency of this information 
amongst individuals possessing the teaching genotype is, in part, a function of the 
frequency of the information in the population at large (see equation 3.1a). 
Accordingly, in order to predict when a teaching event will occur (which is essential 
to investigate its evolution), it is necessary additionally to track the frequency of the 
information in the sub-populations, and not just allele, genotype, or phenotype 
frequencies. It is difficult to find any model of cooperation that, in addition to the 
donation of physical resources by cooperators, also allows physical resources to be 
acquired both through individual’s own efforts and through scrounging, and moreover 
that also tracks resource frequencies as dynamic variables amongst co-operators and 
non-cooperators. Furthermore, were such a model to be formulated it would still 
exhibit different dynamics to the teaching model presented here. That is because 
physical resources and informational resources have quite different dynamical 
properties. For instance, an informed individual can exploit the information without 
depleting it, and can pass it on to others without hindering their ability to utilise it 
themselves. In addition, the fitness of the teaching genotype increases the more 
information there is in the population, since the teachers need to know the information 
to pass it on to their relatives. At the same time, the amount of information increases 
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with the number of teachers (since teachers are better at spreading information than 
non-teachers). This is in contrast to most models of cooperation, where the benefit to 
defection tends to grow as cooperation becomes more common. 
In these respects the treatment of teaching also differs from previous models 
of the cultural evolution of cooperative behaviour (e.g. Henrich & Boyd 2001; Boyd 
et al. 2003; Bowles and Gintis 2004), which have not distinguished between asocial 
learning, inadvertent social learning and teaching. As a result of this lack of 
distinction, the frequency of cooperative behaviour is directly related to the frequency 
of socially transmitted information. Recent theory suggests that asocial learning could 
plausibly play an important role in cooperative behaviour and needs to be 
incorporated into cultural evolution models (Lehmann et al. 2008). The findings of 
the teaching analysis support this argument. The most interesting results of this 
model, that teaching is not favoured both for very difficult and very easy to learn 
traits (figure 3.1b), and is promoted by cumulative culture (figures 3.1c, 3.2), stem 
directly from this disconnect between the frequency of the teaching genotype and the 
frequency of the information to be taught, and the idiosyncratic properties of 
information flow.  
These differences mean that the problem of the evolution of teaching does not 
reduce to the problem of the evolution of cooperation in any general form, at least not 
in a straightforward manner such that established theory fully explains the evolution 
of teaching. While some of the more intuitive findings from the teaching model (e.g. 
that the likelihood of teaching increases with the degree of relatedness between tutor 
and pupil and decreases with the costs of teaching, figure 3.1a) are unsurprising in the 
light of current understanding of evolution of cooperation (Sachs et al. 2004; West et 
al. 2007), the more significant and novel findings emerge solely from this treatment. 
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Recent thinking within anthropology supports the argument that teaching is 
widespread in humans (Tehrani and Riede 2008; Hewlett et al. 2011), in spite of 
earlier claims to the contrary (e.g. McDonald 2007; Lewis 2007), but that teaching 
takes on a variety of forms from direct verbal instruction to more subtle pedagogical 
cueing. The models presented in this chapter imply that teaching may be widespread 
in humans because cumulative cultural knowledge-gain renders otherwise difficult to 
learn, high-fitness information available for tutors to impart. While it is frequently 
claimed that human cooperation is unique (Boyd and Richerson 1988a; Henrich 
2004), it is not immediately clear in what respects (West et al. 2010). This analysis 
provides one possible answer to this conundrum. West et al. (2010) point out that 
‘complex and unique mechanisms to enforce cooperation have arisen in humans, such 
as contracts, laws, justice, trade and social norms…’ It is likely that all of these 
mechanisms require teaching to spread. Human cooperation may, therefore, be 
unusually extensive as a result of cumulative culture and may be uniquely reliant on 
an important mechanism less frequently observed in other species: teaching. 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 101 
 
 
 
 
 
 
SECTION 2: 
THE SOCIAL LEARNING STRATEGIES TOURNAMENT 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 102 
 
 
 
SECTION 2, CHAPTER 4 
 
WHY COPY OTHERS? INSIGHTS FROM THE SOCIAL LEARNING STRATEGIES 
TOURNAMENT 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
Human culture is widely thought to underlie the extraordinary demographic success 
of our species, manifest in virtually every terrestrial habitat (Richerson and Boyd 
2005, Cavalli-Sforza and Feldman 1981). Cultural processes facilitate the spread of 
adaptive knowledge, accumulated over generations, allowing individuals to acquire 
vital life skills. One of the foundations of culture is social learning – learning 
influenced by observation or interaction with other individuals (Heyes 1994) – which 
occurs widely, in various forms, across the animal kingdom (Hoppitt and Laland 
2008). Yet it remains something of a mystery why it pays individuals to copy others, 
and how best to do this.  
At first sight, social learning appears advantageous because it allows 
individuals to avoid the costs, in terms of effort and risk, of trial-and-error learning. 
However, social learning can also cost time and effort, and theoretical work reveals 
that it can be error prone, leading individuals to acquire inappropriate or outdated 
information in non-uniform and changing environments (Boyd and Richerson 1985, 
Rogers 1988, Feldman et al. 1996, Kameda and Nakanishi 2003, Giraldeau et al. 
2003, Wakano et al. 2004, Enquist et al. 2007). Current theory suggests that to avoid 
these errors individuals should be selective in when and how they use social learning, 
so as to balance its advantages against the risks inherent in its indiscriminate use 
(Giraldeau et al. 2003). Accordingly, natural selection is expected to have favoured 
social learning strategies, psychological mechanisms that specify when individuals 
copy, and from whom they learn (Laland 2004, Kendal et al. 2009).  
These issues lie at the interface of multiple academic fields, spanning the 
sciences, social sciences and humanities, from artificial intelligence to zoology (Boyd 
and Richerson 1985, Danchin et al. 2004, Apesteguia et al. 2007, Whitehead et al. 
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2004, Dautenhahn and Nehaniv 2002, Schlag 1998). Formal theoretical analyses (e.g. 
Cavalli-sforza and Feldman 1981, Boyd and Richerson 1985, Rogers 1988, Feldman 
et al. 1996, Kameda and Nakanishi 2003, Giraldeau et al. 2003, Enquist et al. 2007, 
Laland 2004, Kendal et al. 2009, Henrich and McElreath 2003) and experimental 
studies (Kendal et al. 2009, Galef 2009) have explored a small number of plausible 
learning strategies. While insightful, this work has focussed on simple rules that can 
be studied with analytical methods, and can only explore a tiny subset of strategies. 
For a more authoritative understanding of when to acquire information from others, 
and how best to do so, the relative merits of a large number of alternative social 
learning strategies must be assessed. To address this, here a large-scale computer 
tournament in which strategies competed in a complex and changing simulation 
environment is presented. €10,000 was offered as first prize to the winner of the 
tournament. The organisation of similar tournaments by Robert Axelrod in the 1980s 
proved an extremely effective means for investigating the evolution of cooperation, 
and is widely credited with invigorating that field (Axelrod and Hamilton1981). 
 
THE TOURNAMENT 
 
Tournament structure  
The simulation environment was represented as a ‘restless multi-armed bandit’ 
encompassing 100 possible behavioural acts (represented arbitrarily by the integer’s 
1-100) and a payoff associated with each act. Axelrod’s cooperation tournaments 
were based on a widely accepted theoretical framework for the study of cooperation – 
the Prisoner’s Dilemma. While there is no such currently established framework for 
social learning research, multi-armed bandits have been widely deployed to study 
learning across biology, economics, artificial intelligence research and computer 
science (e.g. Schlag 1998, Koulouriotis and Xanthopoulos 2008, Gross et al. 2008, 
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Bergman and Valimaki 1996, Niño-Mora 2007, Auer et al. 2002) because they mimic 
a common problem faced by individuals that must make decisions about how to 
allocate their time in order to maximize their payoffs. Multi-armed bandits capture the 
essence of many difficult problems in the real world, for instance, where there are 
many possible actions, only a few of which yield a high payoff, where it is possible to 
learn asocially or through observation of others, where copying error occurs and 
where the environment changes. When the payoffs of a multi-armed bandit change 
over time, as in the tournament, the bandit is termed ‘restless’, and the framework has 
the advantage of proving extremely difficult, perhaps impossible, to optimize 
analytically (e.g. Papadimitriou and Tsitsiklis 1999). Thus it was possible to be 
confident that the tournament would be a genuine challenge for all entrants.  
In all other respects the model structure was kept as simple as possible to 
maintain breadth of applicability and ease of understanding, and attract the maximum 
number of participants. This simplicity was balanced with the inclusion of three 
critical features, namely, individual memories (to facilitate learning), a degree of error 
associated with social learning (the existence of which nearly all the current literature 
agrees on), and replicator dynamics with mutation, to allow an evolutionary process. 
Time was used as a common currency for costs and each possible move cost the 
same, to minimise structural assumptions. The agents in each simulation could not 
identify or communicate directly with each other, an assumption that precluded the 
deployment of some model-based strategies present in the cultural evolution literature 
(e.g. prestige bias Henrich and Gil-White 2001). Nonetheless, it was reasoned that the 
simplicity, accessibility and generality of the proposed tournament structure 
outweighed the benefits of further complexity. 
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As mentioned above, the simulation environment contained 100 possible acts. 
The payoff for each available act was an integer drawn at random from an exponential 
distribution (λ=1; values were squared, then doubled, and finally rounded to give 
integers mostly falling in the range 0-50). Payoffs changed between rounds with 
independent probability pc, with new payoffs drawn at random from the same 
distribution. This information was kept deliberately vague to participants, so as to 
discourage overly specific solutions. 
Each simulation contained a population of 100 agents each possessing a 
behavioural repertoire, which was empty at the start of the agent’s life. An agent’s 
repertoire could subsequently only gain acts through some form of learning. To gain 
behaviours or payoffs, entered strategies had to specify how individual agents, in a 
finite population, choose between three possible moves in each round, namely 
INNOVATE, OBSERVE and EXPLOIT. INNOVATE represented asocial learning, 
or individual learning through direct interaction with the environment, for example 
through trial-and-error. An INNOVATE move always returned accurate information 
about the payoff of a randomly selected behaviour previously unknown to the agent. 
OBSERVE represented any form of social learning or copying through which an 
agent could acquire a behaviour performed by another individual, whether by 
observation of or interaction with that individual (Heyes 1994). An OBSERVE move 
returned information about the behaviour and payoff currently being demonstrated in 
the population by one or more other agents playing EXPLOIT. OBSERVE was error 
prone with regard to both act and payoff. OBSERVE returned a different act to that 
performed by the observed agent with probability pcopyActWrong, with the learned act 
selected at random from the 99 not being performed, although the payoff learned was 
still that of the observed agent. Independently, the returned payoff estimate was 
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subject to normally distributed random error (rounded to the nearest integer) with 
mean 0 and standard deviation σpayoffError (with the returned payoff estimate lower 
bounded at 0). Playing OBSERVE could return no behaviour if none were 
demonstrated, or if a behaviour that was already in the agent’s repertoire was 
observed. The probabilities of these errors occurring, and the number of agents 
observed, were varied parameters. Finally, EXPLOIT represented the performance of 
a behaviour from the agent’s repertoire, equivalent to pulling one of the multi-armed 
bandit’s levers. An individual could only EXPLOIT behavioural acts it had previously 
learned. When an individual chose to EXPLOIT an act, it received the current payoff 
specified in the environment. Note that this value could differ from the expected 
payoff held in the agent’s behavioural repertoire, for two reasons. Firstly, the payoff 
for an act could have changed in the rounds since it was learned or last exploited 
(with probability pc each round). Secondly, if the act was learned in an OBSERVE 
move, then the payoff could have been subject to error. When an agent played 
EXPLOIT, it could, by performing an act, update its knowledge of how profitable that 
act was, and store the updated information in its behavioural repertoire. These moves 
are summarised in Table 4.1.  
The role of the entered strategies was to specify which of these three moves an 
agent should play in each simulation round, with optional reference to information 
that was made available to that agent (the agent’s history and behavioural repertoire) 
Each agent was controlled by one of the entered strategies, assigned at the start of its 
life and agents did not change strategy during their lives. 
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Table 4.1: Move available to agents in the tournament simulation 
Move 
(represents) 
Information gained Payoff  
INNOVATE 
(Asocial 
learning) 
Act and payoff (without error) randomly chosen from 
those currently unknown to the agent. 
None. 
OBSERVE 
(Social 
learning) 
Act and payoff of nobserve demonstrators chosen at 
random from those playing EXPLOIT in the previous 
round. N(0, σpayoffError) error always added to payoff 
information. Incorrect, randomly chosen, act returned 
with probability pcopyActWrong. 
None. 
EXPLOIT 
(Performing 
behaviour) 
 
Current actual payoff of chosen act. 
Current 
payoff of 
chosen act. 
 
Agents could remember their own history of moves and payoffs, as well as 
their current behavioural repertoire. Along with the number of rounds the agent had 
been alive, this history and behavioural repertoire was the only information available 
to the entered strategies when deciding which move an agent should play. 
Evolutionary change was modelled as a death-birth process. Within a simulation, 
agents died with probability 0.02 per round, giving an expected lifespan of 50 rounds. 
Dying individuals were replaced by the offspring of agents selected to reproduce from 
those surviving with probability proportional to the agent’s mean lifetime payoff P 
defined as the sum of all its payoffs from playing EXPLOIT during its life, divided by 
the number of rounds it had been alive. The probability of individual z reproducing 
was Pz / ΣP, where ΣP was the summed mean lifetime payoff of the population in that 
round. 
Offspring usually carried their parent’s strategy, except for a small probability 
of mutation, in which case the offspring carried one of the other strategies available in 
the simulation. While the mutation rate used (0.02) was quite high relative to natural 
rates of mutation in eukaryotes, reducing this rate did not qualitatively affect the 
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outcomes, and the higher rate offers significant computational advantages in terms of 
time to equilibrium. 
The tournament received 104 entries, most, though not all, from academics 
across a wide range of disciplines, and from all over the world. The tournament was 
run in two stages. Strategies first competed in pairwise round-robin contests, taking 
turns to invade, or to resist invasion by, another strategy under a single set of 
conditions (strategy performance was unaffected by whether they were the invading 
or invaded strategy - Pearson correlation between invading and invaded scores, r = 
0.9998, p < 0.0001). The ten best performers progressed to a second stage, where all 
ten strategies competed simultaneously in melee contests over a range of simulation 
conditions. Scores in the first stage ranged from 0.02 to 0.89 (with a theoretical 
maximum of 1), indicating considerable variation in strategy effectiveness (shown in 
Figure 4.4a).  
 
Strategy evaluation Stage I: Round-robin pair-wise contests 
Strategies first took part in pair-wise contests against all other strategies. Each pair-
wise contest consisted of 10 simulations in which agents performing strategy A were 
introduced (using the mutation process described above) into a population containing 
only strategy B, and the reciprocal 10 simulations in which B was introduced into A-
dominated populations. This reciprocal invasion approach was used to ensure that the 
findings were robust to strategies’ initial frequencies. In each simulation, a population 
of the dominant strategy was introduced and run for 100 rounds without mutation so 
that agents could establish their behavioural repertoires. Mutation was then 
introduced, providing the second strategy the opportunity to invade, and simulations 
were run for a further 10,000 rounds. The mean frequency of a strategy over the last 
2,500 simulation rounds was its score for that simulation. Simulation scores were then 
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averaged over the 20 simulations, and this average recorded as the contest score for 
that strategy in that contest. Strategies were ranked on their average contest score 
once they had played against every other strategy. These simulations were run with 
the parameter set [pc=0.01, nobserve=1, pcopyActWrong=0.05, σpayoffError=1]. This stage 
involved 5,356 paired contests, with 107,120 (5,356×20) individual simulation runs. 
Initially, it was planned that the 10 highest scoring strategies would carry 
through to the next tournament phase, however the division cut off a series of 
strategies (ranked 6 to 24) with relatively small differences in their scores such that 
the initial ranking could plausibly have been dependent on the set of conditions 
(Figure 4.4a inset). Since it was important to be confident that the success of the 10 
best strategies was not due a chance match of any strategy to the specific single 
parameter set, more pair-wise contests on the top 24 strategies were run across a range 
of conditions.  
It was computationally feasible to run a further 8 conditions for the subset of 
strategies ranking in the top 24 of the first set of contests; these conditions are set out 
in Table 4.2. Note that the parameter σcopyPayoffError was not varied in these conditions, 
as the parameter pcopyActWrong affected the accuracy of social learning in a similar 
manner but to a stronger degree; to vary σcopyPayoffError orthogonally would 
unnecessarily duplicate effort in exploring the effect of the accuracy of social learning 
as well as doubling the computation time required. A single pair-wise simulation with 
two extra conditions was run, varying σcopyPayoffError from the initial condition above 
[pc=0.01, nobserve=1, pcopyActWrong=0.05, σcopyPayoffError=5], and [pc=0.01, nobserve=1, 
pcopyActWrong=0.05, σcopyPayoffError=10]. For all of these further conditions the number of 
repetitions per contest was reduced to 3 symmetric repetitions (i.e. 3 runs with 
strategy A as invader and 3 runs with strategy B as invader) as opposed to the 10 such 
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repetitions run for the initial pair-wise contest. The value 3 was selected based on 
Figure 4.1, which shows that the distribution of coefficient of variation values for 
each pair-wise contest does not change for more than 3 repetitions. 
 
Table 4.2: Details of further conditions run for top 24 strategies 
Condition pc nobserve pcopyActWrong σcopyPayoffError 
1 0.001   1   0.01  1 
2 0.1   1   0.01  1 
3 0.001   1   0.1  1 
4 0.1   1   0.1  1 
5 0.001   6   0.01  1 
6 0.1   6   0.01  1 
7 0.001   6   0.1  1 
8 0.1   6   0.1  1 
 
 
 
Figure 4.1: Boxplot of pair-wise coefficient of variation distributions by number of repetitions. 
 
These additional analyses required 13,248 further simulation runs 
(23×24×3×8). No strategy switched from the original pair-wise results by more than 
11 places, and the average change in rank was 2.5 places, suggesting it was highly 
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unlikely that any strategies outside the top 24 would have been elevated into the top 
10. The extra conditions resulted in two strategies from the original best 10 
(senescence and observe3ThenExploit) being dropped in favour of two others 
(livingdog and valueVariance) that had initially ranked 13 and 15 respectively. 
 
Strategy evaluation Stage II: Melee contests 
In the melee stage simulations, all ten of the strategies selected in Stage I competed 
simultaneously. Each simulation started with a population consisting of a simple 
strategy that did not use any social learning, but played INNOVATE on the first 
round of its life and subsequently played EXPLOIT continually with the single act 
that it acquired on the first round (this strategy was entered independently in the 
tournament as exploitOneInnovation. It did not progress past the pairwise phase, 
ranking 102nd). This strategy was used to avoid giving any of the ten competing 
strategies any advantage or disadvantage from being established in the population 
before the invasion of the others. Mutation was introduced from round 1, providing 
the competing strategies with equal opportunity to invade. Simulations were run for 
10,000 rounds, but mutation was turned off in the last quarter (i.e. rounds 7,500 – 
10,000). The mean frequencies of each strategy over the last quarter of each run were 
recorded as the scores for each strategy in that simulation. Strategies were then ranked 
on their average score across all simulations.  
Two sets of conditions were run, termed systematic and random. For the 
systematic condition set, a number of values for each of the four parameters were 
selected, pc, nobserve, pcopyActWrong, and σcopyPayoffError (Table 4.3). Fifty simulations were 
run with each of the 280 possible combinations of these parameter values giving 
14,000 simulations. To check that the results of this process were not unduly affected 
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by the specific parameter values chosen, random conditions, where parameter values 
were chosen at random from statistical distributions weighted in accordance with the 
values chosen for the systematic conditions were also run (Figure 4.2). These 
distributions were weighted toward lower values of pc, nobserve, and pcopyActWrong 
because higher values of these parameters were considered to be less biologically or 
ecologically plausible than lower ones. 1,000 unique sets of parameter values were 
selected in this way and a single simulation run with each set of values, giving a 
further 1,000 simulations. Systematic and random analyses gave identical returns on 
the ranked performance of the 10 strategies, computed across all simulations and 
based on their frequency in the last quarter of each simulation. Accordingly strategy 
scores were averaged over all 15,000 melee simulations to give the final scores. 
 
Table 4.3: Details of further conditions run for top 10 strategies; values in bold are those used 
for the main pair-wise contest in Stage I. 
 
Parameter Values 
pc 0.001, 0.005, 0.01, 0.05, 0.1, 0.2, 0.4 
nobserve 1, 2, 6, 12 
pcopyActWrong 0.01, 0.05, 0.1, 0.25, 0.5 
σcopyPayoffError 1, 10 
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Figure 4.2: Distributions of parameter values chosen for melee (Stage II). Blue bars are histograms of 
values chosen for the random conditions, red lines show values selected for systematic conditions. 
 
All simulations were run in the Matlab®/Octave computing environment, using both 
the UK National Grid Service and desktop computers. Entries could take the form of 
Matlab®/Octave code or prose pseudocode; in the latter case, the pseudocode was 
converted to real code. Coding errors were guarded against by recoding each strategy 
using a second independent coder, and testing that each version produced exactly 
identical results when given the same input sequences, including identical sequences 
of randomly-generated numbers when strategies made decisions stochastically. 
Strategies were restricted to take, on average, no longer than 25 times the duration of 
an example strategy provided in the rules to return a decision. No strategy failed this 
criterion, and there was no relationship at all between computation time and score in 
the pair-wise phase of the tournament (Figure 4.3). 
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Figure 4.3: Strategy scores in pair-wise tournament phase plotted against the average per-round 
computation time, expressed as a multiple of the time taken by an example strategy. 
 
Statistical analyses 
The factors that made a strategy successful in the pair-wise-contests (Stage I) were 
examined using linear multiple regression and model selection, with contest score as 
the dependent variable. For each strategy, a range of possible predictors of a 
strategy’s score was established (Table 4.4), and these were entered into an all-
possible-subsets model comparison procedure. The analysis was run with all 
strategies and subsequently with only the top 24 to see if the same factors were 
responsible for success in the broadest context and when competing only against 
successful strategies. In each case, the package ‘leaps’ in the statistical package R was 
used to return the five best models for each subset of predictors, selected by Mallow’s 
Cp. The model that minimised Akaike’s Information Criterion (AIC) was then 
selected, although results were very similar when model selection was based on 
Bayesian Information Criterion (BIC). Finally, predictor effect sizes were calculated 
as beta weights using the package ‘yhat’. 
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Table 4.4: Predictors entered into model selection 
Predictor name Explanation 
Check central payoff? (Y=1, N=0) Categorical variable indicating whether a 
strategy checked any central tendency (e.g. 
mean) in the payoff values in the agent’s 
history, either from learning or EXPLOIT. 
Check mean EXPLOIT? (Y=1, N=0) Categorical variable indicating whether a 
strategy checked the mean payoff from 
playing EXPLOIT in the agent’s history. 
Estimate nObserve? (Y=1, N=0) Categorical variable indicating whether a 
strategy estimated the value of the 
parameter nObserve. 
Estimate pc? (Y=1, N=0) Categorical variable indicating whether a 
strategy estimated the rate of environmental 
change as given by the parameter pc. 
Flexible behavior? (Y=1, N=0) Categorical variable indicating whether a 
strategy’s choice of move was affected by 
the outcome of previous moves, or always 
followed a predetermined series of moves. 
Log of variance in rounds to EXPLOIT Pooled variance, across all agents with the 
strategy, in the number of rounds between 
the ‘birth’ of an agent with the strategy and 
the first time the agent played EXPLOIT 
(continuous measure). The log of this value 
was used as exploratory analysis showed a 
log-linear relationship with score. 
Mean rounds between learning moves Average number of rounds between any 
learning moves (OBSERVE or 
INNOVATE), across all agents with the 
strategy (continuous). 
Proportion of learning moves Average proportion of moves dedicated to 
learning (either OBSERVE or 
INNOVATE), across all agents with the 
strategy (continuous). 
Proportion of learning that is OBSERVE Average proportion of learning moves that 
were OBSERVE, across all agents with the 
strategy (continuous). 
Stochastic? (Y=1, N=0) Categorical variable indicating whether a 
strategy ever chose between actions 
stochastically, i.e. dependent on the draw of 
a random number. 
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RESULTS 
Statistical analysis of all 104 strategies returned a best model containing 5 predictors 
of a strategy’s score, although not all were significant at α = 0.05 in that model (Table 
4.5). Strong effects of “Proportion of learning that is OBSERVE” and  “Variance in 
time to first EXPLOIT” and moderate effects of “Proportion of learning moves” and 
“Average rounds between learning moves” were detected. The categorical variable 
indicating whether a strategy estimated the rate of environmental change apparently 
had a positive effect, but high variability within categories meant that the mean 
effects were not significant at α = 0.05 (Figure 4.5a). When the same analysis was 
restricted to just the 24 top-scoring strategies a different, and reduced, set of 
predictors emerged (Table 4.6). However, the best-fit model in this analysis was not 
able to explain as much variation as the analysis with all strategies. 
In this reduced model, the categorical variable indicating whether a strategy 
had flexible behaviour was retained with the largest effect size, in place of the 
variable indicating whether a strategy estimated the value of pc (Figure 4.5b). The 
proportion of learning moves was retained with a large negative effect. The log of the 
variance in time to EXPLOIT was also retained with a significant negative effect, as 
in the model with all strategies. Two predictors present in the model with all strategies 
were dropped in this model - the proportion of learning moves dedicated to 
OBSERVE, and the categorical variable indicating whether a strategy estimated the 
rate of environmental change. Finally, the mean number of rounds between learning 
moves had a significant effect in both analyses. However, the effect is in opposite 
directions when considering data from all strategies, where there is an apparent 
positive relationship, compared to data from only the top 24 strategies, where the 
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effect is negative (Figure 4.6). Thus, when competing against other effective 
strategies, it was detrimental to leave too many rounds between learning moves. 
 
 
Figure 4.4: Performance of entered strategies. (a) Ranked overall strategy scores in the final stage of 
the tournament (cWYTLWPD = copyWhenYoungThenLearnWhen-PayoffsDrop and wTGGTGS = 
whenTheGoingGetsToughGetScrounging). Scores are averaged over all final stage simulations. Inset 
shows scores for all 104 entered strategies. Dotted black line indicates the ten highest scoring 
strategies; solid red line indicates the 24 strategies entered into further pair-wise conditions. (b) Ranked 
scores from those final stage simulations in which conditions were chosen at random (33), and under 
the same conditions but with the tournament winner, discountmachine, re-coded to learn only with 
INNOVATE and never OBSERVE (red). (c) As (b) but comparing original results with pcopyActWrong 
fixed at 0 (red). (d) Average individual fitness, measured as mean lifetime payoff, in populations 
containing only single strategies for each of the final stage contestants, ranked by tournament placing. 
Data are average values from the last quarter of single simulations, run under the same conditions as 
the first stage of the tournament, and also under the same conditions except with pcopyActWrong = 0. The 
horizontal dashed line represents the mean lifetime payoff of individuals when all strategies are played 
together under the same conditions. Strategies relying exclusively on social learning are those ranked 1, 
2 and 4. Error bars are ± SEM, but mostly not visible as all SEMs<0.004. 
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Table 4.5: Parameters of the AIC best-fit model predicting strategy scores in the first, pairwise, 
tournament stage. Adjusted R2=0.76. 
Predictor Effect size        
(β weight) 
β S.E. t p(>|t|) 
(Intercept) - 0.32 0.06 5.43 <0.0001 
Proportion of learning that is 
OBSERVE 
0.42 0.43 0.06 7.15 <0.0001 
Variance in rounds to first 
EXPLOIT* 
-0.42 -0.06 0.01 -6.62 <0.0001 
Proportion of learning moves -0.17 -0.34 0.12 -2.79 0.0063 
Average rounds between 
learning moves 
0.16 0.01 <0.01 3.09 0.0026 
Estimate pc? (Y=1, N=0) -0.07 -0.04 0.03 -1.47 0.1452 
* natural log of this predictor was used to give a better linear relationship 
 
 
 
Figure 4.5: Box plots showing scores for strategies that did or did not (a) estimate the rate of 
environmental change and (b) have flexible behaviour in the sense that behaviour was conditional on 
the move history or current repertoire of an agent. Data are from pair-wise contests. 
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Table 4.6: Best model for pair-wise strategy scores using top 24 strategies only. Adjusted 
R2=0.50. 
Predictor Effect size        
(β weight) 
β S.E. t p(>|t|) 
(Intercept) - 0.98 0.14 6.95 <0.0001 
Flexible behavior? (Y=1, N=0) 0.69 0.34 0.13 2.75 0.0127 
Proportion of learning moves -0.64 -2.74 0.78 -3.52 0.0023 
Average rounds between learning moves -0.61 -0.01 0.01 -2.35 0.0298 
Variance in rounds to first EXPLOIT* -0.47 -0.05 0.02 -3.11 0.0058 
*We used the natural log of this predictor to give a better linear relationship 
 
 
 
Figure 4.6: Final score against the mean number of rounds between learning moves. Data from all pair-
wise contests are labelled ‘All strategies’ data restricted to contests between the top 24 strategies are 
labelled ‘Top 24 only’. Note that for the latter, the mean score is calculated from contests involving 
only those 24 strategies, so appear lower than might initially be expected. 
 
The ten highest scoring strategies from the pair-wise phase then progressed to the 
melee phase, in which all ten strategies competed simultaneously in series of 
simulations across a broad range of parameter values. Strategies were ranked 
according to their score averaged over all melee simulations. The highest scoring 
strategy in this phase, and therefore the tournament winner, discountmachine, was the 
same strategy that scored highest in the first, pair-wise, phase, and scored highest in 
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both the random and systematic analysis of the melee. This strategy won 
convincingly, although with the second placed strategy, intergeneration, it formed a 
pair of strategies that performed markedly better than the other contenders (Figure 
4.4a).  
All ten melee strategies were responsive to changes in the rate of 
environmental variation in that they all increased the amount of learning they did at 
higher rates of variation (Figure 4.7a). Most strategies continued to increase the 
amount of learning as variation rates increased, although four did not, including the 
top two, in that they appeared to cap the amount of learning they did even as rates of 
environmental change continued to increase. The second placed strategy stands out 
has having the lowest learning rates of all the melee contenders. While all strategies 
continued to learn to some extent throughout the agent’s lives, the winner stood out 
by distributing learning almost equally across different phases of life (Figure 4.7b). In 
contrast, the second placed strategy had the highest variance in learning rates, 
concentrating over 60% of its learning in the first third of the agent’s lives. This 
contrast goes some way to explaining the relative performance of the strategies in 
varying rates of environmental change. When the environment is relatively static, low 
learning rates overall and a concentration at the beginning of life are advantageous to 
intergeneration, as the acquired information is less likely to change, while in 
changeable environments, the higher lifelong learning rates of discountmachine give 
it the upper hand.  
When learning, all melee strategies used OBSERVE at least 50% of the time, 
regardless of the conditions (Figure 4.7c-d). There was a great deal of variation in 
how strategies changed their use of social and asocial learning as conditions varied. 
Notably, the top two ranked strategies, as well as two others (wePreyClan and 
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dynamicAspirationLevel, ranked 4th and 6th respectively) played OBSERVE almost all 
the time, regardless of how much the environment was changing (Figure 4.7c) or what 
the relative costs of social and asocial learning were (Figure 4.7d). The other 
strategies showed a variety of responses to both variables, with some increasing the 
amount of social learning with increasing environmental variation and reduced cost of 
social learning, and others decreasing the amount of social learning under the same 
conditions. 
The timing of (either form of) learning also emerged as a crucial factor. 
Strategies with a high variance in the number of rounds spent learning before the 
agent first played EXPLOIT, caused by occasionally waiting too long before 
beginning to exploit, tended to do poorly (Figure 4.8b). Conversely, strategies that 
engaged in longer bouts of exploiting between learning moves tended to do 
significantly better (Figure 4.8d). In general, successful strategies were able to target 
the timing of their learning moves effectively, increasing the amount of learning in 
periods immediately following significant drops in average lifetime payoff in the 
population caused by environmental change that reduced the payoff of a commonly 
exploited act, but also quickly dropping back to low levels of learning so as to 
maximize the amount of exploiting (Figure 4.8c). To quantify this, the maximum 
absolute lagged Pearson correlation value was calculated between the time series of 
the average lifetime payoff in the population and the proportion of the population 
playing a learning move, for 200 of the random melee simulations. To compare this 
with less effective strategies, the strategy piRounds, that chose an action based on the 
digit of π that corresponded to the age of an agent (i.e. behaved at random) and which 
ranked 88 in the pair-wise phase, and the nine strategies ranked immediately above it 
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were selected, and calculated the same maximum correlation values for these 
strategies when they played 200 rounds under the same conditions.  
 
Figure 4.7: Why the winner won. (a) Proportion and (b) timing of learning moves in the final 
tournament stage. First and second place strategies are highlighted; the rank of the other strategies is 
indicated by shading, with darker shading indicating higher rank. (c-d) Variation in the proportion of 
learning moves that were OBSERVE with (c) variation in the rate of environmental change (pc) and (d) 
the number of agents sampled when playing OBSERVE  (nobserve), in the final tournament stage. Error 
bars are ± SEM, but mostly not visible as all SEMs<0.003 
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Figure 4.8: Key variables affecting strategy performance. (a) Final score plotted against the proportion 
of learning (i.e. INNOVATE or OBSERVE) moves that were OBSERVE in the first tournament stage. 
(b) Final score against the variance in the number of rounds before the first EXPLOIT. (c) Final score 
against the proportion of rounds spent learning in the first tournament stage. In both, each point 
represents the average value for one strategy. (d) Final score against the mean number of rounds 
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between learning moves. (e) Time series plots of the per-round average individual mean lifetime payoff 
in the population and proportion of learning moves, from 1000 simulation rounds run under identical 
conditions with the final stage contestants (top panel) and the strategies ranked 79-88 in the first 
tournament stage (lower panel). 
 
For melee strategies, the largest absolute correlations were always negative 
(Figure 4.9), and always with a positive lag of 1 or 2, indicating a rapid increase in 
learning almost immediately after payoff drops. In contrast, the maximum 
correlations for the less effective strategies were less strong, not always negative and 
occurred at a more diverse range of lags. Successful strategies targeted learning to 
periods when it was likely to be most valuable (i.e. when the environment changed) 
but otherwise minimised learning, allowing them both to improve their payoffs 
through learning, and to maintain high rates of exploiting. The issue of when to break 
off exploiting current knowledge in order to invest in further knowledge gain – the 
exploitation/exploration trade-off – had not been incorporated into previous theory in 
this field, and the tournament introduces this new dimension into the domain of 
understanding social learning. 
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Figure 4.9: Boxplot of maximum absolute lagged Pearson correlation values between average lifetime 
payoff and proportion of learning in a population for effective (Rank 1-10) and less effective (Rank 78-
88) strategies. 
 
The timing of learning was not, however, the only key to success. The winning 
strategy stood out by spreading learning more evenly across agent lifespans than any 
other second stage strategy (Figure 4.7b). It did this by using a proxy of geometric 
discounting to estimate expected future payoffs from either learning or playing 
EXPLOIT. Importantly, it also relied more heavily on recently acquired than older 
information. The top two strategies shared the following expression for estimating the 
expected payoff (wexpected) of a known behaviour: 
 
,     (4.1) 
 
where w is the current payoff held in the agent’s memory and acquired i rounds ago, 
w¯ est is the estimated mean payoff for all behaviour, and pest is an estimate of pc, the 
probability of payoff change. This expression weights expected payoffs increasingly 
towards an estimated mean as the time since information was last obtained increases. 
Given the uncertain and potentially conflicting nature of information obtained through 
social learning, the winning strategy used a further weighting based on its estimate of 
pc, discounting older social information more severely in more variable environments 
than in relatively constant ones. No other strategies in the melee round evaluated 
payoffs in this way (See Chapter 6 for a full discussion).  
The winning strategy used social learning virtually exclusively – it would play 
INNOVATE only on the second round of an agent’s life if, after playing OBSERVE 
on the first, there was no behaviour observed, i.e. no other agent in the population 
wexp = w 1! pest( )i +west 1! 1! pest( )i( )
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played EXPLOIT. That this reliance on social learning was crucial to its success is 
shown by the results of running the random conditions melee again but with a version 
of discountmachine re-coded to learn only by playing INNOVATE (Figure 4.4b). In 
this analysis, the innovate-only version places last against the other melee strategies, 
and, interestingly, other strategies change scores significantly, such that the second 
placed tournament strategy does not win and is instead overtaken by 4 other 
strategies. This result suggests that there are frequency-dependent effects present. 
Seemingly, discountmachine inhibits the fitness of other melee strategies when it 
relies exclusively on OBSERVE. 
Previous theory suggests that reliance on social learning should not necessarily 
raise the average fitness of individuals in a population (Rogers 1988, Feldman et al. 
1996, Wakano et al. 2004), and may even depress it (see Chapter 2).This was not the 
case with the melee strategies in the tournament where average lifetime payoff was 
positively correlated with proportion of OBSERVE moves (Figure 4.10a). It was also 
possible to look at this relationship for strategies that had performed relatively poorly 
in the first, pair-wise, phase of the tournament, running 200 random condition melee 
rounds with the strategies that ranked 78-88 for comparison. Poorly performing 
strategies showed a relationship between average individual fitness and the rate of 
social learning that was strongly negative (Figure 4.10b), the opposite of the result for 
the melee strategies. This highlights the importance of the strategic use of social 
learning in raising the average fitness in a population (Boyd and Richerson 1985, 
Laland 2004, Henrich and McElreath 2003). 
This contrast between the results and previous theory can be explained by noting 
that the tournament structure contained a mechanism by which social learning can 
result in new behaviour entering the population, through the parameter pcopyActWrong, 
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the probability that OBSERVE returns not the observed act, but another randomly 
selected act. When 200 random condition melee rounds were run with the melee 
strategies with pcopyActWrong set to zero, the positive correlation between average 
individual fitness and the rate of social learning amongst melee strategies disappeared 
and became instead strongly negative (r = -0.30, p < 0.001; Figure 4.10c). Thus, when 
there is no copy error, high levels of social learning are associated with reduced 
average individual fitness in the population. 
 
 
 
Figure 4.10: The average lifetime payoff in a population against the mean proportion of OBSERVE 
when learning, for (a) strategies in melee phase with pcopyActWrong > 0, (b) strategies ranked 78-88 in pair-
wise phase with pcopyActWrong > 0, and (c) strategies in melee phase with pcopyActWrong fixed at 0. Results are 
means over the last quarter of 200 simulations across randomly selected conditions. 
 
The effect of pcopyActWrong and the presence of frequency dependent effects is further 
illustrated by analysis of the performance of each strategy by itself. For all melee 
strategies, single simulations containing only one strategy were run, using the same 
conditions as in the pair-wise tournament phase. The same simulations were then run 
again but with pcopyActWrong set to zero, and the results compared in terms of the 
average individual mean lifetime payoff in each population. Under the pair-wise 
conditions, there was a strong inverse relationship between the mean lifetime payoffs 
of strategies playing alone and their scores in the tournament melee – lower ranked 
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strategies had higher fitness when playing alone than those ranked higher (Figure 
4.4d). The effect of setting pcopyActWrong = 0 is dramatic for those strategies that rely 
exclusively on OBSERVE, with the average individual payoffs in populations 
containing only those strategies dropping to one quarter or less of their previous 
values. This again suggests that copy error is a significant source of novel behaviour. 
However, the strategy that ranked 6th, dynamicAspirationLevel, while relying heavily 
on OBSERVE, did not do so exclusively (average proportion of learning moves that 
were OBSERVE was 0.995 across all melee simulations), and its performance when 
playing by itself was unaffected by setting pcopyActWrong = 0; thus in this model 
relatively small amounts of innovation can bring in enough new behaviour to 
maintain payoff levels.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                
The two most successful strategies, discountmachine and intergeneration, 
each had unique features: the former had a neural network, which it used to decide 
between learning and exploiting alternatives, while the latter deployed behaviour 
designed to pass signals from older to younger agents regarding what should be 
considered a good payoff. The analyses suggest, however, that it was not these unique 
features that were crucial to their success, as re-runs of the random conditions melee 
with versions of these strategies coded to remove these unique features produced 
results identical to the original tournament (Figure 4.11). The role of the neural 
network in the success of the winner, discountmachine, was further investigated by 
playing it against the version of itself without a neural network across 1,000 random 
melee conditions. The complete version tended to do increasingly better than the 
reduced version as pc increased (linear regression of difference between the scores of 
the strategies against pc across 1,000 conditions: β = 1.78, s.e. = 0.2, t = 8.97, d.f. = 
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998, p < 0.00001), indicating that under certain conditions the neural network did 
make a positive contribution to the strategy’s performance. 
 
Figure 4.11: Ranked scores from tournament random conditions melee and from runs under the same 
conditions with the strategies discountmachine and intergeneration re-coded to remove, respectively, 
the neural network in discountmachine and the attempted intergenerational signalling of 
intergeneration.  
 
OBSERVE moves revealed information about the payoff of behaviour as well as 
the behaviour. TO examine the implications of this assumption for the tournament 
results, the random conditions melee was run a further time, devaluing information 
about social learning payoffs by making payoff observation extremely unreliable 
(setting sigma, the standard deviation of payoff observation error, to 50, when payoffs 
themselves are generally in the range 0-50). Under these conditions OBSERVE 
essentially provided no information about payoff. Nonetheless, while the tournament 
result is altered in the sense that a different winner emerges, the new winning and 
second-place strategies, which ranked 4th and 6th in the tournament proper, also use 
social learning in >95% and >97% of all learning moves respectively (Figure 4.12). 
Thus the success of social learning in the tournament does not depend on the ability to 
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observe demonstrator payoffs. These are surprising results, given that the error-prone 
nature of social learning is widely thought to be a weakness of this form of learning, 
whilst the ability to copy multiple models rapidly or preferentially copy high-payoff 
behaviour are regarded as strengths (Richerson and Boyd 2005). Strategies relying 
heavily on social learning did best irrespective of the number of individuals sampled 
by OBSERVE (Figure 4.7d). These findings are particularly striking in the light of 
previous theoretical analyses (Boyd and Richerson 1985, Rogers 1988, Feldman et al. 
1996, Kameda and Nakanishi 2003, Wakano et al. 2004, Enquist et al. 2007, Kendal 
et al. 2009), virtually all of which have posited some structural cost to asocial 
learning and errors in social learning. An established rule in ecology specifies that, 
among competitors for a resource, the dominant competitor will be the species that 
can persist at the lowest resource level (Tilman 1982). An equivalent rule may apply 
when alternative social learning strategies compete in a population: the strategy that 
eventually dominates will be the one that can persist with the lowest frequency of 
asocial learning (Kendal et al. 2009). The tournament findings are consistent with this 
hypothesis. 
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Figure 4.12: Ranked scores from tournament random conditions melee and from runs under the same 
conditions except with σpayoffError set to 50 so as to make the OBSERVE move uninformative with 
regard to the payoffs of the learned behaviour. 
 
Filtering of adaptive information by demonstrators also underpinned the 
success of social learning in the tournament. To investigate this an alternative 
simulation model was run in which OBSERVE returned a behaviour chosen at 
random from a demonstrator’s repertoire with the behaviour the demonstrator had 
chosen to exploit removed, thereby preventing the filtering of information by rational 
agents choosing to exploit their best behaviour. A series of such modified simulations 
were run in which the tournament winner and a version of itself altered to learn only 
by INNOVATE played against each other, together with the exploitOneInnovation 
strategy used to initiate simulations in the melee phase of the tournament. The rate of 
environmental change (pc) across simulations was systematically varied. Five 
simulations were run at each level of pc, and the other parameters were fixed at 
nobserve=1, pcopyActWrong=0.05, and σpayoffError=1, identical to the first phase of the 
tournament. The results showed that discountmachine’s innovating cousin generally 
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dominated the population irrespective of the rate of environmental change (Figure 
4.13a). A second analysis, using simulations in which OBSERVE returned a 
behaviour chosen at random from a demonstrator’s repertoire with the behaviour the 
demonstrator had chosen to exploit retained, also dramatically reduced the range over 
which social learning prospered, restricting this to highly stable environmental 
conditions. These results clearly demonstrate that the filtering of information by 
informed individuals is crucial to the success of social learning. In the absence of this 
filtering, social learning is in fact costly enough, through its associated errors and 
propensity to fail to introduce new behaviour to an agent (which occurred at a rate of 
53% of OBSERVE moves in the first phase of the tournament), to be selectively 
disadvantaged. 
 
 
 
Figure 4.13: (a) Results of a series of simulations in which the tournament winner played against a 
version of itself altered to learn only by INNOVATE in a model where OBSERVE returned a 
behaviour selected at random from a demonstrator’s repertoire. (b) Results of a series of simulations in 
which the tournament winner played against a version of itself altered to learn only by INNOVATE in 
a model where OBSERVE returned no behaviour in the event of a copying error (rather than a 
randomly selected behaviour as in the original tournament). 
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DISCUSSION 
 
The most significant outcome of the tournament is the remarkable success of 
strategies that rely heavily on copying when learning, in spite of the absence of a 
structural cost to asocial learning, an observation evocative of human culture. This 
outcome was not anticipated by the tournament organisers, nor by the committee of 
experts established to oversee the tournament, nor, judging by the high variance in 
reliance on social learning (Figure 4.8a), by most of the tournament entrants. While 
the outcome is in some respects consistent with models that used simpler 
environmental conditions and in which individual learning is inherently costly relative 
to social learning (Boyd and Richerson 1985), in the tournament the environment was 
complex and there was no inherent fitness cost to asocial learning. Indeed, there 
turned out to be a considerable cost to social learning, as it failed to introduce new 
behaviour into an agent’s repertoire in 53% of all the OBSERVE moves in the first 
tournament phase, overwhelmingly because agents observed behaviours they already 
knew. Nonetheless, social learning proved advantageous because other agents were 
rational in demonstrating the behaviour in their repertoire with the highest payoff, 
thereby making adaptive information available for others to copy. This is confirmed 
by modified simulations wherein social learners could not benefit from this filtering 
process, in which social learning performed poorly (Figure 4.13b). Under any random 
payoff distribution, if one observes an agent using the best of several behaviours that 
it knows about, then the expected payoff of this behaviour is much higher than the 
average payoff of all behaviours, which is the expected return for innovating. 
Previous theory has proposed that individuals should critically evaluate which form of 
learning to adopt in order to ensure that social learning is only used adaptively 
(Enquist et al. 2007), but a conclusion from the tournament is that this may not be 
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necessary. Provided the copied individuals themselves have selected the best 
behaviour to perform from at least two possible options, social learning will be 
adaptive. It is possible that this is the reason why copying is widespread in the animal 
kingdom.  
That social learning was critical to the success of the winning strategy is 
shown by the results of running the random conditions portion of the second 
tournament stage with a version of discountmachine recoded to learn only by 
INNOVATE – it came last (Figure 4.4b). It was also shown that discountmachine 
dominated its recoded cousin across a large portion of the plausible parameters space 
with respect to environmental change (Figure 4.14), with payoffs needing to change 
with 50% probability per round before the INNOVATE-only version could gain a 
foothold. This is another way that the tournament challenges existing theory, which 
predicts that evolution will inevitably lead to a stable equilibrium where both social 
and asocial learning persist in a population (e.g. Rogers 1988).  
It is important to note that, while this tournament may offer greater realism 
than past analytical theory, the simulation framework remains a simplification of the 
real world where, for instance, model-based biases and direct interactions between 
individuals operate (Apesteguia et al. 2007). It remains to be established to what 
extent the results will hold if these are introduced in future tournaments, where the 
specific strategies that prospered here may not do so well. Nonetheless, the basic 
generality of the multi-armed bandit problem lends confidence that the insights 
derived from the tournament may be quite general. 
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Figure 4.14: Results of a series of simulations in which the tournament winner played against a version 
of itself altered to learn only by INNOVATE. The rate of environmental change (pc) was systematically 
varied. Five simulations were run at each level of pc. Other parameters were fixed at nobserve=1, 
pcopyActWrong=0.05, and σpayoffError=1. 
 
The tournament also draws attention to the significance of social learning 
errors as a source of adaptive behavioural diversity. In the tournament, there was a 
probability, pcopyActWrong, that a social learner acquired a randomly selected behaviour 
rather than the observed behaviour. Modelling social learning errors in this way 
means new behaviour can enter the population without explicit innovation. The 
importance of these errors is illustrated by the fact that strategies relying exclusively 
on social learning were unable to maintain high individual fitness when 
 (Figure 4.4d). This does not mean that the success of the winning 
strategy depended on the condition pcopyActWrong > 0 – in the presence of other 
strategies providing the necessary innovations, discountmachine and intergeneration 
maintain their respective first and second places when pcopyActWrong = 0 (Figure 4.4c). 
Other models have highlighted copying errors as potentially important in human 
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cultural evolution (Henrich and Boyd 2002), but the extent to which adaptive 
innovations actually come about through such errors is an important empirical 
question ripe for investigation.   
The ability to evaluate current information based on its age, and to judge how 
valuable that information might be in the future, given knowledge of rates of 
environmental change, is also highlighted by the tournament. There is limited 
empirical evidence that animals are able to discount information based on the time 
since it was acquired (Van Bergen et al. 2004), but little doubt that humans are 
capable of such computation. The tournament suggests that the adaptive use of social 
learning could be critically linked to such cognitive abilities. There are obvious 
parallels with the largely open question of mental time-travel, the ability to project 
current conditions into the future, in non-humans (Suddendorf 2007), raising the 
hypothesis that this cognitive ability could be one factor behind the gulf between 
human culture and any non-human counterpart (see Chapter 6). A critical next step 
will be to evaluate experimentally to what extent human behaviour mirrors that of the 
tournament strategies (e.g. Salganik 2006). By drawing attention to the importance of 
adaptive filtering by the copied individual and temporal discounting by the copier, the 
tournament helps to explain both why social learning is common in nature and why 
human beings happen to be so good at it. 
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SECTION 2, CHAPTER 5: 
HOW COPYING AFFECTS THE AMOUNT, EVENNESS AND PERSISTENCE OF CULTURAL 
KNOWLEDGE: INSIGHTS FROM THE SOCIAL LEARNING STRATEGIES TOURNAMENT  
 
Material from this chapter is published as:  
Rendell, L.E., Boyd, R, Enquist, M., Feldman, M.W., Fogarty, L & Laland, K.N. 
2011, How copying affects the amount, evenness and persistence of cultural 
knowledge: insights from the social learning strategies tournament, Philosophical 
Transactions of the Royal Society B: Biological Sciences, vol 366, pp. 1118-1128. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Understanding the evolution of human culture is one of the greatest challenges facing 
science. The gulf between the complexity of human culture and cognition and that 
observed in other animals is so vast that to many it has seemed unbridgeable. 
Nonetheless, evolutionary links are there to be found. Most behavioural biologists 
now acknowledge, for example, the existence of diverse behavioural traditions 
observed in other apes and monkeys (Emery and Clayton 2004; Sumpter 2006; 
Conradt and List 2009), the surprisingly complex cognition of corvids (Emery and 
Clayton 2004), and the impressive collective decision-making and rich social 
behaviour of insect societies (Sumpter 2006; Conradt and List 2009). Yet the fact 
remains that however much we talk up these phenomena, there is a chasm between 
our achievements and theirs. If one accepts the argument that chimpanzees, and for 
that matter monkeys, whales, birds and fishes, have some semblance of culture, then 
one must acknowledge that the ‘culture’ of nonhuman animals is very different from 
our own. 
 Such reasoning leads to two kinds of question. First, in what ways do the 
processes that underlie human culture differ from those observed in other animals, 
such that they can create such distinct patterns of behavioural, social and 
technological complexity. Second, how did those processes that underlie human 
culture evolve out of the kind of rudimentary capabilities observed in other animals?  
In simple terms, we can ask ‘what is the gap?’ and ‘how can we bridge it?’ Here, to 
answer these questions, this analysis draws on and extends insights into the evolution 
of culture that emerged from the social learning strategies tournament (see Chapter 4 
for a full discussion). The current chapter uses the same model framework to 
investigate how the strategies that were successful in the tournament affect cultural 
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evolution. Here the analyses of the tournament results discussed in Chapter 4 are 
extended to consider how the strategies that did well affect the amount, evenness, and 
persistence of cultural traits. 
Amongst the striking differences between human and animal culture is the 
sheer amount of culture that humans possess. Here, the amount of culture refers to the 
number of cultural traits that a population knows about, or actually expresses in 
behaviour, which are labelled the amount of knowledge and behaviour respectively. 
This analysis investigates the relationship between these quantities and the learning 
strategies deployed in a population, expressed as the amount and type (social or 
asocial) of learning used.  
Using the tournament structure it is also possible to investigate how 
evolutionarily successful strategies affect the evenness of culture, which is defined 
here as the flatness or uniformity of the distributions of knowledge and expressed 
behaviour across a population. Logic suggests that copying should increase the 
behavioural evenness exhibited by a population, since copying generates homogeneity 
in exhibited behaviour, but it is less clear whether and how copying will affect the 
evenness of acquired knowledge.  
Finally, this chapter looks at how these strategies affect the persistence of 
cultural traits, which is defined here as the average length of time individual traits 
persist, given that they became known or expressed by at least one individual, either 
in the knowledge or the expressed behaviour of at least one individual in a population. 
Human culture is uniquely cumulative, with each generation building upon the 
cultural knowledge of the previous generations (Tomasello 1994). Cumulative culture 
requires cultural traits to persist for long enough to allow refinements or elaborations 
of acquired knowledge (Enquist et al. 2010). The cultures of other animals are 
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frequently characterized by ‘lightning traditions’, which rapidly sweep through a 
group of animals, and then are replaced as quickly, with little sign of any 
accumulation of knowledge (Laland et al. 1993). Conversely, humans today possess 
knowledge first acquired many thousands of years ago. It is plausible that the 
preservation of acquired knowledge over long periods of time creates the opportunity 
for refinement, elaboration and diversification (Enquist et al. 2010; Lewis and Laland 
in press), and that this again explains some of the uniqueness of human culture. The 
data generated by the tournament can be used to explore how the proportion of 
learning moves that is OBSERVE affects the longevity of cultural knowledge. The 
analysis considers how the level of copying affects the average persistence of both 
exploited behaviour and behavioural knowledge in the population’s repertoire. 
One of the challenges facing a developing theory of cultural evolution is to 
link the small-scale, social learning decisions of individuals to the creation and 
subsequent evolution of the collections of knowledge, tradition, language and 
behaviour that characterize populations. The tournament is effective both because it 
proposes specific means by which copying may be implemented strategically to 
enhance copying efficiency, and because it illustrates the population-level 
consequences of such strategies. The sections below first summarise the methods and 
findings of the social learning strategies tournament then present analyses of 
tournament simulations designed to shed light on how copying affects the longevity, 
evenness and amount of cultural knowledge in the virtual ‘cultures’ constructed by 
the strategies that did well in the tournament. Finally, these insights are collated to 
shed light on both the field of cultural evolution and, more generally, understanding 
of the evolution of culture. 
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THE DYNAMICS OF CULTURAL KNOWLEDGE AND BEHAVIOUR: FACTORS AFFECTING 
AMOUNT, EVENNESS AND PERSISTENCE  
Methods 
The tournament was run as described in detail in Chapter 4. The initial tournament 
analysis (Chapter 4) focussed primarily at the individual level, asking how and why 
individuals using certain strategies performed well. However, the tournament 
framework also allowed us to explore factors such as how copying affects the amount 
of cultural knowledge at the population level. Each simulation contained 100 
individuals; each of those individuals has, at any one time, a set of behaviour patterns 
in its repertoire (almost always a subset of the 100 possible behaviour patterns defined 
in the multi-armed bandit). These combined repertoires thus constitute the combined 
knowledge of that population. The population can also be characterised by the set of 
behaviour patterns it is performing, provided at least one individual is playing 
EXPLOIT at a given time. This distinction between things individuals know about 
and things individuals actually do, between knowledge and behaviour, is not often 
captured in theoretical studies of cultural evolution, and cultural evolution theory has 
been criticised precisely for this reason (Cronk 1995). It is however a core feature of 
the tournament model that behaviour and knowledge can be distinguished. Here these 
two aspects of culture are investigated independently, by using simulations that keep 
track of three simple measures characterising the knowledge and behaviour present in 
these virtual cultures. 
The first quantity tracked was simply the number of different behaviour 
patterns present, which was expressed as a proportion of the 100 possible behaviour 
patterns defined by the multi-armed bandit. Both the proportion (out of 100) of 
possible behaviour patterns that were known – i.e. that were present in the repertoire 
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of at least one individual – and the proportion that were actually performed in an 
EXPLOIT move by at least one individual were measured. These proportions were 
labelled the amount of knowledge and behaviour respectively; they measure the 
number of behaviour patterns known about, or performed, by a population at a given 
time.  
Second, to describe what is here termed evenness in the context of this paper, 
the flatness of the frequency distribution of behaviour patterns across the population 
was measured using Pielou’s evenness index (Smith and Wilson 1996). This is a 
measure used in quantifying species evenness in ecological communities based on the 
Shannon-Wiener diversity index, and is given by 
J =
! pi ln pi
i=1
S
"
ln S( )  ,    (5.1) 
where S is the number of species present in a sample, and pi is the relative frequency 
of species i in the sample. In this case, it is used as a measure of the distribution of 
behaviour patterns, so S is the number of possible behaviour patterns (100) and pi is 
the number of individuals in the population at that iteration with that behaviour. The 
value of J can range from 0 to 1, the latter representing maximum evenness. For 
example, consider a sample of 100 individuals, in an environment where 5 behaviour 
patterns were possible. Maximum evenness would be if twenty individuals each 
performed one behaviour (p = [0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2], J = 1), while minimum evenness 
would be if 100 individuals performed one behaviour and none performed the others 
(p = [1 0 0 0 0], J = 0). An uneven distribution of behaviour with most individuals 
choosing the same behaviour could come about through conformism, the strategy of 
preferentially copying the most commonly seen behaviour, the importance of which 
in human culture is an area of active debate (Eriksson et al. 2007; Henrich and Boyd 
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1998). This analysis was used to explore the extent to which apparently conformist 
outcomes, such as an uneven distribution of behaviour, could arise in the absence of 
explicitly conformist strategies being deployed by individual agents (Franz and 
Matthews 2010). 
Finally, the rate of cultural turnover was investigated by calculating what was 
termed the persistence of knowledge and expressed behaviour. Persistence was the 
average number of iterations that behaviour patterns were known (as before, present 
in the repertoire of at least one individual) or for which they were performed (as 
before, being chosen in an EXPLOIT move by at least one individual), given that they 
had become known or expressed by at least one individual (such that a persistence 
value of zero did not occur).  
The analysis was concentrated on the top ten strategies (Figure 4.4a) as, being 
highly effective, it was reasoned that of the strategies considered these are most likely 
to occur at high frequency in nature and so it is their behaviour that is of greatest 
relevance here. Data was gathered on amount, evenness and persistence by running 
two batches of tournament simulations. The first re-created the random melee section 
of the tournament, where the top ten strategies competed simultaneously across varied 
simulation parameters, to investigate how variation in learning strategies affects 
cultural dynamics. Varying simulation parameters reflect different assumptions about 
the environmental conditions. The cultural measures that were analysed could change 
in response to this variation through both the way strategies themselves changed their 
behaviour in response to varying parameter values, and also the way in which the 
parameter values themselves altered the simulation dynamics by changing the error 
rates and relative cost associated with social learning. The second set of simulations 
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took each strategy in turn and ran simulations with only that strategy present, using 
the same parameter values as the pairwise tournament phase (Chapter 4). 
This exercise was repeated twice, in each case a major alteration was made to 
the model assumptions. First, the probability of copying the wrong behaviour when 
playing OBSERVE was set to zero ( pcopyActWrong = 0), removing the assumption that 
copying errors could introduce new behaviour into a population. Second, the standard 
deviation of a normally distributed error applied to payoffs returned by OBSERVE 
was set such that σcopyPayoffError, = 100, making information about the payoffs of 
behaviour acquired by social learning too inaccurate to be useful. The characteristics 
of the virtual cultures constructed by the single strategies under these varied 
assumptions were compared. 
 
Results  
It is worth noting that this was not a standard simulation study in which one changes a 
parameter to analyze how this parameter causally affects some measure in the results, 
rather it was a correlation study, where both dependent and independent variables 
were outcomes of variation in other variables. Several noteworthy results emerged. 
The learning approach of the mixed strategy populations were first characterised 
simply as the average proportion of learning in each round that was social (i.e. the 
number of individuals playing OBSERVE divided by the number of individuals 
playing either learning move – OBSERVE plus INNOVATE), how this single feature 
affected the population level measures described above was then examined (Figure 
5.1). In general, it was found that there was a step change in the relationships 
examined, which for the parameter sets explored, occurred after the proportion of 
OBSERVE exceeded around 0.7. 
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High levels of social learning were associated with increased amounts of 
knowledge until the proportion of OBSERVE exceeded ~0.7, after which there was a 
ceiling effect with populations generally knowing all possible behaviour patterns 
(Figure 5.1a). This is a counter-intuitive result because, compared to reliance on 
asocial learning, a reliance on social learning must reduce the amount of new 
information entering a population (see Chapter 2 for example). This apparent paradox 
results in part from the assumption that copy error could introduce new behaviour into 
a population, hence more social learning leading to more copying errors leading to 
more knowledge, an interpretation which is supported by the results of switching off 
copying errors, presented below. More copying also means that behaviour patterns are 
more likely to be retained within the population, since multiple copies of any given 
variant are more likely to be generated. Under restricted circumstances, this can 
increase the amount of cultural knowledge in the population, where the knowledge 
that is built up over time is not lost (Figure 5.1e) and compensates for the reduced 
introduction of variants that would have occurred through innovation. However, for 
increases in copying to be associated with increases in the amount of culture there has 
to be a source of new variants, either stemming from innovation or copy-error. 
Conversely, high levels of social learning were associated with reduced 
numbers of expressed behaviour patterns, especially when the proportion of 
OBSERVE exceeded ~0.7 (Figure 5.1b). Accompanied by the concurrent reduction in 
the evenness of behaviour apparent in Figure 5.1d, this observation suggests that in 
populations containing effective strategies and with high levels of social learning, 
individuals concentrate on performing relatively few behaviour patterns even though 
they have knowledge of many. Those few behaviour patterns performed are drawn 
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from those with the best payoffs available at that time as many individuals choose to 
adopt them. 
As these patterns in the amount of culture were counter-intuitive, it was important to 
ask whether they could be explained either by simply the amount of learning that 
strategies did (quantified as the proportion of moves that were either OBSERVE or 
INNOVATE), or directly by the variation in simulation parameter values. Simple 
GLMs were fitted with identity link and normal error (Faraway 2006) to the data on 
the amount of knowledge, using as predictors the average proportion of learning in 
each simulation, which is termed p(learn), and the values of the four simulation 
parameters (pc, nobserve, σcopyPayoffError, and pcopyActWrong). 
These predictors, including all first-order interactions, were used in a model 
selection analysis, testing all possible combinations to see which gave the best fit, as 
determined by the lowest Akaike Information Criteria (AIC) value. Once the best 
model had been identified, AIC was then compared with that of an identical model 
but with the average proportion of learning that was social (which is termed 
p(OBSERVE)) as an additional predictor. The best model without p(OBSERVE) 
contained all predictors and interactions save σcopyPayoffError*pcopyActWrong and 
σcopyPayoffError*p(learn), with an AIC of -7013.5. The same model with p(OBSERVE) 
added as a predictor had an AIC of -7093.4, some 79.9 units smaller, comfortably 
exceeding 3, the rule of thumb generally used to indicate a better fitting model 
(Burnham and Anderson 2002). This analysis shows that while other factors certainly 
had an effect, the proportion learning that is social still independently explains a 
significant amount of variation in the amount of knowledge. 
High levels of social learning did not affect the evenness of knowledge 
(Figure 5.1c), but drastically reduced the evenness of behaviour (Figure 5.1d). Once 
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the proportion of OBSERVE exceeded ~0.7 populations emerged in which most 
individuals performed just one or two behaviour patterns.  
 
 
Figure 5.1: How effective learning strategies affect culture at the population level. Plots show 
quantitative measures of the (a-b) amount, (c-d) evenness, and (e-f) longevity of knowledge 
(a,c,e), and behaviour (b,d,f), plotted against the proportion of learning that was social, in 
mixed-strategy populations running under the random melee tournament conditions. Each 
point represents the average value across all iterations for a single 10,000-iteration simulation 
run. Note the order of magnitude difference in y-axis scales between (e) and (f). 
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High levels of social learning (especially >~0.7) were sometimes associated 
with very large increases in the persistence, or longevity, of knowledge in these 
populations (Figure 5.1e). Given that the average lifespan of individuals in these 
populations is 50 iterations, it is clear that increased levels of social learning can, in 
this model, lead to knowledge that far outlives its original innovators, lasting for tens 
and sometimes hundreds of generations. Conversely, in populations with high levels 
of social learning persistence of behaviour was reduced, because effective strategies 
were quick to stop exploiting behaviour that did not return payoffs as high as 
expected, leading to a low average persistence (as the most effective strategies were 
the ones that did most social learning, populations with high levels of social learning 
are likely dominated by those strategies). 
It emerged that only the evenness and amount of behaviour (not knowledge) 
were affected by varying the simulation parameters (Figure 5.2), while persistence 
was not affected at all and that increased rates of environmental variation were 
associated with both greater evenness and more expressed behaviour patterns (Figure 
5.2a,c), even though the evenness and amount of knowledge were not affected. It is 
not inevitable that an increased amount of expressed behaviour is linked to increased 
evenness – it would be perfectly possible, for example, for a population to contain one 
very popular behaviour and a lot of relatively unpopular ones – but in these 
simulations they do appear to be linked, a result of individuals diverging in their 
estimates of what is currently the best behaviour to be deploying. Surprisingly, the 
extent to which social learning was error-prone appeared to have no effect on 
knowledge and behaviour at the population level (Figure 5.2b,d), even when it 
reached extreme levels such as 0.5. 
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How two important assumptions affected the outcome of the tournament was 
also investgated. These assumptions were first, that social learning carries a 
probability of learning the wrong behaviour (copy error) and thereby introduces new 
knowledge into a population, and second, that social learners are capable of learning 
the payoff associated with a given behaviour (payoff information). It is easy to 
envisage situations where these might not apply – for example, in the first case where 
strict error correcting mechanisms are deployed to maintain fidelity (reproduction of 
classical music, or ballet steps), and in the second case, when the behaviour is one 
with delayed or opaque payoffs (e.g. planting seeds). Simulations containing single 
strategies explicitly were run to consider the effect of no copy error and no payoff 
information (Figure 5.3). 
These factors had strong effects on the amount of behaviour and knowledge. 
Both were reduced in the absence of copying errors but increased in the absence of 
useful payoff information (Figure 5.3). They had either no effect (in the absence of 
copy error) or relatively little effect (in the absence of payoff information) on the 
evenness of either behaviour or knowledge, except that a lack of payoff information 
slightly increased the evenness of both knowledge and behaviour. Switching off copy 
error profoundly affected the persistence of behaviour, increasing it up to seven-fold 
for some strategies, but did not affect the persistence of knowledge. A lack of payoff 
information appeared to have little general effect on persistence, although in some 
strategies it appeared to increase the persistence of knowledge. These effects are 
generally intuitive. The switching off of copying errors reduces the supply of new 
information into a population when that population learns mostly by social learning, 
which is thought to be an important weakness of social learning in general (see 
Chapters 2 and 4), resulting in reduced amounts of knowledge and behaviour. 
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Individuals in these populations were forced to rely heavily on that reduced set of 
behaviour patterns they did know about, resulting in an increased persistence of 
behaviour in a population. Finally, increased evenness of behaviour in the absence of 
payoff information likely reflects a reduced ability by the strategies in question to 
identify the currently optimal behaviour.  
 
Figure 5.2: How the rates of environmental change and copying error affect the amount and evenness 
of expressed behaviour when effective strategies are present. Plots (a-b) show the proportion of the 100 
possible behaviour patterns being used (i.e. by playing EXPLOIT), in mixed-strategy populations 
running under the random melee tournament conditions, as a function of (a) the rate of environmental 
change, and (b) the standard deviation of error in the estimated payoff of a behaviour learned socially 
(i.e. by OBSERVE). Plots (c-d) show the evenness of the distribution of behaviour patterns being used, 
in the same populations, as a function of (c) the rate of environmental change, and (d) the standard 
deviation of error in the estimated payoff of a behaviour learned socially. Each point represents the 
average value across all iterations for a single 10,000-iteration simulation run. 
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Figure 5.3: The effect of information transmission parameters on (top panel) amount, evenness and 
(bottom panel) persistence of knowledge and behaviour (note differing x-axis scales between panels). 
Boxplots show the change from the standard conditions used in the tournament when (white bars) the 
probability of copying the wrong behaviour when playing OBSERVE, pcopyActWrong = 0 or when (grey 
bars) the social learning of payoffs is so error-prone as to be uninformative (the standard deviation of a 
normally distributed error applied to payoffs returned by OBSERVE, σcopyPayoffError = 100). Values are 
taken from averages over ten 10,000 iteration simulations in each of which only one of the ten best 
tournament entries was present.  
 
 
 
 
−1 −0.5 0 0.5 1 1.5 2
Evenness
(knowledge)
Evenness
(behaviour)
Amount
(knowledge)
Amount
(behaviour)
 
 
No copy error
No payoff information
−1 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
Change as proportion of value for standard conditions
Persistence
(knowledge)
Persistence
(behaviour)
 153 
DISCUSSION: WHAT DOES THE TOURNAMENT IMPLY FOR CULTURAL EVOLUTION? 
Analysis of the social learning strategies tournament (Chapter 4) revealed that social 
learning is a more effective means of knowledge gain than asocial learning under 
most biologically plausible conditions, even when it is highly error prone. Copying 
pays because the copied individual is usually rational in performing his or her most 
effective (i.e. highest-payoff) behaviour, such that only the subset of high-
performance behaviour patterns are exploited, thereby inadvertently filtering 
behaviour for the copier. This is probably why copying is widespread in nature, since 
even random copying is more effective than trial-and-error learning, and effective 
copying can be performed in the absence of cognitively challenging learning rules. 
However, this does not detract from the utility of strategic copying. The most 
successful strategies were highly selective about when they copied, which they 
achieved by engaging in bouts of copying only when payoffs dropped significantly, 
and evaluating information based on its age. It was only when copying was conducted 
in this efficient manner that it increased mean fitness within the population. This may 
explain why a reliance on social learning has led to demographic success in humans 
but not in other animals; conceivably, only we copy with sufficient efficiency and 
fidelity to give the demographic success observed in human history (Boyd and 
Richerson 1985).  
 The analyses of population level cultural characteristic produced a number of 
interesting insights. Humans possess a great deal more cultural knowledge than other 
animals and this analysis suggests that this may go hand-in-hand with our greater 
reliance on social learning compared to other animals. The results outlined in this 
chapter were consistent with this hypothesis and established a positive relationship 
between the proportion of learning that was OBSERVE and the amount of cultural 
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knowledge in the population (Figure 5.1a). While, in principle, this relationship need 
not be a causal one, the aforementioned analyses show that it probably is: that is, that 
under restricted circumstances increased reliance on copying can increase the amount 
of culture present in the population through retaining knowledge. However, it is not 
possible to rule out the idea that the relationship between pOBSERVE and amount of 
knowledge is partly a product of selection between alternative strategies, perhaps 
favouring strategies associated with large repertoire sizes. Learning strategies can also 
be characterised by the amount of learning they do, and the statistical analyses 
presented here showed that this also affected the amount of culture present in a 
positive way, which is an intuitive result, but that this factor on its own was a much 
less powerful predictor of the data than the proportion of social learning, which is 
perhaps less intuitive. High levels of copying were associated with complete 
knowledge saturation, such that all theoretically possible behaviour was represented 
in the repertoire of at least one individual in the population. This knowledge was 
retained in spite of the fact that enhanced copying led to a much smaller average 
proportion of behaviour actually being expressed at any point in time (Figure 5.1b).  
These results are perhaps best understood in conjunction with the striking 
effect of copying on the retention of knowledge within a population (Figure 5.1e). A 
heavy reliance on social learning led to an average duration of knowledge within 
populations that was several orders of magnitude longer than for populations reliant 
on asocial learning. There was a threshold level of copying, above which cultural 
knowledge could be retained for many hundreds of generations (given an average 
lifespan of 50 iterations). It is possible that it is this retention of knowledge that 
allows knowledge repertoires to approach saturation when populations rely heavily on 
social learning, because even with very low levels of innovation, if knowledge 
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persists then it will over time accumulate. The caveat here is that there must be a 
source of new variation present, either copy-error or occasional innovation. Once 
again, there is a marked contrast with the strong negative effect of copying on the 
persistence of behaviour (Figure 5.1f). High levels of copying led to rapid turnover in 
the behaviour patterns exploited, without a concurrent loss of knowledge from the 
population’s repertoire. These observations have parallels in human populations, 
where we simultaneously witness fads and fashions that change rapidly, representing 
high turnover in behaviour, and the retention of cultural knowledge over millennia. 
By illustrating how copying enhances the persistence of knowledge, this analyses 
explain why these observations are not conflicting. 
These observations help to resolve the conundrum that, while logic dictates 
that copying promotes behavioural homogeneity, humans have accumulated large 
amounts of cultural knowledge. As expected, individuals converge, through copying, 
on high-payoff behaviour, such that increasing levels of copying reduce the 
proportion of behaviour exploited to the high-performance end of the spectrum.  
However, in a changing environment, with individuals born naïve, inevitably there is 
some low-level exploitation of poor-performing behaviour too. It would seem that 
copying sometimes promotes the maintenance of cultural knowledge in a population, 
by preventing such knowledge from being lost when individuals die. This illustrates, 
once again, the striking adaptive advantages of social learning: individuals rapidly 
converge on, and reap the benefits of, exploiting high-payoff behaviour, yet at the 
same time high-copying populations retain high levels of cultural knowledge, 
conferring the plasticity to switch behaviour when environments change.  
 As expected, the analysis also found that copying typically reduced the 
evenness of exploited behaviour, because it leads to a small number of high-
 156 
performance behaviour patterns being disproportionately performed (Figure 5.1d). 
Indeed, even in the absence of an explicit ‘conformist learning’ rule being deployed 
by individual agents, there was some semblance of conformity emerging at the 
population level, reflected in lower evenness of the distribution of behaviour (Figure 
5.1d) a finding consistent with other analyses (Matthews et al 2010). This did not, 
however, greatly affect the size of the cultural knowledge base (Figure 5.1a), since, as 
described, it allowed more knowledge to be retained over a greater period. The 
tournament simulations focused on a single focal population, and it is possible that, 
were multiple populations involved, the large cultural knowledge base promoted by 
copying would lead to extensive cultural diversity between populations. 
One of the cleanest and most intuitive relationships shown by this analysis 
was between the rate of environmental change and amount of culture, where greater 
rates of turnover in the environment led to a greater range of behaviour patterns being 
performed (Figure 5.2a). High rates of change also resulted in more even distributions 
of behaviour, as no single high-performance behaviour was persistently optimal in the 
changing world (Figure 5.2c). Unlike much previous theory, which has suggested that 
a reliance on social learning can sometimes hinder the adaptive tracking of temporally 
changing environments (Rogers 1988; Feldman et al. 1996; Boyd and Richerson 
1988b), a heavy reliance on social learning did not compromise the ability of agents 
in the tournament to adjust to changing environments. This probably reflects the 
greater biological realism of the tournament over analytical models, since only in the 
former do individuals possess a repertoire of behaviour. Possessing knowledge of 
multiple behaviour patterns allows individuals to switch rapidly to an alternative high-
performing action when changes in the environment reduce the payoff to the current 
behaviour. This flexibility dramatically reduces the costs of copying. 
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Perhaps surprisingly, copy error had little effect on the amount of expressed 
behaviour (Figures 5.2b and 5.2d), except at the extreme where there was no copy 
error at all (Figure 5.3). Error-free copying reduced the amount of both cultural 
knowledge and behaviour, since new behaviour could no longer be introduced by this 
route. While it is no surprise that without copy error behaviour patterns persisted for 
longer (Figure 5.3), it is less intuitive that this would lead to individual actions being 
exploited for longer (on average, twice as long). This reflects the fact that a great deal 
of copying (53% of all OBSERVE moves in the first tournament phase) failed to 
introduce new behaviour into individuals’ repertoire, as individuals observed 
behaviour patterns that they already knew about. In the tournament, copy error 
increases the chances that individuals will acquire new behaviour when they play 
OBSERVE. These findings reinforce the view that copy error may be an important 
source of adaptive variation within natural populations (Henrich and Boyd 2002). 
One of the more surprising findings from the tournament was that copying 
paid even when copiers had no information about the payoff associated with the 
copied behaviour (Chapter 4). In keeping with other researcher (Schlag 1998), it 
seemed safe to assume that one advantage to copying would be that it allowed 
individuals to home in on high-performance behaviour; and indeed, this assumption 
may yet be correct. However, copying offers advantages over trial-and-error learning 
even if observers receive no payoff information, because even blind copiers benefit 
from the aforementioned filtering of behaviour by the copied agents (Boyd and 
Richerson 1985). This insight could help explain the extreme reliance of children on 
imitation, leading them faithfully to copy even superfluous actions in a demonstrated 
task. When children copy adults, they are typically taking advantage of decades of 
information filtering by the adult, making it on average simply more efficient to take 
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their word for it. In the absence of payoff information, greater amounts of cultural 
knowledge are retained and exploited (Figure 5.3), since the potential to be selective 
in the acquisition and performance of behaviour is reduced by a lack of payoff 
information. This also leads to greater evenness in behaviour across the population. 
These observations suggest that copying confers an adaptive plasticity on 
cultural populations, allowing them to respond to changing environments rapidly by 
drawing on a deep knowledge base. In biological evolution the rate of change is 
positively related to genetic diversity (Fisher 1930), and formal analyses suggest a 
similar relationship between the rate of cultural evolution and the amount of cultural 
variation (Boyd and Richerson 1985; Cavalli-Sforza and Feldman 1981). 
Accordingly, populations heavily reliant on culture could rapidly diverge 
behaviourally, exploiting the rich levels of variation retained in their knowledge base. 
The tournament suggests that the ecological and demographic success of our species, 
our capacity for rapid change in behaviour, our cultural diversity, our expansive 
knowledge base, and the sheer volume of cultural knowledge we exhibit, may all be 
direct products of the heavy, but smart, reliance of our species on social learning. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Learning and memory are two clearly related concepts, with the ability to learn 
resting on the ability to form memories of past actions. Learning is generally defined 
as an extended and long-term process whereby an individual can alter its behaviour 
and state of knowledge, based, in part, on their previous experiences. As the neural 
substrate for learning, memory can be considered to be a description of how changes 
in knowledge state, motor abilities or behavioural repertoire are encoded in the brain 
and later retrieved to form the basis of behavioural changes (Richter 1966). It is 
therefore not a huge leap in imagination to glean information about memory use from 
models of learning. Here a short analysis extending those presented in Chapters 4 and 
5 is presented paying special attention to the role of memory in the learning exhibited 
in the social learning strategies tournament. 
The strategies submitted to the tournament varied substantially in their 
performance, affected by a number of factors, the majority of which we will not 
consider in this chapter (but see Chapter 4). However, the winning strategy, called 
discountmachine submitted by Dan Cownden and Tim Lillicrap, appeared to enhance 
its performance through a simple form of ‘mental time travel’, as did several other 
successful strategies. This chapter discusses what this use of a type of ‘mental time 
travel’ by a number of the strategies submitted to the tournament might imply about 
memory in a social learning context.  
Typical definitions of mental time travel involve ‘episodic memory’ of the 
past, consideration of the future and an understanding of how these related to the self 
(Tulving 1983; Suddendorf and Corballis 2007; Dudai and Carruthers 2005). Thus, 
mental time travel involves subjective reconstruction or construction of past or future 
events. In the case of humans, researchers can clearly see and demonstrate the 
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presence of episodic memory and future planning. Conversely, in the case of animals, 
who are unable to verbalise their experiences of memory, researchers must rely on 
their actions to draw conclusions about the content of their memories and the 
mechanisms by which they access that content. This has led to the use of the terms 
‘episodic-like memory’, ‘future planning’ or ‘what, where, when’ (www) memory in 
discussions of animal mental time travel (Clayton and Dickinson 1998; Raby et al. 
2007; Clayton et al. 2003). 
The importance of mental time travel and its specificity to humans has been 
hotly debated for some years (Clayton et al. 2003; Suddendorf and Busby 2003; 
Suddendorf and Corballis 2007). Even in the midst of this debate, it is useful and 
interesting to examine the effects of memory, and future projection, on the success of 
individuals in a changing environment. Here it is possible to take a general definition 
of ‘mental time travel’ and apply it to the tournament strategies. The intention is to 
elucidate the effect of memory use on the success, or otherwise, of individuals using 
these strategies. The tournament provides a unique opportunity to examine the effects 
of different memory use capabilities on evolutionary success in a standardised and 
simplified environment.  
When discussing memory in computer models such as the tournament, we 
encounter a series of definitional problems that need addressing before proceeding. 
Each agent in the tournament had full access to their past moves and the results of 
those moves. In essence the agents had access to what Tulving (1983) called ‘memory 
as a warehouse’. Therefore, if they chose to, they could remember every move they 
made from the moment of their birth to their last simulation round. However the 
agents did not have access to the computer memory containing information about 
other agents’ histories or environmental parameters.  
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The agents in the tournament were incapable of the type of complex mental 
task, vividly reliving the past and imagining the future, described above, making it 
challenging to define the type of memory to which agents in the tournament model 
had access. What is seen when looking at these computer agents is how the 
information encoded in their simple memories can be used (for instance, by weighting 
more recent learning more heavily than older knowledge, or making predictions into 
the future about the likely success of cultural behaviour), and what effect the extent to 
which they access this information can have on the agent’s success. Here the analyses 
are narrowly focussing on personal www memory, but since there is no spatial context 
in the simulations reported here, the ‘where’ aspect is ignored. The difference 
between mental time travel and www memory is really a difference in subjective 
experience, say the difference between remembering the time, date and location of 
your birth and being able to mentally relive the event itself (Suddendorf and Busby 
2003). Thus the analysis concentrates on the content of memories rather than the 
subjective experience of them. This is true for many computer models of learning, 
which focus primarily on what information is retained and the origins of the 
information - what individuals learn and from whom. As a result the models are 
generally agnostic as to the exact memory mechanisms used to encode the 
information. It is therefore possible to discuss the effects of learning and memory 
without defining the memory mechanisms in detail.  
 
THE TOURNAMENT  
Competitors entering the tournament were asked to specify the circumstances under 
which individual agents should learn asocially (INNOVATE), learn socially 
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(OBSERVE), or perform an act from their repertoire (EXPLOIT). These rules were 
subsequently translated into computer code. 
The simulation model was organized into a series of iterations, or rounds. 
Each round a new entry was made in the memory matrix (termed ‘myHistory’) of 
each agent in the simulation, whose first row contained the round number or age of 
the agent, second row contained the previous moves (OBSERVE = 0, INNOVATE = 
-1, EXPLOIT > 0), third row contained the acts learned or exploited, and whose final 
row contained the payoffs associated with those acts. For example the agent with the 
following myHistorymatrix, 
 
myHistory =
1 2 3 4
0 !1 2 2
3 33 5 8
6 9 3 1
"
#
$
$
$
$
%
&
'
'
'
'
, 
 
is four rounds old, played OBSERVE in the first round, learning act 3 with payoff 6 
etc.  
The tournament was run in two stages, although only the results of the first 
stage are discussed in here. As described in Chapter 4, the first stage was a pair-wise 
round-robin tournament. Each pair-wise contest in the first stage consisted of 10 
simulations in which agents with one strategy were introduced to a population of 
agents with another, and 10 simulations in which the first strategy dominated the 
population with the second invading. The mean frequency of a strategy over the last 
2,500 simulation rounds was its score for that simulation. These scores were then 
averaged over 20 simulations, and this average recorded as the overall score for that 
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strategy in that contest. Strategies were ranked according to average score across all 
pairwise contests.  
 
MEMORY IN THE TOURNAMENT: DEFINITIONS AND DIFFICULTIES 
Using submitted prose descriptions as well as the computer code submitted with or 
generated for each strategy, it is possible to divide the strategies entered to the 
tournament into a number of memory-use categories (Table 6.1). These categories by 
necessity neglect aspects of mental time travel (like theory of mind) that apply only to 
humans (and perhaps a few non-human animals) and instead concentrate on the use of 
memory by the computer agents. Thus it is possible to account for their 
‘understanding’ of environmental changes and motivational states but must remain 
agnostic as to the emotional or representational content of these memories.   
Category 0 indicates that the strategy made no use of myHistory. Ignoring 
their age, past moves, and the results of those moves, these strategies relied on a range 
of other methods (in one not quite serious entry, the digits of 𝜋) to determine their 
next move. Categories 1 and 2 describe those strategies that were relatively inflexible, 
deciding on future moves based on the agent’s age or previous moves. This type of 
strategy partially used its memory, gleaning from it aspects of the agent’s history, but 
neglecting the actual outcomes, in terms of payoff or environmental information that 
could be used to plan for future environmental changes. Category 3 describes 
strategies that pay close attention to their histories and use the information in 
myHistory to ascertain when a drastic environmental change has occurred. They can 
then adjust their behaviour accordingly. Finally category 4 strategies use all the 
information encoded in myHistory. Similar to category 3, they are capable of 
detecting environmental change but they can also use past information to predict the 
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likelihood of future environmental changes (i.e. the exact value of pc, or other error 
rates) and to act accordingly. Another important feature of category 4 strategies is 
their ability to discount information based on the time since acquisition of the 
information and the likelihood of environmental change occurring in the intervening 
time. In order to do this, they typically catalogue past instances in which a particular 
behaviour was used and keep track of instances in which that behaviour did not return 
the expected payoff – perhaps the closest thing to episodic memory the tournament 
agents achieved. 
Table 6.1. Loose memory categories in the tournament strategies. 
 Memory type  Example Example strategies 
0 Minimal use of declarative 
memory 
e.g. I know one 
act, that’s what I’ll 
do 
exploitOneInnovation, 
genderedStrategy, piRounds 
1 Used memory as a guide 
for their next action in 
terms of agent’s age only. 
 
e.g. If I am 7 
rounds old, do this 
aHandfulOfSkill, 
innovateAndObserve, 
observeNoThanks, keepUp 
2 Used memory as a guide 
for their next action in 
terms of last action only. 
e.g. if I did this in 
the last round, do 
that in the next 
anyRandGambit,  
3 Used memory to generate 
an estimate of temporally 
local environmental 
conditions.  
e.g. my payoff 
dropped in the last 
round, so I have 
undergone 
environmental 
change, better do 
this 
copyIfBetter, 
balancedCopyWhenPayoffsDecr
ease, infantJuvinileMature 
4 Used memory to estimate 
environmental parameters 
and use these to predict the 
probability of certain 
environmental changes in 
the future or discounting 
(see below) 
e.g. I have 
estimated that 
there is a 95% 
chance of an 
environmental 
change in the next 
round, better do 
this next 
W00t, discountMachine, 
prospero, 
whenTheGoingGetsThoughGetS
crounging 
 
This categorisation allows examination of the complexity of memory use and the link 
between the past and future aspects of mental time travel. Dudai and Carruthers 
(2005) suggest that there is a strong link, in the human mind at least, between 
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memories of the past and prediction of the future. It is common sense to assume that 
prediction of the future without access to information about the past is little more than 
guessing, but equally it is possible that using memory in the very short term, noticing 
sudden changes, for example, without using that information to generate predictions 
about the future is almost equally fruitless. It is therefore possible that the selective 
advantage of episodic memory lies in its application to future events (Suddendorf and 
Corballis 2007, Tulving 1983). If this were the case, we would expect to see that the 
average scores of strategies in the pairwise contest of the tournament were similar for 
strategies using memory alone (category 3) and higher for those using both memory 
and future planning (category 4). 
 
RESULTS  
Memory categories were analysed in terms of median score using a Kruskal-Wallis 
test. The memory categories (0,1,2,3,4) were significantly different from each other 
(p<0.001) at the 95% confidence level. Category 4, incorporating both use of 
memory, discounting and prediction of future environmental changes, had the highest 
median score (Figure 6.1) and was significantly higher than categories 0, 1, 2 and 3. 
Both the eventual winner of the tournament, discountmachine, and the second place 
strategy, intergeneration, were in category 4, and of the top twenty strategies in the 
first round of the tournament, 10 were from category 4 and 4 were from category 3.  
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Figure 6.1. Plot shows memory category (0,1,2,3,4) against tournament score for all 104 strategies in 
stage 1 of the tournament. Median score shown (± interquartile range and maximum and minimum 
values). *p < 0.05, n.s implies non-significance.   
 
The original analysis of the tournament strategies also stressed the importance of 
timing learning moves, whether social or asocial (Figure 4.8e). The analysis showed 
that the ability to time learning moves to coincide with environmental changes was 
crucial to success in the tournament. Effective timing of learning combines elements 
of both category 3 and 4 memory use. The positive relationship between the number 
of learning moves that were social, and a good strategy’s success in the tournament, 
coupled with a negative relationship between social learning and success in the poorer 
performing strategies, implies that social learning is adaptive only when used well. 
This suggests that natural selection could have selected for more efficient use of 
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social learning and the analysis here suggests that investment in mental time travel 
may be one means of increasing this efficiency.  
 
DISCUSSION 
It is of course difficult to discuss aspects of the strategies submitted to the tournament 
in isolation since, as the original analysis of the tournament results showed, there 
were a number of factors that contributed to the success or otherwise of each strategy 
(Chapter 4). The most important factors that emerged from that analysis were the 
proportion of learning moves that were social, and the timing of those learning moves 
(Chapter 4). It is easy however to see that there might be a significant link between 
the ability to time social learning moves correctly and the strategy’s use of mental 
time travel.  
The tournament winner, discountmachine, was a complex (category 4) 
strategy in terms of memory use. The most important and robust features of the 
strategy were (1) its overwhelming propensity to engage in social learning at the 
expense of individual learning (the strategy could only INNOVATE in one 
circumstance, when it was in the founding generation of a new simulation), (2) the 
timing of its social learning moves, which coincided optimally with environmental 
changes, and (3) its ability to discount information based on the age of the 
information and an estimate of the rate of environmental change. 
There were a number of memory-related reasons for the success of 
discountmachine. The strategy adopted a forward-looking approach to making 
decisions in a way not seen in any of the other strategies. It chose between EXPLOIT 
and OBSERVE by using the closed form of a geometric series to compare the 
expected payoff gains from each move. It considered the gains expected from either 
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exploiting the best act currently known until death or a change in payoff, or observing 
once and then exploiting the expected observed payoff, again until death or a change 
in payoff. The strategy chose to play OBSERVE if 
 
,       (6.1) 
 
where wmax is the maximum of the expected payoffs currently available in the agent’s 
repertoire, Oest is an estimate of the expected payoff of an observed act calculated 
simply as the mean of all the observed payoffs in the agent’s history, and d is a 
‘discounting’ factor given by the product of the probability the agent will be alive in 
the next iteration and the agent’s current estimate of pc,  
 
.       (6.2) 
 
Both discountmachine and the strategy that came in second overall in the 
tournament, intergeneration, used the same formula to discount information based on 
its age, specified in Equation 4.1 
The formula discounts the value of information towards the estimated mean 
for all behaviours as the time since acquisition increases. The success of the strategies 
using this kind of flexible discounting suggests the possibility that natural selection 
could have shaped memory in a similar way. The strategies suggest that the ability to 
discount information based on experience of the past and prediction of the future is an 
important part of survival in changeable environments. The winning and runner-up 
strategies contrast with a number of less successful strategies in their ability to 
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discount the value of information. Less successful strategies, although also capable of 
discounting, did so in a fixed and unresponsive way. For example, both 
dynamicaspirationlevel (3rd in round 1) and spynwork (34th in round 1) discounted 
information according to different rules. spynwork behaved in a rational way, 
exploiting only its best act but only considering acts updated in the last 25 rounds. 
This amounts to generating a fixed estimate of the rate of environmental change to be 
pc =0.04, or one change every 25 rounds. dynamicaspirationlevel was similar but 
decayed the value of all behavior by a set amount each round. Again this made an 
assumption about the rate of environmental change without specific reference to what 
the agents actually knew about the simulation environment and the probability of 
change. The kind of discounting that these strategies engaged in is arguably similar to 
the kind of discounting observed in stickleback fish. In the face of conflicting social 
information, these fish were shown to value their asocial information less as time 
passed since they collected the information (Van Bergen et al. 2004). It may be 
reasonable to assume that the costly calculations involved in constantly updating 
predictions about the world may not be worthwhile in all circumstances, and that in 
the absence of extreme variability in environmental conditions, natural selection may 
fashion some useful ‘rules of thumb’ about information discounting. 
An analysis of the tournament strategies from the perspective of their memory 
use may go some way towards explaining why humans are particularly good at social 
learning – humans, perhaps alone, are capable of the kind of complex mental time 
travel required to maximize the benefits of social learning and ensure that any 
investment in social learning is strategic and low-risk. For instance, discountmachine 
computed whether investment in further learning would likely reap greater dividends 
in the future than relying on current behavior given its estimate of environmental 
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change and the age of the information. It is possible that only humans are capable of 
this kind of calculation and that deployment of this kind of reasoning greatly enhances 
the efficiency of learning. Results from the tournament suggest strategic use of 
memory must be combined with strategic forgetting or discounting in order for a 
strategy to be successful. 
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SECTION 3, CHAPTER 7 
RUNAWAY CULTURAL NICHE CONSTRUCTION 
 
Material from this chapter has been published as:  
Rendell, L, Fogarty, L & Laland, K.N. 2011, Runaway cultural niche construction, 
Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society B: Biological Sciences, vol 366, no. 
1566, pp. 823-835 
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INTRODUCTION 
In recent years, there has been increasing recognition of the significance of niche 
construction, the capacity of organisms to modify natural selection in their 
environment and thereby act as co-directors of their own, and other species’, 
evolution (Lewontin 1983; Odling-Smee et al. 2003). Examples of niche construction 
include animals manufacturing nests, burrows and webs and plants modifying nutrient 
cycles. The defining characteristic of niche construction is not modification of the 
environment per se, but rather an organism-induced change in the selective 
environment; hence the term includes migration, dispersal and habitat selection, 
where organisms relocate in space and experience new conditions, as well as traits 
that have a negative effect on the constructor’s fitness, such as habitat degradation 
(Odling-Smee et al. 2003). 
 Genetic and ecological models have demonstrated that niche construction can 
affect evolutionary outcomes, even without culture (Laland et al. 1996, 1999; Odling-
Smee et al. 2003; Day et al. 2003; Silver and DiPaolo 2006; Kylafis and Loreau 
2008). For instance, niche construction can fix genes that would otherwise be 
deleterious (Laland et al. 1996, 1999), allow the persistence of organisms in 
inhospitable environmental conditions that would otherwise lead to their extinction 
(Kylafis and Loreau 2008), and be favoured even when costly because of the benefits 
that will accrue to distant descendants (Lehmann 2008). However, mathematical 
models reveal that niche construction due to cultural processes can be even more 
potent than gene-based niche construction, and demonstrate that cultural niche 
construction can modify selection on human genes with resulting effects on 
evolutionary outcomes (Laland et al. 2001; Odling-Smee et al. 2003; Boni and 
Feldman 2005; Borenstein et al. 2006; Laland 2008). Indeed, human niche 
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construction is informed by a uniquely potent and cumulative cultural knowledge base 
(Odling-Smee et al. 2003; Smith 2007).  
 It is highly likely that human cultural niche construction has co-directed 
human evolution (Laland et al. 2000, 2001; Borenstein et al. 2006; Laland & Brown 
2006; Laland et al. 2007, 2010; Richerson et al. 2010). In the last 100kyr humans 
have spread from East Africa around the globe, experienced an ice age, begun to 
exploit agriculture, witnessed rapid increases in densities, domesticated hundreds of 
species of plants and animals, and, by keeping animals, experienced a new proximity 
to animal pathogens (Laland et al. 2007; Smith 2007). Each of these events represents 
a major transformation in human selection pressures, and all (except the ice age) have 
been self-imposed. Humans have modified selection, for instance, by dispersing into 
new environments with different climatic regimes, devising agricultural practices or 
domesticating livestock.  Niche-construction theory leads to the expectation that gene-
culture co-evolution has been a general feature of human evolution (Laland et al. 
2010). 
This perspective is reinforced by analyses of data from the human genome, 
which have revealed numerous genes that have experienced recent positive selection, 
many of which exhibit functions that imply they are responses to human cultural 
practices (Voight et al. 2006; Wang et al. 2006; Sabeti et al. 2006, 2007; Nielsen et 
al. 2007; Williamson et al. 2007; Laland et al. 2010). For instance, several lines of 
evidence demonstrate that dairy farming created the selective environment that 
favored the spread of alleles for adult lactose tolerance (Durham 1991; Holden & 
Mace 1997; Burger et al. 2007; Tishkoff et al. 2007). Similarly, Perry et al. (2007) 
found that copy number of the salivary amylase gene (AMY1) is positively correlated 
with salivary amylase protein level and that individuals from populations with high-
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starch diets have, on average, more AMY1 copies than those with traditionally low-
starch diets. Higher AMY1 copy numbers and protein levels are thought to improve 
the digestion of starchy foods, consumed at elevated levels by agricultural 
populations, and may buffer against the fitness-reducing effects of intestinal disease. 
The transition to novel food sources with the advent of agriculture would appear to 
have been a major source of selection on human genes, and several genes related to 
the metabolism of protein, carbohydrates, lipids and phosphates show signals of 
recent selection (Richards et al. 2003; Voight et al. 2006; Wang et al. 2006; 
Williamson et al. 2007). In turn, agricultural and the domestication of animals is 
known to have facilitated the spread of crowd diseases and zoonoses, generating 
selection for human genes that confer resistance to these diseases in regions where 
they are prevalent (Saunders et al. 2002; Thompson et al. 2004; Voight et al. 2006; 
Wang et al. 2006; Sabeti et al. 2006; Nielsen et al. 2007). Cultural niche construction 
could also have selected for enhanced cognitive capabilities (Richerson et al. 2010), 
and many of the alleles subject to recent selection are known to be expressed in the 
brain (Voight et al. 2006; Wang et al. 2006; Laland et al. 2010). 
 Estimates for the number of human genes subject to recent rapid evolution 
range from a few hundred to two thousand: Williamson et al. (2007) conclude that as 
much as 10% of the human genome may be affected by linkage to targets of positive 
selection. While, in the vast majority of cases, it is not known what phenotype was the 
target of the inferred selection, nor which environmental conditions favoured such 
phenotypes, human cultural practices remain primary candidates, and geneticists are 
increasingly considering culture as a source of selection on humans (Hawks et al. 
2007; Varki et al. 2008; Laland et al. 2010). 
 177 
 One of the best-researched cases is the haemoglobin S allele (HbS), famous as 
a textbook case of heterozygote advantage, since it provides protection against 
malaria in the heterozygote form. Durham (1991) studied populations of Kwa-
speaking agriculturalists from West Africa, who cut clearings in forests to grow crops, 
often yams. The removal of trees had the effect of inadvertently increasing the 
amount of standing water when it rained, which provided better breeding grounds for 
malaria-carrying mosquitoes, which intensified selection on HbS. The fact that 
adjacent populations whose agricultural practices are different do not show the same 
increase in allele frequency supports the conclusion that cultural practices can drive 
genetic evolution. Moreover, this example illustrates how it may be necessary for 
models to take account of the frequency of resources modified through human niche 
construction (in this case, the amount of standing water) if they are to capture co-
evolutionary dynamics accurately. 
 Human agricultural practices are tied to specific spatial locations, and the 
selective feedback on human genes resulting from such practices, whether related to 
diet, disease resistance or morphology, is likely to co-vary in space with the incidence 
of the practice. Accordingly, there is a need for spatially explicit models with which 
to better understand how some human cultural processes have interacted with human 
genes during recent human evolution, whilst simultaneously tracking the frequency of 
relevant resources. While there has been extensive modelling of human gene-culture 
coevolution (Cavalli-Sforza & Feldman 1981; Boyd & Richerson 1985; Kumm et al. 
1994; Aoki & Feldman 1991, 1997; Richerson and Boyd 2005; Mesoudi & Laland 
2007; Enquist et al. 2007; Laland et al. 2010; Richerson et al. 2010), thus far spatial 
effects have been comparatively neglected. However, the introduction of spatial 
structure and stochasticity in finite populations is known to affect evolutionary 
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outcomes when compared with non-spatial models (Durrett & Levin 1994a,b; 
Krakauer & Pagel 1995). Moreover, spatially explicit models of gene-based niche 
construction have revealed that niche-constructing traits can drive themselves to 
fixation by creating statistical associations with the recipient traits they favour (Silver 
& DiPaolo 2006). Niche-constructing alleles expressed in the modification of local 
resources transform environmental conditions to favour some genotypes, and 
provided mating and dispersal is local, the niche-constructing alleles can hitchhike 
across a landscape to fixation.  
 Here spatially explicit gene-culture co-evolutionary models are developed to 
explore the interaction between local cultural niche construction and genetic 
evolution. The aim was to explore whether interactions between cultural traits and 
alleles mediated by niche construction can create the conditions under which runaway 
selection can lead to evolutionary outcomes that can overcome external natural 
selection. The models therefore investigate whether, and under what circumstances, 
cultural niche-constructing practices can ‘run away’ with genetic variation, and to 
what extent this dynamic is affected by (i) cultural transmission biases operating 
against the niche-constructing trait, (ii) the cost of cultural niche construction, 
modelled as a viability deficit to the cultural practice, and (iii) a viability cost to the 
genotype favoured by cultural niche construction. The models also investigate (iv) 
whether genetic variation enhancing the capability for cultural niche construction can 
be favoured by this runaway dynamic. The analysis concentrates on three questions: 
1. Can a culturally transmitted niche-constructing practice become universal, even 
when costly, through statistical association with a genetic trait it favours? 
2. Can cultural niche construction generate selection for costly genetic traits that 
confer improved ability to cope with, or exploit the products of, said niche 
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construction (for example, genes expressed in disease resistance, or an expensive 
digestive protein)? 
3. Can cultural niche construction favour the secondary hitchhiking of costly 
capabilities at other loci, which confer more powerful niche-constructing abilities on 
the bearer (e.g. bigger brains)? 
 
METHODS 
The model presented here marries the spatially explicit individual-based methods of 
Silver and Di Paolo (2006) with the gene-culture co-evolutionary analysis of Laland 
et al. (2001). It therefore draws on simpler, well-understood systems to provide a 
foundation for exploring these complex co-evolutionary processes. The model has a 
finite population of diploid individuals. It focuses initially on a single diallelic 
resource-dependent locus, A, with alleles A and a, and a single two-state cultural 
niche-constructing practice, E, with variants E and e (see Table 7.1), but adds a 
further genetic locus, B, for later analyses.  
 
Table 7.1: Probabilities of vertical cultural transmission of E and e given parental traits 
Parental traits Probability of E offspring Probability of e offspring 
E × E c3 1-c3 
E × e c2 1-c2 
e × E c1 1-c1 
e × e c0 1-c0 
 
Following Silver and Di Paolo (2006), individuals are arranged in an n × n 
square lattice with wrap-around (toroidal) boundaries. Each lattice point (i, j) is 
occupied by a single individual with phenogenotype {Aij,Eij} and has an associated, 
local environmental resource frequency {Rij}. Each individual has eight nearest 
neighbours (its Moore neighbourhood). Alleles make a contribution to fitness that is 
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in part a function of the local resource frequency. Resource frequencies are subject to 
change as a result of (i) the niche-constructing activities of individuals in the 
population, and (ii) independent processes of depletion and renewal. An individual’s 
capacity for niche construction depends on the cultural practice deployed, with E 
individuals exhibiting niche construction, and e individuals exhibiting no niche 
construction. As in Laland et al. (2001), if p t-1(E) is the frequency of the trait E in the 
population at time t-1, the amount of the resource, R at time t is given by  
 
 R
t
= !
1
R
t"1
+ !
2
p
t"1
(E)+ !
3
.        (7.1) 
 
Here, !
1
 is the coefficient of independent depletion of the resource; !
2
 is the 
coefficient of positive niche construction, corresponding to niche-constructing activity 
that increases R (assuming only positive niche-construction); !
3
 is a coefficient of 
independent renewal of the resource. Following Silver and Di Paolo (2006), a scalar 
version of this equation is applied at each lattice point. At any particular lattice point, 
p(E) takes one of the values {0, 1} corresponding to the two possible cultural states, 
respectively {e, E}. Local resource frequency is thus a function of independent 
processes of depletion and renewal, and of the cumulative effect of local niche-
construction activity over preceding generations. Following Laland et al. (2001),
0 < !
1
,!
2
,!
3
and !
1
+ !
2
+ !
3
"1, such that the local resource frequency, Rij, can take 
any real value between 0, corresponding to complete absence of the resource, and 1, 
corresponding to resource saturation. Unless otherwise specified, these parameters 
were set to !
1
= 0.7 , !
2
= 0.2 , and !
3
= 0.1  in the simulations reported here. These 
values mean the resource depletes in the absence of niche construction to an 
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equilibrium of !3
(1" !
1
)
= 1/ 3 . For example, in the case of the aforementioned Kwa, 
the amount of standing water is a function of independent renewal (i.e. rainfall), 
independent depletion (e.g. evaporation, runoff, absorption) and niche-constructing 
activities over multiple generations (e.g. planting crops, which reduces absorption and 
thereby increases standing water). All variables and coefficients are dimensionless. 
Fitnesses were allocated to combinations of genotype and cultural practice, 
henceforth ‘phenogenotypes’, as specified in Tables 7.2-7.4, which are tailored to 
addressing questions 1-3 above. Genotype fitness depended both on resource 
frequency and on selection from an external source. In all models the baseline fitness 
of the three genotypes are as follows: 
 
 
fAA =!1 + "R,
fAa = 1+ " R 1# R( ),
faa =!2 + " 1# R( ),
       (7.2) 
 
where R = Rij, the resource frequency at the individual’s lattice point. The first terms 
in each of these fitness relations correspond to fixed-fitness components, representing 
the effect of external selection operating at A. The second terms refer to the resource 
frequency-dependent components of selection, and it is these that are affected by 
niche construction. The coefficient of proportionality !  determines the strength 
(relative to external selection), and direction of resource-based frequency-dependent 
selection, with positive !  indicating that increased environmental resource levels will 
favour the A allele. In all simulations reported in this chapter !  = 0.3. A summary of 
all parameters used is given in Table 7.5. 
 Individuals mate with a randomly chosen neighbour (Moore neighbourhood), 
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and offspring inherit their parents’ genotypes in Mendelian proportions. Here both 
vertical and oblique transmission of cultural traits is considered. Vertical transmission 
occurs according to the parameters specified in Table 7.1. Offspring (viability) fitness 
is determined with reference to the resource level at one (randomly selected) parent’s 
location, under the assumption that newborn offspring develop in the same location as 
one of their parents. The probability of an offspring surviving is proportional to its 
fitness related to the minimum and maximum values of equation 7.2 given the 
selection coefficients in a given simulation and the limits of R (0,1). Offspring 
surviving to the dispersal stage are placed in a cell chosen at random from the 8 cells 
in the neighbourhood of the parent with which the newborn develops, plus that 
parent’s own cell, replacing the original occupant. These individuals are then 
considered adult and capable of reproduction. In this way fitter offspring may spread 
out to colonise neighbouring cells, while an effective carrying capacity equal to the 
total population size is maintained. Following Silver and Di Paolo (2006), a 
generation is defined as n2 consecutive random matings, so that there will be 
significant overlap between one generation and the next.  
Here questions 1-3 are considered in turn, in each case a series of simulations 
were run to explore the behaviour of the system, using the parameters and fitness 
equations described in tables 7.2-7.4, respectively. For each set of parameter values 
the starting frequencies of A and E were varied independently from 0.1 to 0.9 in 0.1 
increments, giving 81 different starting conditions, and 10 simulations were run at 
each one. Spatial models ran in a 60×60 toroidal grid, and non-spatial models had the 
same population size of 3600 individuals. Alleles were distributed randomly and 
independently of each other at the start of each simulation, such that genotype 
frequencies at the start of the simulation averaged Hardy-Weinberg proportions, and 
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cultural traits were randomly distributed across individuals irrespective of genotype. 
Lattice points were assigned uniform randomly distributed starting resource values 
(R) between 0 and 1. For each analysis there were non-spatial controls in which the 
'neighbourhoods' for mating and dispersal comprised the entire lattice so that 
individuals and resource locations were picked at random from the general 
population. All simulations ran until A (question 1), E (question 2) or A and E 
(question 3) became either fixed or extinct, or simulations reached 1,000 generations.  
 
1. Can a cultural niche-constructing practice drive itself to fixation, even when costly, 
through statistical association with a genetic trait it favours? 
A costly niche-constructing practice E (selection coefficient ! <1) is considered, 
which increases the amount of resource R in the environment and generates selection 
favouring allele A. Phenogenotype fitnesses are specified in Table 7.2. Here the 
analysis explores how a transmission bias for and against the cultural practice E (i.e. 
variation in c =c1=c2={0.45, 0.5, 0.55}, c0=0, c3=1), and selection against E (! ), 
affect the dynamics. 
 
Table 7.2: Pheno-genotype fitness functions to explore the evolution of costly cultural niche 
construction (a is the selection coefficient operating on the cultural practice E). 
 E e  
AA  w11=! +! R w12=1+ ! R 
Aa  w21=! +!   w22=1+ !   
aa w31=! +! (1-R) w32=1+ ! (1-R) 
 
 
2. Can cultural niche construction generate selection for costly genetic traits? 
A costly genetic trait AA (selection coefficient h ≤1), that is favoured by the niche-
constructing practice E (selection coefficient ! =1) is considered. Here, the increase 
R(1! R ) R(1! R )
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in resource due to niche-construction depends on the frequency of both A and E. The 
modified version of Equation 7.1 used to update the resource level, and the relevant 
phenogenotype fitness functions, are specified in Table 7.3. A transmission bias for 
and against the cultural practice E (c) and selection against the AA genotype (h) affect 
the dynamics are also explored. 
 
Table 7.3: Phenogenotype fitness functions to explore the evolution of a costly capability to 
exploit cultural niche construction. 
Genotype  Fitness 
AA  w11=h+! R 
Aa  w21=1+!  
aa  w31=1+! (1-R) 
where R
t
= !
1
R
t"1
+ !
2
u + !
3
 and u is the frequency of AE.  
  
3. Can cultural niche construction favour the secondary hitchhiking of costly 
capabilities at other loci, expressed in more potent niche construction?  
For this question a second genetic locus, B, with alleles B and b, where allele B 
enhances the rate at which niche constructors produce resource R is introduced. 
Homozygous BB individuals have selection coefficient β1, those with bb have 
coefficient β2, and heterozygotes (Bb) have (β1+ β2)/2. In individuals with the cultural 
trait E (selection coefficient ! =1), BB enhances niche construction by proportion 
1+f, and Bb by proportion 1+f/2 (although the condition 0 ≤ R ≤ 1 was still applied). 
The modified version of Equation 7.1 was used to update the resource level, and the 
relevant phenogenotype fitness functions are specified in Table 7.4. The effects of a 
transmission bias for and against the cultural practice E (c), and selection against the 
B allele (β1<1, β2=1), on the evolutionary dynamics are considered.  
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Table 7.4: Can niche construction favour the hitchhiking of costly capabilities at other loci? 
 BB (β1) Bb((β1+β2)/2) bb (β2=1) 
AA (h=0.999) w11=β1+! R w12=(β1+β2)/2)+ ! R w13=1+ ! R 
Aa (1) w21=β1+!  w22=(β1+β2)/2)+ !  w23=1+!  
aa (1) w31=β1+! (1-R) w32=(β1+β2)/2)+ ! (1-R) w33=1+ ! (1-R) 
where Rt = !1Rt+1 + !2 (z1(1+ f )+ z2 (1+
f
2 )+ z3)+ !3 , where z1,z3 are the frequencies of 
BBE, BbE and bbE individuals, respectively.  
 
Table 7.5: Summary of parameters 
Parameter Explanation 
E,e Alternative niche-constructing cultural practices 
A,a Alleles at A locus 
B,b Alleles at B locus 
R Resource frequency 
!
1
 Independent resource depletion 
!
2
 Positive niche construction 
!
3
 Independent resource renewal 
p(E) Frequency of E cultural practice  
!  Negative niche construction 
!  Strength and direction of resource frequency dependence  
!  Selection coefficient acting on cultural practice  
c0 Probability e x e mating has E offspring 
c1 Probability e x E mating has E offspring 
c2 Probability E x e mating has E offspring 
c3 Probability E x E mating has E offspring 
η1 AA fitness 
η2  aa fitness 
β1 BB fitness  
β2 bb fitness  
!  Degree to which B potentiates niche construction 
f Probability of oblique transmission 
 
 
R(1! R)
 
R(1! R)
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RESULTS   
Can a cultural niche-constructing practice drive itself to fixation, even when costly? 
Across a broad range of conditions, cultural niche-constructing practices can generate 
selection for specific gene-based traits and hitchhike to elevated frequencies through 
the build up of statistical associations between practice and trait (Figures 7.1-7.3). 
This is most apparent where there is little or no fitness cost to the cultural practice 
(Figure 7.2, ! " 1), but is observed to a lesser degree even in the face of strong 
selection against E (e.g. a 5% disadvantage).  
These dynamics occur because, initially by chance, clusters of niche 
constructors appear in specific regions of space, generating a local concentration of 
the resource R, which in turn generates selection that favours allele A. In the spatial 
model, individuals mate and reproduce locally. Under these circumstances, allele A 
becomes statistically associated with the niche constructing practice E, while allele a 
becomes associated with e. This means that the selection on A generated by niche 
construction inadvertently favours E through hitchhiking. Provided the clusters of 
niche constructors reach a critical threshold size they will typically increase until the 
trait is fixed. This assortative mating does not occur in the non-spatial model, 
preventing E from being disproportionately favoured by selection on A. 
The cluster size effect represents a balance of several processes (Figure 7.1). 
The dynamics are similar to those observed in Silver and Di Paolo’s genetic niche 
construction spatial model, but here there is the additional complication of cultural 
transmission biases. To understand the process, it is helpful to envisage two 
concentric circles, the smallest encompassing the cluster. Because the niche 
construction leads to non-random associations between the alleles and cultural traits, 
inside the inner circle are mainly AAE individuals, while outside the outer circle are 
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mainly aae individuals. Separating the two is a boundary layer dominated by 
heterozygotes. Newly born AAE individuals disperse into the boundary layer from the 
inner circle, while newly born aae individuals enter the boundary layer from the outer 
region. Because the outer circle is larger than the inner circle, other matters being 
equal, this dispersal will tend to act to reduce cluster size. The magnitude of this force 
diminishes with cluster size, since the relative size of the two circles approaches 1 as 
the cluster increases. Opposing this process is the niche construction of those 
boundary layer individuals exhibiting the E cultural practice. This niche construction 
generates conditions that favour the A allele, which is disproportionately found in E 
individuals. Natural selection and cultural transmission also play a role, by affecting 
phenogenotype fitness (Figure 7.1). Provided the balance of these processes favours E 
over e within the boundary layer, then the clusters will increase in size. 
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Figure 7.1: (a) Schematic diagram of evolutionary forces acting on spatial clusters of individuals 
carrying linked cultural niche construction traits and alleles favoured by niche construction. (b) 
Snapshot illustrating spatial clustering associations between A, E, and R during a simulation run of the 
evolution of a costly capability to take advantage of cultural niche construction (selection against A 
allele, η, = 0.95, no cultural transmission bias). 
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Figure 7.2: Evolution of costly cultural niche construction. Plots show frequency of allele A favoured 
by higher resource levels and cultural niche-constructing trait E at the end of simulations run with 
varying levels of selection against, and cultural transmission bias with respect to, E (α and c 
parameters respectively). Values are means over all starting conditions with respect to the initial 
frequencies of A and E and error bars show ±1 standard error. Open circles show results from 
simulations with local mating and dispersal, filled circles are from those with global interactions.  
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The model showed that cultural niche construction could overcome moderate 
and sometimes even strong counter selection, and evolve to high frequency, especially 
when there was no transmission bias or where a transmission bias favoured the 
practice (c>0.5) (Figure 7.2).  
The similarity in outcome for both the A allele and the E cultural practice 
shows that strong associations built up between them under most conditions. 
Generally, in spatially structured populations A and E both reached higher frequencies 
on average than in fully mixed scenarios, except when counter-acting natural or 
cultural selection was very strong. This difference was driven largely by spatial 
structure, enabling both trait and practice to become established and increase from 
lower initial frequencies (Figure 7.3). When initial frequencies are very high or very 
low there are also differences between spatial and non-spatial model outcomes. These 
result from the possibility in spatial models that local gene frequencies can diverge 
significantly from population level frequencies. This can have a buffering effect that 
acts to preserve low-frequency alleles in pockets of local abundance in situations 
where a lack of spatial structure would lead to extirpation of the allele. The exception 
to this trend occurred when a cultural transmission bias (i.e. c<0.5) or extremely 
strong selection (i.e. a=0.9) acted against the E trait. In this case, the outcomes in 
mixed and structured populations were very similar. The effects described above 
break down when oblique transmission is very potent (i.e. the probability of learning 
from a non-parent is greater than 0.8), but that the effects persist with moderate or low 
levels of oblique transmission. 
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Can cultural niche construction generate selection for costly gene-based traits? 
Here the results were very clear. Under almost all conditions a cultural niche 
construction trait could drive a genetic trait to fixation, in spite of a significant 
viability deficit to the trait. The only exception occurred when a cultural transmission 
bias against the niche-constructing practice and a very strong viability deficit to the 
trait were both acting together. The aforementioned dynamic, resulting from the 
association of genetic trait and cultural practice, is sufficiently strong to overcome 
strong counter selection (e.g. >5% disadvantage). Even more striking is the 
observation that a modest cultural transmission bias favouring the practice can 
generate selection that takes extremely low fitness traits (e.g. >10% disadvantage) to 
fixation. That this is not dependent on spatially mediated hitchhiking is illustrated by 
the observation of the same process operating in non-spatial populations, and is 
consistent with earlier analyses of the impact of cultural niche construction (Laland et 
al. 2001). The niche construction allows allele A to reach high frequencies when 
counter-selection was moderate to weak, and persist at non-negligible frequencies 
even in the face of potent counter-selection (Figure 7.4). Only a moderate cultural 
transmission bias (i.e. c>0.5) is required to strongly favour the niche constructing 
practice so that both allele and cultural practice nearly always evolve to fixation even 
when initially quite rare (Figure 7.5). Again, spatial structure facilitates the spread of 
these traits to higher frequencies than in mixed populations. The values chosen for 
!
1
,!
2
,!
3
, and ε mean that the fitness functions defined in Equation 7.2 produce an 
asymmetry with respect to that portion of fitness that relates to the level of R that 
favours the A allele (in the long-term presence of E, R→1, so the second term of the 
fitness function for AA evaluates to ε while for aa in the long-term presence of e this 
evaluates to 2ε/3). Not surprisingly, altering the dynamics of the niche constructing 
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ecology via these parameters can alter the model outcomes such that the coevolution 
of A and E no longer occurs.  
In terms of starting frequencies, the switch between those resulting in 
extinction of the trait and those resulting in fixation occurred over much smaller 
change in starting conditions than the previous analysis. Under some conditions, 
particularly when cultural transmission biases favour E, a change in the starting 
frequencies of either allele by 0.1 can shift the outcome from a high probability of 
extinction to a near-certainty of fixation, suggesting that factors such as drift, 
bottlenecks or founder effects could play a significant role in shifting populations 
from one state to another. 
 
Can cultural niche construction favour the secondary hitchhiking of costly 
capabilities at other loci, expressed in more potent niche construction? 
Here a similar analysis produced more ambiguous results, with B only hitchhiking to 
higher frequency under much more restricted conditions. Across the bulk of 
conditions under which E hitchhikes, B does not. While A and E both reach high 
frequencies, and exhibited a similarity of outcome that showed they were highly 
associated, there was no indication that B had formed any association with either A or 
E. To the contrary, its outcomes were independent of the practice and the alleles at the 
other locus, and appeared largely to be affected only by selection at B, even for large 
values of f  (e.g. f = 10), and no matter the strength of cultural transmission bias, c. 
These results occur in spite of the fact that, even with f = 1, the effect of B on resource 
levels is dramatic. 
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Figure 7.3: Effect of starting conditions on the evolution of costly cultural niche construction. Plots 
show end frequencies of A and E against their starting frequencies. Cell values are means over all 
levels of selection against E (α ={0.9, 0.95, 0.99, 0.999, 1}). 
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Figure 7.4: Evolution of a costly capability to take advantage of cultural niche construction. Plots show 
frequency of allele A favoured by higher resource levels and cultural niche-constructing trait E at the 
end of simulations run with varying levels of selection against the homozygote AA (η={0.9, 0.95, 0.99, 
0.999, 1}), and cultural transmission bias with respect to E (c). Values are means over all starting 
conditions with respect to the initial frequencies of A and E and error bars show ±1 standard error. 
Open circles show results from simulations with local mating and dispersal, filled circles are from 
those with global interactions.  
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However, there is a restricted region of parameter space in which the 
secondary hitchhiking reliably occurs. It requires, perhaps counter-intuitively, a low 
coefficient of positive niche construction, λ2. Figure 7.6 shows that B’s hitch-hiking 
lags behind the rapid and strong interaction between A and E; this is the characteristic 
pattern. There exists a window of low levels of positive niche construction, λ2, under 
which secondary hitchhiking is apparent (Figure 7.7), with values of λ2 too high or too 
low failing to lead to increased frequencies of B. When λ2 is too high then the niche 
construction of individuals with bb genotype and the E practice is already potent, and 
the resource R reaches saturation before enough time has passed for an association of 
alleles A and B to build up. Once A and E become fixed, the opportunity for B to 
hitch-hike on them is lost. Conversely, when λ2 is too low then the niche construction 
of E individuals with the bb genotype is too weak, so A and E simply never become 
established, and B cannot hitch-hike. Only when niche construction is within the 
window illustrated in Figure 7.7 are A and E’s spread to fixation sufficiently reliable 
and slow to allow linkages to build up between these and B. Once the association is 
established, typically in a confined spatial region, then the AABBE combination 
begins to expand. This effect was only observed in spatial models, and never in non-
spatial ones. Spatial structure is absolutely essential for B’s spread because the 
requisite mutual reinforcement of the A, E, and B traits cannot happen if their effects 
are diluted and dispersed across a population. 
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Figure 7.5: Effect of starting conditions on the evolution of a costly capability to take advantage of 
cultural niche construction. Plots show end frequencies of A and E against their starting frequencies. 
Cell values are means over all levels of selection against A (h). 
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Figure 7.6: Time series of a single simulation run with λ2 = 0.06, showing lagged hitch-hiking of B 
allele even when selection acts against BB (β1 = 0.99). Note that after A and E fix (typically at this 
point the resource, R, will also be saturated), B can no longer hitch-hike and begins to show drift-like 
dynamics. Other parameters were cultural transmission bias, c = 0.5, selection on AA, η = 0.999, and 
selection on bb, β2 = 1. 
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Figure 7.7: Effect of λ2, the coefficient of positive niche construction, and f, the strength of B’s effect 
on niche construction, on the evolution of costly genes that potentiate niche-construction. Plots show 
frequency of allele B at the end of simulation runs, with each point representing the mean (± 1 standard 
error) of ten runs. Symbols are shaded according to the proportion of the ten runs in which A and E 
both fixed (white = no runs fixed, black = all runs fixed). All other parameters were fixed – cultural 
transmission bias, c = 0.5, selection on AA, η = 0.999, selection on BB, β1 = 0.99, selection on bb, β2 = 
1. Initial frequencies of E, A and B were set at 0.25, 0.5 and 0.25 respectively. Note the high levels of B 
at intermediate values of λ2 for spatial models only. 
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DISCUSSION 
Here spatially explicit gene-culture coevolutionary models are presented to 
investigate how cultural processes could drive bouts of selection on human genes 
through modifying local resource distributions. The principle point to emerge from 
the analysis is that under a broad range of conditions cultural niche-constructing 
practices can generate selection for specific gene-based traits and hitchhike to fixation 
through the build up of statistical associations between practice and trait. This is most 
apparent where the fitness cost of the cultural practice is low but is observed to a 
lesser degree even in the face of very strong counter-selection. Cultural niche 
construction could overcome moderate and even strong counter selection and evolve 
to high frequency, especially when there was no transmission bias or where a 
transmission bias favoured the practice. 
These dynamics are most pronounced in the spatially explicit models because 
niche construction and spatial structure lead the genetic trait and cultural practice to 
become statistically associated. This means that the selection on genes generated by 
niche construction inadvertently favours the cultural niche-constructing practice itself 
through hitchhiking. Provided the clusters of niche constructors reach a critical 
threshold size they will typically increase until the trait is fixed. The dynamics are 
similar to those observed in Silver & Di Paolo’s genetic niche construction spatial 
model, but further complicated by cultural transmission biases. They are robust to 
moderate levels of oblique cultural transmission (here, learning from neighbours), 
although high levels of oblique transmission unsurprisingly make it harder to build up 
gene-culture correlations. 
In essence, the dynamical process closely resembles that of runaway sexual 
selection. Geneticist R. A. Fisher (1930) proposed a positive feedback mechanism 
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that could potentially explain the evolution of costly traits in animals that do not 
increase survival. Such traits were thought to be favoured because they increase the 
individual’s attractiveness to the opposite sex. Subsequent analysis has established 
that if the preference reaches a sufficiently high frequency it can overcome a viability 
deficit to the trait and generate selection that will increase trait frequency. Since 
individuals with the trait mate assortatively with individuals with the preference, over 
time these characters become statistically associated, such that the selection on the 
trait leads to the preference hitchhiking to higher frequency (Lande 1981; Kirkpatrick 
1982). The process is described as ‘runaway’ because over time it would facilitate the 
elaboration of both trait and preference.  
Here the cultural niche construction practice (E) is analogous to the mating 
preference which, provided it is of sufficiently high frequency, could generate a 
selective environment that favours the otherwise costly allele A. There is strong 
support for the hypothesis that cultural niche construction can generate selection for 
costly gene-based traits. The cultural niche construction trait almost always drove the 
low viability genetic trait to fixation, with the only exception being where both 
natural selection and a transmission bias opposed the process. Population structure 
strengthens this effect because it promotes assortative mating leading to non-random 
associations between trait and practice. While here the process stops once the trait 
reaches fixation, the resulting uplift in the frequency of E is sufficient to significantly 
increase the chances of E becoming fixed. Niche-constructing cultural traits have 
effectively driven themselves to fixation. Note, the focus on a single di-allelic locus is 
purely for mathematical convenience, and is designed to provide insight into the 
likely selection on any relevant genetic variation. In reality, human biological traits 
are likely to be influenced by multiple genes, and the runaway cultural niche 
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construction process described would potentially favour, and hitchhike on, any 
genetic variation that thrived in the resource rich environment. Moreover, genetic 
variation that enhances the cultural niche-constructing capability can also be caught 
up in this dynamic, opening up the possibility that both cultural practice and trait may 
experience repeated waves of selection, as is characteristic of runaway sexual 
selection. This process could help to explain the evolution of certain costly biological 
traits in the human lineage, such as large brains, complex cognition or expensive 
digestive enzyme production. Alleles expressed in the nervous system, brain function 
and brain development are an over-represented category amongst classes of genes 
known to be subject to recent selection (Laland et al. 2010; Voight et al. 2006; Wang 
et al. 2006). The argument of leading Evolutionary Psychologists that minds are co-
adapted gene complexes that are unable to respond quickly to selection (Buss, 2008; 
Cosmides & Tooby, 1987; Tooby & Cosmides, 1990, 2005) must be regarded as 
untenable in the face of this data. Molecular geneticists have not only identified 
numerous brain-expressed genes in the human genome (or, indeed, no longer in the 
human genome) that have been subject to recent selection, they have estimated the 
time depth of these changes, and they have mapped them onto gene-expression 
networks using molecular tools such as co-expression analysis (Varki et al. 2008). 
Cultural niche construction and cultural transmission in general are prime candidates 
for the source of this selection (Laland et al. 2010; Richerson et al. 2010), and the 
processes revealed by the analysis presented here are potentially important candidate 
mechanisms. 
Such considerations are further strengthened by the description here of the 
conditions favouring secondary hitch-hiking at other loci, whereby costly alleles are 
favoured simply because they amplify the niche-constructing effects of the cultural 
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trait E. Two points stand out in these findings - firstly, that this secondary hitch-
hiking can only occur when the niche-constructing effect on resource dynamics is 
comparatively weak, and secondly that this can only occur in spatially structured 
populations.  
The first limitation arises from the time lag between the initial favouring of the 
AAE complex and the subsequent hitch-hiking of the B allele on its rising frequency. 
If, either because niche construction is too weak to favour allele A, or because niche 
construction is so effective that AAE fixes too rapidly and the resource R saturates, B 
cannot hitch-hike. However, within this window of opportunity, weak but nonetheless 
effective niche-constructing capabilities generate selection for more potent niche 
constructing capabilities, in a self-reinforcing dynamic.  
This restriction to the range of circumstances under which secondary 
hitchhiking occurs results directly from the assumption of the model that there is a 
fixed upper bound to R. One might argue that for many aspects of human niche 
construction this assumption might be relaxed. For example, agricultural revolutions 
have repeatedly produced massive increases in yields per unit area. If R was an 
unbounded resource, then it is possible to envisage how a prolonged upward dynamic 
of primary hitchhiking resulting from niche construction could produce broader 
conditions favourable to the secondary hitch-hiking of enhanced niche-constructing 
capabilities. Nonetheless, most resources cannot rise without limit, so at some point 
an upper bound will be reached, and the opportunities for the evolution of more potent 
niche construction will diminish. 
The second limitation, that secondary hitch-hiking can only occur in spatially 
structured populations, is especially interesting because it appears to reflect so well 
the kind of agriculture- or technology-driven gene-culture co-evolution discussed in 
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the introduction. This spatial structure acts in two ways. Firstly, it generates a local 
concentration of the AAE complex, and secondly, it creates an advancing boundary 
zone of heterozygotes (Figure 7.1), which is especially fertile ground for secondary 
hitch-hiking. It is possible to envisage such zones occurring as waves of agricultural 
or technological innovation, through which cultural niche-constructing traits favour 
locally advantageous genotypes and in the process relentlessly drive their own 
advance, and perhaps even their own potency. In the non-spatial case, the dispersal of 
niche-constructing individuals across the shared resources of a population dilutes 
local resource concentrations, and means that statistical associations between the A 
and B alleles cannot build up.  
The findings discussed in this chapter suggest that runaway cultural niche 
construction could have played an important role in human evolution, both through 
driving specific gene-culture coevolutionary episodes, and through facilitating the 
evolution of an enhanced niche-constructing capability in the human lineage through 
secondary hitchhiking (Laland et al. 2010). Note that the models presented here 
considered only moderate biases in cultural transmission (0.45 ≤ c ≤ 0.55), but such 
biases can be considerably stronger (Cavalli-Sforza & Feldman, 1981; Boyd and 
Richerson 1985), and this may well increase the potency of cultural niche 
construction further. The B locus in the model can potentially serve to represent any 
genetic locus expressed in a costly biological trait that impacts on the niche-
constructing capability. Consideration of this secondary hitchhiking was largely 
motivated by the possibility that the average effect of allele B might confer a larger 
brain or enhanced cognitive capability. The latter includes an improved cultural 
capability, for instance, a capacity for motor imitation, teaching or language. 
Accordingly, this analysis may help to explain the observations that humans are 
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simultaneously the species with the largest relative brain size, the most potent 
capacity for niche construction, and with the greatest reliance on culture.  
Furthermore, in spatially structured contexts, the benefits of local niche construction 
could potentially accrue both to the constructor’s own offspring and those of its 
neighbours. The potential for niche-construction theory to generate insights into the 
evolution of cooperation is an exciting area for future research (Lehmann 2007, 2008; 
Van Dyken and Wade 2012). 
 It is apparent that cultural niche construction can lead to non-trivial alterations 
in evolutionary processes, especially in the case of spatially structured populations. It 
may be highly likely that human cultural processes have driven evolutionary episodes 
in the human lineage, and this analysis may help understand current features of the 
human genome. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 205 
 
 
 
 
SECTION 3, CHAPTER 8: 
MODELS OF CULTURAL NICHE CONSTRUCTION: SELECTION AND ASSORTATIVE 
MATING 
 
Material from this chapter has been submitted for publication as: 
Fogarty, L., Creanza, N. & Feldman, M.W. Models of cultural niche construction 1: 
selection and assortative mating. In review at PLoS ONE. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Niche construction has recently received attention as an important evolutionary 
process by which organisms alter the evolutionary pressures on themselves and 
organisms that share their ecological niche (Lewontin 1982; Lewontin 1983; Odling-
Smee et al. 1996; Odling-Smee et al. 2003; Laland et al. 2003; Laland et al. 2010). 
Niche construction has usually been considered in an ecological context, and typical 
examples include the aeration of soil by earthworms or the building of dams by 
generations of beavers (Darwin 1881; Laland et al. 1996). These environmental 
changes are mediated by individual organisms and become part of the evolutionary 
niche into which their offspring (and those of other species) are born (Jones et al. 
1994). In this way, organisms inherit and develop in an altered ecological niche from 
previous generations.  
Humans have collectively engaged in millennia of niche construction on a 
spectacular scale, often changing their natural environment beyond recognition and 
almost certainly altering the course of their own evolution as a result (Laland et al. 
2010; Richerson et al. 2010). Humans are also unique in the extent and complexity of 
their cultural learning, and recent theoretical and empirical work suggests that 
‘cultural niche construction,’ where one set of human cultural practices contribute to 
the evolutionary forces acting on a second set of culturally transmitted traits, can be a 
powerful force explaining human evolution and behaviour (Guglielmino et al. 1995; 
Ihara and Feldman 2004; Odling-Smee and Laland 2009; Laland et al. 2010). Recent 
years have seen increasing recognition that there may be multiple levels of feedback 
from niche construction, including the modification of cultural selection (Laland et al. 
2000; Odling-Smee et al. 2003; O’Brien and Laland in press). Similar ideas have 
been discussed in explorations of both gene-culture coevolution (Cavalli-Sforza and 
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Feldman 1973) and dual-inheritance theory (Feldman and Cavalli-Sforza 1976; Boyd 
and Richerson 1985). The model presented here follows the gene-culture and culture-
culture frameworks proposed by Odling-Smee et al. (2003, pp. 338) and Ihara and 
Feldman (2004) in formulating a general model capable of accounting for both. 
Culturally transmitted behavioural traits have been important in human 
evolution, and humans can also affect aspects of their evolutionary trajectories by 
influencing their cultural environment (e.g. by farming, migrating, or living in large 
groups). For example, the advent of dairy farming and animal domestication led, in 
Europe, to an increase in the frequency of the allele for lactase persistence, allowing 
more individuals to benefit from drinking milk into adulthood (Aoki 1986; Feldman 
and Cavalli-Sforza 1989; Durham 1991). Animal domestication also changed aspects 
of the human immune system as humans came into contact with a variety of new 
animal pathogens (Saunders et al. 2002). In this way, the human-constructed cultural 
niche may affect the evolutionary trajectory of genes; this is one form of niche 
construction first studied quantitatively by Feldman and Cavalli-Sforza (1976). 
However, it is also possible that one aspect of a culture or one set of culturally 
transmitted traits forms a cultural niche that affects either the transmission, 
persistence, or reproductive contributions of other cultural traits. The resulting joint 
evolutionary dynamics are characterised by feedbacks between the different sets of 
cultural entities. For example, Lipatov et al. (2011) describe a model that focuses on 
traditional Chinese marriage beliefs, which interact with the economic index of a 
population to influence marriage practices. This concept is sometimes called ‘context 
dependence’ in the social sciences, and it has received little attention from a 
quantitative evolutionary point of view. Cases where culturally transmitted behaviour 
modifies an ecological or social niche are known as ‘cultural niche construction’. 
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Here a model of cultural niche construction is described that formalises a wide 
range of evolutionary interactions, including gene-culture interactions, in which a 
cultural trait can alter selection pressures on a genetic trait or vice versa, and culture-
culture interactions, in which a cultural trait alters the evolutionary forces acting on 
another cultural trait. The model can represent either type of interaction depending on 
the rules of transmission, mating, and selection, which generate feedback between one 
trait and the other (Figure 8.1). For example, the extent of assortative mating for one 
trait may influence the evolutionary dynamics of another. Applications of the model 
include the interaction between religious beliefs and fertility (e.g. Rowthorn 2011), 
the cultural evolution of large-scale conflict (e.g. Halperin et al. 2011), level of 
education and attitudes towards fertility control (e.g. Ihara and Feldman 2004), male-
biased sex preference and marriage practices in Asia (e.g. Lipatov et al. 2011), or the 
possible interaction between marriage customs and other cultural beliefs (e.g. Brown 
and Feldman 2009). The model allows for two vertically transmitted traits, where 
each could be considered either genetically or culturally transmitted, and horizontal 
transmission is incorporated as cultural mutation, where an individual’s traits may 
diverge from those of its parents. Also incorporated is assorting, an individual’s 
tendency to choose a mate carrying the same trait (either cultural or genetic) as itself, 
and selection, which allows the relative fitness of the phenotypes to differ. This 
enables the model to elucidate the interaction between assortative mating and any 
direct selective advantages or disadvantages the traits might bestow. The framework 
accommodates two interacting cultural traits, which can influence the evolutionary 
trajectories of one another, but can also be applied to gene-culture interactions. 
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Figure 8.1. Cultural niche construction results in environmental variation, which may produce two 
distinct forms of feedback. Route 1: a cultural trait modifies selection pressures, which can induce 
further cultural change. Route 2: gene-culture coevolution, where a cultural trait changes selection 
pressures, causing population level genetic changes in response. Evolutionary outcomes from both 
route 1 and route 2 depend on the frequency of T and N (cultural or genetic) traits in the population and 
the selection pressures they generate, here represented by σi. Modified from Odling-Smee, Laland, and 
Feldman (2003).  
 
THE MODEL 
The model considers two cultural traits: T, a recipient trait that determines a cultural 
phenotype, and N, a niche constructing trait that determines selection and assortative 
mating parameters that influence the dynamics of the T trait. Each has two possible 
states (T: T, t and N: N, n), thus there are four possible phenotypes – TN (type 1), Tn 
(type 2), tN (type 3), and tn (type 4), whose population frequencies are denoted by x1, 
x2, x3, and x4, respectively, with xi = 1i=1
4! . The relative fitnesses of T and t 
individuals depend on the state of the N trait, as shown in Table 8.1. Individuals with 
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the t trait always have a relative fitness equal to 1, but the relative fitnesses of TN and 
Tn can differ. The state of the N trait sets the value of the selection coefficient σi (-1 ≤ 
σi ≤ 1), such that the phenotype TN has fitness 1 + σ1 and the phenotype Tn has fitness 
1 + σ2,, whereas the tN and tn phenotypes both have fitness 1.  
 
Table 8.1. Relative fitnesses of the four phenotypes. 
 
Phenotype Relative fitness 
TN 1 + σ1 
Tn 1 + σ2 
tN 1 
tn 1 
 
The relative fitness of individuals carrying the T trait can differ from that of individuals carrying the t 
trait. The amount of this difference is dictated by the N state: the N trait confers a fitness difference of 
σ1 between TN and tN, and the n trait confers a fitness difference of σ2 between Tn and tn. 
 
 The state of the N trait also determines the value of an assortative mating 
parameter, which measures the departure from random mating. A ‘choosing parent,’ 
is arbitrarily assigned as the father in the subsequent analysis. The choosing parent’s 
N state dictates the level of assortative mating, that is, the degree to which an 
individual of a given T state will preferentially mate with another individual of the 
same state, expressed by parameters αi (0 ≤ αi ≤ 1).  In the population, a fraction (1 - 
αi) of individuals will mate randomly, while the remainder of the population (αi) will 
mate preferentially with individuals of the same T state. If the choosing parent is N, 
individuals mate randomly with probability 1 – α1 and mate preferentially with 
individuals of the same T state with probability α1, whereas if the choosing parent is 
n, individuals mate randomly with probability 1 – α2 and mate preferentially with 
individuals of the same T state with probability α2.  
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Table 8.2. Mating frequencies for all possible matings. 
 
   ♂ x ♀ mating frequency    ♂ x ♀ mating frequency 
 
TN x TN m1,1 = x12 (1!"1)+
"1x12
(x1 + x2 )
 
 
tN x TN 
 
m3,1 = x3x1(1!"1)  
 
 
TN x Tn m1,2 = x1 x2 (1!"1)+
"1x1 x2
(x1 + x2 )
 
 
 
tN x Tn 
 
m3,2 = x3x2 (1!"1)  
 
 
TN x tN 
 
m1,3 = x1 x3(1!"1)  
 
 
tN x tN m3,3 = x32 (1!"1)+
"1x32
(x3 + x4 )
 
 
 
TN x tn 
 
m1,4 = x1 x4 (1!"1)  
 
 
tN x tn m3,4 = x3x4 (1!"1)+
"1x3x4
(x3 + x4 )  
 
 
Tn x TN m2,1 = x1 x2 (1!" 2 )+
" 2x1 x2
(x1 + x2 )  
 
 
tn x TN 
 
m4,1 = x4x1(1!" 2 )  
 
 
Tn x Tn m2,2 = x22 (1!" 2 )+
" 2x22
(x1 + x2 )  
 
 
tn x Tn 
 
m4,2 = x4x2 (1!" 2 )  
 
 
Tn x tN 
 
m2,3 = x2x3(1!" 2 )  
 
 
tn x tN m4,3 = x4x3(1!" 2 )+
" 2x4x3
(x3 + x4 )  
 
 
Tn x tn 
 
m2,4 = x2x4 (1!" 2 )  
 
 
 
tn x tn m4,4 = x42 (1!" 2 )+
" 2x42
(x3 + x4 )
 
 
 
In this model, α1 is the rate of assortment if the choosing parent is N, and α2 is the rate of assortment if 
the choosing parent is n. The choosing parent is listed first for each mating. On the right side of the 
equations, the first term represents the frequency of random matings and the second term the frequency 
of assortative matings. 
 There are sixteen father-mother pairs possible from the four phenotypes 
described here, denoted by notation mi,j to indicate the frequency of a mating between 
a father of type i and a mother of type j where i, j = {1, 2, 3, 4}; the mating frequency 
of each pairing is given in Table 8.2. With preferential mating based on their T state, 
the mating frequency for individuals of different T states is the product of the 
frequency of each phenotype multiplied by the probability of individuals mating at 
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random (1 - αi). The mating frequency for individuals of the same T state is the sum 
of the probability that the individuals mate at random and the probability that the 
individuals mate assortatively. Since the traits in question are transmitted vertically, 
for each phenotype it is psossible to specify the probability that the mating produces 
an offspring of that phenotype. These probabilities, bi and ci for i = {0, 1, 2, 3} shown 
in Table 8.3, are assumed to be constant (0 ≤ bi ≤1, 0 ≤ ci ≤ 1).  
 
Table 8.3. Probabilities of offspring outcomes from cultural trait pairings 
 
 T t  N n 
T x T b3  1! b3  N x N c3  1! c3  
T x t b
2
 1! b
2
 N x n c
2
 1! c
2
 
t x T b
1
 1! b
1
 n x N c
1
 1! c
1
 
t x t b
0
 1! b
0
 n x n c
0
 1! c
0
 
 
For each mating, the probability of transmitting each trait is given. For example, a mating between a T 
individual and another T individual will result in a T offspring with probability b3 and a t offspring with 
probability (1 – b3).  
 
T and N are assumed to be transmitted independently, so the probability of 
offspring outcomes for each of the sixteen possible matings is obtained by 
multiplying the corresponding probabilities from each side of Table 3. For example, a 
mating of a TN individual with a Tn individual will produce a TN offspring with 
probability b3 c2 and a Tn offspring with probability b3 (1 – c2). If b0 = 0 and b3 = 1, 
then there is no cultural ‘mutation’ from one T state to another: two T parents will 
always produce a T offspring and two t parents will always produce a t offspring. In 
addition, these transmission parameters could take values that represent Mendelian 
inheritance: b0 = 0, b1 = b2 = 0.5, and b3 = 1. However, if b0 > 0 and b3 < 1, there is 
some rate at which two T parents can produce t offspring and vice versa. The 
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corresponding statements are true of ci with respect to the N state. This cultural 
mutation may also be viewed as frequency-independent horizontal transmission. 
To compute the frequency of a given phenotype in the next generation, each 
mating frequency is multiplied by the probability that the mating produces that 
offspring phenotype and sum over each of the sixteen possible mating combinations. 
Selection, in terms of σ1 and σ2, then operates on these offspring. The full recursions, 
giving !xi , the phenotype frequencies in the next generation, in terms of xi  in the 
current generation, are given in Equations 8.1-8.4 below.  
 
w !x1 = (1+" 1)(m1,1b3c3 +m1,2b3c2 +m1,3b2c3 +m1,4b2c2 +m2,1b3c1 +m2,2b3c0 +
m2,3b2c1 +m2,4b2c0 +m3,1b1c3 +m3,2b1c2 +m3,3b0c3 +m3,4b0c2 +m4,1b1c1 +
m4,2b1c0 +m4,3b0c1 +m4,4b0c0 )
   
                                                                                                         (8.1) 
 
w !x2 = (1+" 1)(m1,1b3(1# c3)+m1,2b3(1# c2 )+m1,3b2 (1# c3)+m1,4b2 (1# c2 )+
m2,1b3(1# c1)+m2,2b3(1# c0 )+m2,3b2 (1# c1)+m2,4b2 (1# c0 )+m3,1b1(1# c3)+
m3,2b1(1# c2 )+m3,3b0 (1# c3)+m3,4b0 (1# c2 )+m4,1b1(1# c1)+m4,2b1(1# c0 )+
m4,3b0 (1# c1)+m4,4b0 (1# c0 ))
 
      (8.2) 
 
w !x3 = (m1,1(1" b3)c3 +m1,2 (1" b3)c2 +m1,3(1" b2 )c3 +m1,4 (1" b2 )c2 +
m2,1(1" b3)c1 +m2,2 (1" b3)c0 +m2,3(1" b2 )c1 +m2,4 (1" b2 )c0 +m3,1(1" b1)c3 +
m3,2 (1" b1)c2 +m3,3(1" b0 )c3 +m3,4 (1" b0 )c2 +m4,1(1" b1)c1 +m4,2 (1" b1)c0 +
m4,3(1" b0 )c1 +m4,4 (1" b0 )c0 )
  
(8.3) 
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w !x4 = (m1,1(1" b3)(1" c3)+m1,2 (1" b3)(1" c2 )+m1,3(1" b2 )(1" c3)+m1,4 (1" b2 )(1" c2 )+
m2,1(1" b3)(1" c1)+m2,2 (1" b3)(1" c0 )+m2,3(1" b2 )(1" c1)+m2,4 (1" b2 )(1" c0 )+
m3,1(1" b1)(1" c3)+m3,2 (1" b1)(1" c2 )+m3,3(1" b0 )(1" c3)+m3,4 (1" b0 )(1" c2 )+
m4,1(1" b1)(1" c1)+m4,2 (1" b1)(1" c0 )+m4,3(1" b0 )(1" c1)+m4,4 (1" b0 )(1" c0 ))
 
(8.4)  
 
The average fitness (w ) is the sum of the right side these four equations and acts to 
normalise !x
i
so that !xi = 1
i
" . If !xi = xi , for i = {1, 2, 3, 4}, the system is at 
equilibrium and the number and structure of these equilibria, as well as whether they 
are stable, depend on the values of the parameters in Tables 8.1-8.3. This analysis of 
the model is then combined with numerical iterations to explore the parameter space 
(-1 ≤ σi ≤ 1, 0 ≤ αi ≤ 1, 0 ≤ bi ≤1, 0 ≤ ci ≤ 1) and the nature and stability of the 
equilibria of the system. For a given set of parameter values, the system is iterated 
until convergence, from several initial values of xi and the equilibrium approached 
from each can be examined.  
 
RESULTS 
Three sets of parameters interact in this model: the selection parameters σi, assortative 
mating parameters αi, and vertical cultural transmission parameters, bi and ci. The 
values of both σi and αi are determined by an individual’s N state, as described above. 
In order to study the dynamics of a population with a given set of parameter values, 
the possible equilibria, their stability, and the effect of initial phenotype frequencies 
on the eventual equilibrium reached are investigated. Although some special cases are 
amenable to mathematical solution, most require numerical analysis. For a given set 
of parameters, the frequency of each phenotype (x1, x2, x3, and x4) is represented as a 
point in the tetrahedron shown in Figures 8.2-8.4, with a vertex representing the 
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fixation of a phenotype; for example, x1 = 1 at the vertex labeled TN. Likewise, a 
point on the edge between the vertices labeled tN and tn represents x1 = x2 = 0. 
Arrows inside the tetrahedron begin at initial frequencies of each phenotype and point 
in the direction of the equilibrium approached from these starting frequencies after 
50,000 generations. 
 
Case 1: No selection, no assortative mating no cultural mutation 
Here σ1 = σ2 = 0 (no selection), α1 = α2 = 0 (no assortative mating), b0 = 0, 
b3 = 1 (no cultural mutation of the T state), and c0 = 0, c3 = 1 (no cultural mutation of 
the N state). The parameters b1 and b2 are the probabilities of producing a T offspring 
from a T x t or a t x T mating, respectively, and in general these parameters need not 
be equal. Likewise, c1 and c2 correspond to the probability of producing an offspring 
with an N trait from an N x n or an n x N mating, respectively. The balance of 
(b1 + b2) with (c1 + c2) dictates the eventual fixation: if b1 + b2 ≠ 1 and c1 + c2 ≠ 1, the 
system approaches fixation of a single phenotype. For example, if b1 + b2 > 1, more 
offspring with the T trait are produced from mixed T/t matings than offspring with the 
t trait. If c1 + c2 > 1 as well, then more N offspring are produced from mixed N/n 
matings than n offspring. If both inequalities hold, TN will be favoured in the long 
term, and any initial phenotype frequencies such that 0 < x1, x2, x3, x4 < 1 will evolve 
toward x1 = 1. However, if N is initially absent in the population, the population 
approaches fixation in Tn (Figure 8.2a). If b1 + b2 = 1 and c1 + c2 = 1, no phenotype is 
favoured by vertical transmission, and any starting point such that 0 < x1, x2, x3, x4 < 1 
can be an equilibrium. This is referred to as the neutral case. 
 If c1 + c2 = 1, which is typical of Mendelian inheritance but is also possible 
with cultural transmission, then neither N nor n will be favoured and both will be 
 216 
present at equilibrium. For example, if c0 = 0, c1 = 0.6, c2 = 0.4, and c3 = 1, then if 
b1 + b2 > 1 the T  
 
Figure 8.2. In this and subsequent figures, a filled square at a vertex indicates a stable fixation at that 
vertex. A filled circle indicates an equilibrium that is unstable except in a specific hyperplane. Inside 
the tetrahedron, arrows originate at the population’s initial phenotype frequencies and point toward the 
equilibrium. Arrows are color-coded by the phenotype fixed at the resulting equilibrium (Tn: red, Tn: 
blue, tN: green, tn: cyan, tN-tn edge: black). (A) No selection, no assortative mating, no cultural 
mutation: when b1+b2>1 and c1+c2>1, TN vertex is stable. When 0<α1, α2<1, the same vertex is stable. 
(B) No selection, no assortative mating, no cultural mutation: when b1+b2<1, t approaches fixation, if 
c1+c2=1, N and n persist in initial proportions. Any point along the edge connecting the tn and tN 
vertices can be an equilibrium. (C) Selection but no assortative mating, no cultural mutation. For 
certain parameters, cultural transmission favours fixation of one phenotype but selection favours 
another. In some cases, two points are stable and which is approached depends on initial frequencies. 
In the case shown here, α1=α2=0, b0=c0=0, b3=c3=1, b1=0.8, b2=0.5, c1=0.5, c2=0.2, σ1=-0.2, and σ2=-
0.6. Transmission favours T and n, but Tn is selected against, so the population approaches fixation of 
either TN or tn depending on initial frequencies. (D) Assortative mating, selection, and cultural 
mutation. From all initial phenotype frequencies, the population will approach a single stable 
polymorphism. In this case, α1=0.1, α2=0.1, b0=0.05, b1=0.49, b2=0.52, b3=0.95, c0=0.05, c1=0.51, 
c2=0.53, c3=0.95, σ1=-0.2, and σ2=-0.1. At equilibrium, x1≈0.1438, x2≈0.0492, x3≈0.6262, and 
x4≈0.1808. 
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state will approach fixation and if b1 + b2 < 1 the t state will approach fixation, but in 
both cases N and n will remain at their original proportions in the population (Figure 
8.2b). In this case, the N trait is neutral. Corresponding statements are true for the T 
and t states if b1 + b2 = 1. If both b1 + b2 = 1 and c1 + c2 = 1, then both the T and the N 
traits are neutral, and T, t, N, and n will persist in their initial proportions. Note that 
while the proportions of these individual states will remain constant, the phenotype 
frequencies (x1, x2, x3, and x4) can change from their initial values because offspring 
can inherit their T and N traits from different parents.  
 
Case 2: No selection, assortative mating, no cultural mutation 
 With σ1 = σ2 = 0 (no selection), α1, α2 > 0 (assortative mating), b0 = c0 = 0 and 
b3 = c3 = 1 (no cultural mutation), the dynamics are largely similar to those in Case 1 
in that the transmission parameters dictate which phenotype ultimately reaches 
fixation (Figure 8.2a) unless there is complete assortative mating, in which case the 
values of the parameters b1 and b2 are irrelevant. Thus, when α1 = α2 = 1, c1 and c2 
dictate which of the N states will approach fixation and the T state is neutral. For 
example, if c1 + c2 < 1, n will approach fixation, but any proportions of Tn and tn can 
be an equilibrium. Here, the Tn-tn edge of the tetrahedron is neutrally stable; 
perturbing the system away from this edge by adding N individuals to the population 
will result in a return to this edge. The proportions of T and t will not change from 
generation to generation, but if a perturbation changes these proportions, they will 
remain at the perturbed frequencies. Likewise, if c1 + c2 > 1, the edge between the TN 
and tN vertices will be stable when assortative mating is complete. 
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Case 3: Selection, no assortative mating, no cultural mutation 
 Next, the case in which the fitnesses of the phenotypes are not equal, 
individuals mate randomly, and there is no cultural mutation is 
considered: -1 < σ1, σ2 < 1, σ1 ≠ σ2, α1 = α2 = 0 (no assortative mating), and b0 = c0 = 0 
and b3 = c3 = 1 (no cultural mutation). In this case, a single phenotype often 
approaches fixation. However, when vertical transmission favours one phenotype but 
selection favours another, two vertices may be locally stable, in which case the initial 
phenotype frequencies dictate which vertex will eventually be approached (Figure 
8.2c).  
 
Case 4: Selection, assortative mating, cultural mutation 
 When there is cultural mutation in the population (0 < bi, ci < 1), no boundary 
can be reached from any starting point. In all cases examined, only one stable 
polymorphism exists in the interior of the tetrahedron (Figure 8.2d).  
 
Case 5: Selection, assortative mating, no cultural mutation 
 With both selection and assortative mating (-1 < σ1, σ2 < 1, α1, α2 > 0) but no 
cultural mutation (b0 = c0 = 0, b3 = c3 = 1), stable equilibria with one or both traits 
fixed are possible. In most such cases, a single phenotype is favoured and ultimately 
approaches fixation, except in populations that are initially missing one of these traits. 
Approximately 25 million combinations of parameters were simulated, avoiding 
values close to zero or one (0.2 < α1, α2 < 0.8, 0.2 < b1, b2 < 0.8, 
0.2 < c1, c2 < 0.8, -0.8 < σ1, σ2 < 0.8) and found that in a small fraction of cases (on 
the order of 1 in 50,000), multiple stable equilibria are possible, including one vertex 
and one polymorphism with all phenotypes at a frequency greater than 0.01, as well 
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as at least one unstable equilibrium. Using these rare polymorphisms as starting 
points, it was possible to identify patterns of parameter values that allowed for the 
persistence of all four phenotypes. As an illustration, consider the case where α1 = 0.8, 
α2 = 0.3, b0 = 0, b1 = 0.7, b2 = 0.7, b3 = 1, c0 = 0, c1 = 0.5, c2 = 0.2, c3 = 1, σ1 = -0.2, 
and σ2 = -0.7. Testing numerous combinations of b1 and b2 but holding the other 
parameters constant, it can be shown that a subset of these combinations produce a 
stable polymorphism and the remainder give fixation of a single phenotype (Figure 
8.3a); likewise, a subset of c1 and c2 pairs will result in the stable persistence of all 
four phenotypes (Figure 8.3b).   
In cases where multiple stable equilibria exist, the equilibrium approached 
depends on the population’s initial composition. For example, with the set of 
parameters listed above, an interior stable polymorphism exists, and from outside of 
its domain of attraction the population approaches fixation of one phenotype (Figure 
8.3c). Which phenotype approaches fixation depends on the relationship between the 
parameters. For example, if α2 > α1, c1 + c2 > 1, σ2 > σ1, σ1 < 0, and σ2 < 0, then that 
x3 = 1 tends to be locally stable in addition to the stable polymorphism. Similarly, 
when α1 > α2, c1 + c2 < 1, σ1 > σ2, x4 = 1 is likely to be stable in addition to the stable 
polymorphism. In both of these situations there is one unstable fixation and another 
unstable equilibrium between the polymorphism’s domain of attraction and the stable 
fixation point.  
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Figure 8.3.  For most parameter sets, the population approaches a single vertex; in rare cases a stable 
polymorphism is also present. Panels (A)-(C) show the parameter values α1=0.8, α2=0.3, b0=0, b1=0.7, 
b2=0.7, b3=1, c0=0, c1=0.5, c2=0.2, c3=1, σ1=-0.2, σ2=-0.7, (A)-(B) shows varied pairs of transmission 
parameters. (A) Effect of transmission of T on the presence of a polymorphism. The x-axis represents 
the value of b1, y-axis represents the value of b2, and the colour scale shows the value of x1. (B) Effect 
of transmission of N on the presence of a polymorphism. The x-axis represents the value of c1, the y-
axis represents the value of c2, and the colour scale represents the value of x1. (C) Pink square 
represents a stable polymorphism (x1≈0.814, x2≈0.0162, x3≈0.0937, x4≈0.0763). Pink arrows illustrate 
the domain of attraction of this equilibrium. Yellow diamonds represent an unstable equilibrium 
between the domains of attraction of the polymorphism and the tn vertex. (D) Polymorphism where 
c1 + c1 = 1. For some initial frequencies, the population approaches a single fixed point at the blue 
square. Pink square represents a stable polymorphic internal equilibrium, pink arrows illustrate the 
domain of attraction of this equilibrium. Red, green, and cyan circles and yellow diamonds represent 
unstable equilibria. Black arrows begin at initial conditions that result in an equilibrium on the tN-tn 
edge of the tetrahedron. Yellow diamonds show unstable equilibria on the n and t fixation edges. In this 
case, α1=0.8, α2=0.3, b0=0, b1=0.2, b2=0.3, b3=1, c0=0, c1=0.3, c2=0.7, c3=1, σ1=0.2, and σ2=0.4.  
 
In certain cases, parameter combinations can produce quite complex 
outcomes, especially when the cultural transmission parameters from mixed matings 
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sum to one for one trait: from certain initial frequencies a stable interior 
polymorphism is approached, whereas from other initial frequencies, fixation in one 
phenotype is approached, while other starting points are neutral with respect to one of 
the traits (an edge of the tetrahedron). In Figure 8.3d, for example, with α1 = 0.8, 
α2 = 0.3, b0 = 0, b1 = 0.2, b2 = 0.3, b3 = 1, c0 = 0, c1 = 0.3, c2 = 0.7, c3 = 1, σ1 = 0.2, 
and σ2 = 0.4, Tn fixation (x2 = 1) is locally stable, and there is a stable polymorphism 
with all four phenotypes present (x1 ≈ 0.0176, x2 ≈ 0.0284, x3 ≈ 0.2558, and 
x4 ≈ 0.6981). In addition, there are four unstable equilibria: two distinct fixation 
points (TN can approach fixation when n is completely absent and tn can approach 
fixation when N is completely absent and x2 < 0.643), one point between the domains 
of attraction of the stable polymorphism and the neutral edge, and one point between 
the domains of attraction of the Tn vertex and the tn vertex. Further, the domain of 
attraction of the neutral edge does not include all initial phenotype frequencies near it. 
If the initial conditions are close to fixation in t, that is, x1 + x2 << x3 + x4 but 
all xi > 0, the system will approach different equilibria depending on the initial 
proportions of N and n in the population. For example, with the parameters above, if 
x3 > 0.735 initially, the population will approach fixation at x2 = 1, but if x3 < 0.735 
initially, the population will approach an equilibrium in which x3 and x4 are both 
present. For most initial frequencies with x3 < 0.735, x3 + x4 = 1 at equilibrium, but 
there is a set of initial conditions near the tN-tn edge, where 0.261 < x3 < 0.372 and x1 
and x2 are close to zero, that lead to an equilibrium with all four phenotypes present. 
This example illustrates that a single set of parameters for selection, assortative 
mating, and cultural transmission can result in a diverse set of evolutionary outcomes 
depending on the founding history of the population.   
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Case 6: Gene-culture coevolution 
Finally, the case in which individuals can mate assortatively and the fitnesses 
of the phenotypes are not equal (-1 < σ1, σ2 < 1, σ1 ≠ σ2, α1, α2 > 0) but one of the traits 
follows Mendelian transmission rules can be considered. Thus, a culturally 
transmitted trait is modifying the evolution of a genetically inherited trait or vice 
versa. In this case, the genetically transmitted trait often approaches fixation, and the 
culturally transmitted trait tends to approach fixation or an equilibrium between the 
two cultural phenotypes. However, with certain levels of selection and assorting, a 
culturally inherited trait (N) can modify the evolutionary dynamics of a genetic trait 
(T), resulting in the stable persistence of all four phenotypes. Likewise, a genetically 
inherited trait (N) can modify the evolution of a cultural trait (T) to produce a 
polymorphism. These polymorphisms can be found in cases with and without cultural 
mutation of the culturally transmitted trait. In contrast, if both traits exhibit Mendelian 
inheritance, no combination of assorting and selection appear to result in a 
polymorphism where all four genotypes are present in the population: at least one set 
of non-Mendelian transmission parameters seems to be necessary for a polymorphic 
equilibrium. By varying the transmission, selection, and assorting parameters in turn 
while maintaining Mendelian inheritance of one trait, regions of the parameter space 
that result in the persistence of all four phenotypes are found, but only when the 
transmission of the other trait is non-Mendelian (Figure 8.4). 
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Figure 8.4.When the T trait is transmitted by Mendelian inheritance and the N trait is transmitted 
culturally, assorting and selection may lead to gene-culture polymorphisms. Parameter set α1=0.83, 
α2=0.24, b0=0, b1=b2=0.5, b3=1, c0=0, c3=1, σ1=-0.01, and σ2=-0.82 and varied pairs of parameters as 
indicated. (A) Cultural transmission affects equilibria: c1 and c2 varied between 0 and 1, and the 
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equilibrium approached from initial frequencies near the x1-x2 edge is indicated by colour. 
Polymorphisms exist in the orange region. In (B) and (D), the transmission parameters are indicated by 
the black star in (A): c1=0.4 and c2=0.31. In (C) and (E), the Mendelian transmission parameters 
indicated by the white star in (A) were used: c1=0.5 and c2=0.5. (B) Selection parameters that produce a 
polymorphism are shown in orange. (C) When both traits show Mendelian transmission, no stable 
polymorphisms exist for any combination of selection levels. (D) The assorting parameter 
combinations that produce a gene-culture polymorphism are shown in orange. (E) When both traits 
show Mendelian transmission, polymorphisms do not exist for any combination of assorting 
parameters.  
 
DISCUSSION 
The term ‘cultural niche construction’ potentially encompasses at least two types of 
interactive processes (Odling-Smee et al. 2003). In culture-culture interaction, a 
cultural trait changes the selection pressures on, or transmissibility of, other cultural 
traits. The other is a process generating feedback between cultural evolution and 
genetic evolution leading to gene-culture coevolution (Laland et al. 2000). The model 
presented above can represent either of these processes depending on the choice of 
transmission parameters. The feedback in the model is generated through the 
interaction of the selection parameters σi, the assorting rates αi, and the transmission 
rates bi and ci. The T and N traits can be culturally transmitted, and N affects the 
relative fitnesses of T and t (see Table 8.1). The N trait thus affects the evolution of 
the population as a result of its culturally induced effect on the T trait. This is cultural 
niche construction, the strength and characteristics of which depend on all three sets 
of parameters in this model: the transmission parameters, the selection pressures, and 
the levels of assortative mating.  
Our model, indeed, has applicability that extends beyond cultural niche 
construction since it can represent gene-culture coevolution in either of two contexts: 
a genetically inherited trait that modifies the evolution of a culturally inherited trait, 
and vice versa. When one of the two traits exhibits Mendelian inheritance (for 
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example, b0 = 0, b1 = b2 = 0.5, b3 = 1) and the other is not Mendelian, most 
combinations of cultural transmission, selection, an assorting lead to equilibria in 
which the genetically inherited trait is fixed. However, as with two culturally 
transmitted traits (Case 5), the transmission, assorting, and selection can be balanced 
in such a way as to result in stable polymorphisms of all four phenotypes. Either case 
of gene-culture coevolution may result in polymorphisms if the cultural transmission, 
selection, and assorting interact appropriately. This phenomenon is seen both when 
the cultural mutation is present and when it is absent. However, no combination of 
assorting and selection parameters were found to give stable polymorphisms when 
both T and N were inherited according to Mendelian rules. This underscores the 
evolutionary importance of the interaction between cultural transmission, selection, 
and assorting. The model may be applied to a wide range of cultural niche 
construction systems, including three often studied social applications: the cultural 
evolution of religion and high fertility, the cultural evolution of war, and the cultural 
evolution of sex ratio bias, which is strong in several parts of the world and can 
interact with mating customs (Li et al. 2001). 
 
Cultural evolution of religion and fertility 
The cultural evolution of religious belief and its effects on in- and out-group 
acceptance and conflict have been widely studied, and attempts have been made to 
explain the evolution of both the human capacity for religious acceptance and its 
persistence as a cultural belief (Rowthorn et al 2011; Sosis and Alcorta 2003; Henrich 
2009). The interaction between religiosity and fertility discussed by Rowthorn (2011) 
can also be described by the model presented here, although there are some 
fundamental differences between his model and this one. After Rowthorn (2011), it is 
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possible to suppose that one of the traits controls a genetic predisposition to religiosity 
(N) and the other determines the cultural belief in religion (T). Following Rowthorn’s 
assumptions that there is complete assortative mating according to religious belief, T,  
(α1 = α2 = 1). The N trait is transmitted genetically, that is, c0 = 0, c3 = 1, and 
c1 = c2 = 0.5. The complete assortative mating renders the parameters b1 and b2 
irrelevant since a T individual will not mate with a t individual. In his model, 
Rowthorn (2011) includes parameters controlling what he describes as ‘switching;’ 
these are the probabilities that an individual adopts the opposite state of the cultural 
trait from the phenogenotype inherited through vertical transmission. In his model, 
there are four such switching parameters, one for each phenotype. Switching from 
non-belief (n) to religious belief (r) is considered more likely for an individual 
possessing the religiosity allele (R) than the non-religiosity allele (N), and, likewise, 
switching to non-belief is more likely for an individual with the non-religiosity allele. 
Rowthorn assumes sRn ! sNn (where sRn  represents the probability that an individual of 
phenotype nR will switch to rR, and so on) and sRr ! sNr ; in other words, the religiosity 
gene predisposes individuals to religious belief because the probability of switching to 
religious belief, from n to r, is greater for individuals carrying R and vice versa for 
carriers of N. Note, one contentious aspect of Rowthorn’s model is that the 
transmission does not involve conversion by contact with individuals of another type 
(horizontal transmission as defined by Cavalli-Sforza and Feldman (1981)), but 
occurs at a constant rate for each phenotype: it is not frequency dependent and can be 
viewed as mutation rather than cultural transmission.  
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Figure 8.5. Small fitness differences can alter the evolutionary dynamics of cultural traits. N represents 
the genetically transmitted religious predisposition trait and T represents the culturally transmitted 
belief trait. For both panels, α1=0.73, α2=0.94, b0=0.02, b1=0.3, b2=0.31, b3=0.98, c0=0, c1=c2=0.5, and 
c3=1. (A) When σ1=σ2=0.12, a stable equilibrium exists on the Tn-tn edge (black square), i.e. fixation of 
the non-religiosity allele (n) and a polymorphism between religious belief (T) and non-belief (t), which 
is approached from all starting points except those on the TN-tN edge, which approach the equilibrium 
illustrated by the black circle. (B) When σ1=0.12 and σ2=0.11, a stable polymorphism (pink square) 
exists such that both religious and non-religious predispositions, as well as religious belief and non-
belief, coexist in the population (x1≈0.521, x2≈0.127, x3≈0.295, x4≈0.057). 
 
Rowthorn’s condition sRn ! sNn  and sRr ! sNr  cannot be matched exactly in the model 
presented here, where transmission of T is independent of transmission of N, so the 
probability of cultural mutation depends on the frequencies of the relevant states, 
which can change over time and with different initial frequencies. For example, the 
frequency of a cultural mutation from T to t is the total frequency of T x T matings in 
the population (when α1 = α2 = 1, TN x TN matings occur with frequency 
x12
x1 + x2
, TN 
A
B
    tN
    tn
    TN
   Tn
    tN
    tn
    TN
   Tn
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x Tn and Tn x TN both with frequency x1x2x1 + x2
, and Tn x Tn with frequency x2
2
x1 + x2
, 
following Table 8.2) multiplied by the probability of producing a t offspring from a T 
x T mating, 1 - b3. Thus, the actual rate of T to t mutation can be viewed as 
x12 + 2x1x2 + x22
x1 + x2
!
"#
$
%&
(1' b3) = (x1 + x2 )(1' b3) , which is not affected by the N phenotype. 
Rowthorn’s model predicts that, regardless of the strength of selection in favour of the 
‘religious predisposition’ allele, and even with high defection from religious to non-
religious sects, the religiosity allele will eventually fix if fertility is higher in the 
religious groups and the switching rates follow the inequalities listed above (Table 1, 
Rowthorn 2011). With cultural mutation (b0 > 0, b3 < 1), as well as the conditions 
outlined above (α1 = α2 = 1, c0 = 0, c3 = 1, c1 = c2 = 0.5, σ1, σ2 > 0, σ1 ≠ σ2), there are 
two potential equilibrium points, one on the TN-tN edge and one on the Tn-tn edge, 
and which of these equilibria is approached depends on the relationship between the 
selection parameters. If σ1 > σ2 > 0, such that fertility is higher in religious groups (T 
is favoured over t) and those individuals with the religiosity allele are more likely to 
become religious (TN is favoured over Tn), analysis of this model reaches the same 
conclusions as Rowthorn (2011): the genetically transmitted religiosity allele 
approaches fixation and the culturally transmitted religious belief approaches an 
equilibrium determined by the transmission parameters b0 and b3. In the tetrahedron, 
there is a single stable equilibrium on the edge between the TN (r, R) vertex and the 
tN (n, R) vertex, corresponding to fixation of the religiosity allele and persistence of 
both cultural states (religious belief and non-belief), as observed by Rowthorn (2011). 
The rate of cultural mutation (b0 and b3) determines the ratio of believers to non-
believers at equilibrium. Given these assumptions, however, the result of this model is 
similar to Rowthorn’s but does not rely on the religiosity trait conferring a 
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predisposition to religion since the genetic trait here does not impose directionally 
biased mutation of the cultural trait according to phenotype-specific switching rates. 
Instead, the genetic trait is much less specific, producing a differential selective 
advantage to one cultural trait over another. Indeed, if conversion occurs between the 
cultural states of religious belief and non-belief, then continued presence of both 
belief and non-belief is inevitable because neither state can reach stable fixation. 
Rowthorn presents an interesting model to explain the persistence of both religious 
belief and non-belief in humans as an alternative to an evolutionary ‘spandrel’ theory 
(Gould and Lewontin 1979). This model gives similar results without the constraint 
that religious predisposition is genetic, as long as cultural mutation is possible and 
there is a fitness advantage to the cultural trait in question.   
However, Rowthorn (2011) makes a series of important assumptions that may 
affect the outcomes of his model. The most striking of these is complete assortment 
among members of religious (and non-religious) groups. Rowthorn further assumes 
that religious individuals, regardless of their genetic background, demonstrate a 
certain level of increased fertility. This regime of assorting and selection in the model, 
namely α1 = α2 = 1 and σ1 = σ2 > 0, results in a selectively neutral line of possible 
polymorphisms connecting the TN-tN edge to the Tn-tn edge. The exact 
polymorphism approached depends on the starting conditions.  
 Many religions have high rates of endogamy, as noted by Rowthorn, but 
religious groups are unlikely to have perfect endogamy and some mixing is inevitable 
(Heaton 1990). Relaxing Rowthorn’s assumption and allowing assorting to be high 
but not complete (0.6 < α1, α2 < 1, following the estimates from census data in 
(Heaton 1990)) enables us to take account of the important effects of mixed marriages 
in the evolution of religiosity. In this case, there are a number of polymorphisms 
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dependent on the values of the assortative mating parameters, the cultural 
transmission of religious beliefs to children of mixed marriages, and the selection 
pressures. Small differences in the selection pressures, however, can lead to fixation 
of the genetic trait while both states of the cultural belief trait persist (Figure 8.5). 
Although Rowthorn makes a series of suggestions regarding possible situations in 
which the religiosity allele may not be driven to fixation (heterozygote advantage, 
convergence of religious and non-religious birth rates etc.), he does not consider the 
effect of relaxing his strong assumption of perfect assorting. It is shown here that 
stable polymorphisms are possible when there is the possibility of even a small 
number of mixed marriages.   
 
Cultural evolution of large-scale conflict 
Our model may also help to understand in- and out-group interactions that 
contribute to conflict and how conflict might be alleviated. Hinde (1997) suggests that 
it is the culturally driven exploitation of genetic predispositions (e.g. fear of strangers) 
towards self-defence that leads to modern large-scale conflicts. The spread of violent 
tendencies in society could be largely facilitated by horizontal transmission ‘catalysed 
by predispositions…that leave individuals particularly receptive to propaganda 
messages’ (Laland and Brown 2002). In terms of this model, the ‘cultural mutation’ 
parameters b0, c0, 1 – b3, and 1 – c3 become very important in determining the 
eventual frequencies of cultural traits in the population. Since horizontal transmission 
is not included these cultural mutations can be interpreted as representing any factor 
that changes the beliefs of offspring relative to those of their parents. Consider the 
investigation by Halperin, et al. (2011) of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. They 
exposed Israeli Jews, Palestinian citizens of Israel, and Palestinians in the West Bank 
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to reading material suggesting that groups were either malleable in their beliefs or, 
alternatively, that they were fixed and unchanging in their beliefs. All of the subject 
groups responded to material suggesting groups were malleable with an ‘increased 
willingness to compromise for peace’ (Halperin et al. 2011). This type of culture-
culture interaction can also be modelled using this system. It is possible to 
characterise one cultural dichotomy as being willingness to compromise for peace 
(T/t), and the other as a cultural modifier, namely an individual’s belief in the 
malleability of groups (N/n). Individuals who place a high value on compromise 
might be more likely to partner with other compromisers, and, likewise, those 
unwilling to compromise for peace might preferentially associate with those who are 
also uncompromising. This entails assortative mating (or, more likely, assortative 
meeting, as in (Eshel and Cavalli-Sforza 1982)) based on the state of an individual’s 
T trait.  
Although the selection acting on such complex cultural traits is difficult to 
characterise, it is possible to make some simplifying assumptions. Lehmann and 
Feldman (2008) describe a model of ‘belligerence and bravery,’ two conflict-related 
traits. Belligerence increases the likelihood of aggression and bravery increases the 
likelihood of victory in the conflicts initiated by acts of aggression. The selection 
pressures acting on those individuals who engage in war-like behaviours are complex. 
On the one hand, they may have a shorter lifespan than their more peaceful 
counterparts, but the increased gain of fitness-enhancing resources may balance this 
loss. However, Lehmann and Feldman’s model is probably most relevant to tribal 
warfare where space and access to resources and mates could be important factors in 
interactions with out-groups. In many modern conflicts this may no longer be the 
case, because the motivations and goals of large-scale industrial societal conflicts are 
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far from fitness maximisation of the individuals who actually fight (Hinde 1987) and 
depend on factors at the level of the whole society (Hinde 1997). It may be sensible to 
assume that the evolutionary effect of reduced life expectancy for present-day 
combatants far outweighs any benefits accrued from increased access to resources and 
mates in conquered land. Thus, in applying the model presented here to modern 
conflicts, it may be true that selection favours compromising traits (T) over cultural 
beliefs that favour war (t). However, the societal pressures (e.g. manipulative media 
or ‘mobilising and abusive leaders’ (Laland and Brown 2002)) may cause the 
offspring of ‘compromisers’ to change beliefs (or actions), thus maintaining war-like 
phenotypes.  
Such a model applied to modern warfare, therefore, is analogous to Case 4 
described above with σ1 > σ2 > 0, α1, α2 > 0, and 0 < bi,  ci < 1, where it is clear that, 
from a system initially containing all cultural traits (TN, Tn, tN, tn), an equilibrium in 
which one phenotype fixes is impossible and there is just one polymorphic 
equilibrium, which is critically dependent on the mutation parameters and the level of 
assortative mating. The model raises an interesting possibility: to the extent that a 
belief in group malleability is correlated with a belief in individual malleability, it 
may be the case that individuals lacking belief in the ability of groups (and hence 
individuals) to change (n) might choose to associate with others that share their 
beliefs about compromising (T), while those who do believe in group and individual 
malleability (N) might not preferentially partner with others that already share their 
beliefs, corresponding to a high value for α2 and a low value for α1. This could in turn 
lead to a population-level increase in the willingness to compromise for peace over 
populations in which believers in malleability also choose to assort preferentially, 
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provided that the relative ability of T individuals to spread their beliefs to the next 
generation in mixed marriages is high enough.   
 
Cultural evolution of sex ratio 
Our model can also be applied to the cultural evolution of sex ratio bias. In China, 
over the past thirty years decreasing total fertility has been correlated with increasing 
male bias in sex ratio at birth, leading to an increasing excess of males, which has the 
potential for dramatic societal ramifications (Lipatov et al. 2011; Tuljapurkar and 
Feldman 1995; Li et al. 2000) as well as consequences for the primary sex ratio 
(Kumm and Feldman 1996; Kumm et al. 1994). In addition to the ethical concerns 
about sex-selective abortion and infanticide, marriage prospects for males, especially 
poor rural males, continue to deteriorate as the children born after the institution of 
China’s family planning policies reach marrying age. In applying this model, it is 
possible to consider T to be a son preference trait and N to be a cultural modifier of 
this trait. An individual with T exhibits son preference, and an individual with t has no 
preference. The N and n states might modulate the degree to which individuals will 
take their partner’s son preference into account when choosing a mate (i.e. assortative 
mating based on son preference) and the fitness benefit or cost conferred upon those 
who exhibit son preference (i.e. selection). It is not unrealistic to assume that an 
individual might not demonstrate exactly the same cultural beliefs (T or t) as his or 
her parents in this context; two parents with the same state might produce an offspring 
with the other state. As shown in Case 4, when this kind of cultural mutation is 
permitted, the equilibrium always has all four types present, and the location of this 
polymorphism depends on the exact parameter values. For example, in a scenario in 
which people are more likely to marry an individual who shares their cultural beliefs 
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(α1, α2 > 0), then sons are less likely to find a mate than daughters and fitness is 
decreased for those that practice son preference (σ1, σ2 < 0). This would produce an 
equilibrium with more individuals exhibiting no son preference (Figure 8.2d), and it is 
possible to test the relative importance of selection, assortative mating, and cultural 
transmission in determining the equilibrium frequency of son preference. An 
alternative framework would have the N/n dichotomy determine a preference for 
virilocal marriage or no such preference. There is some evidence that virilocal 
marriage is correlated with an increase in the likelihood of sex selection of a foetus 
(Li et al. 2001), which is the behavioural expression of son preference.  
This model of cultural evolution provides a framework for investigating the 
evolution of a diverse set of interacting human behaviours. It can explore cases of 
cultural niche construction in which one cultural trait alters the selective environment 
of another cultural trait, gene-culture coevolution in which a cultural trait changes 
selection pressures on a genetic trait, and situations in which a genetic trait influences 
the selection pressures on a cultural trait. The evolutionary dynamics depend on the 
balance between the parameters regulating cultural transmission, selection, and 
assortative mating. This analysis considered neutral values for each of these sets of 
parameters in turn and showed that polymorphisms can only persist when both 
assortative mating and selection are included, unless cultural mutation makes such 
polymorphisms inevitable. Although this chapter has suggested a few areas where the 
framework of the model it presents could be applicable, many more applications of 
this kind of cultural niche construction may be possible. 
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SECTION 3, CHAPTER 9 
THE CULTURAL AND DEMOGRAPHIC EVOLUTION OF SON PREFERENCE AND 
MARRIAGE TYPE IN CONTEMPORARY CHINA 
 
Material from this chapter will be published as: 
 
Fogarty, L. and Feldman, M.W., The cultural and demographic evolution of son 
preference and marriage type in contemporary China, accepted to Biological Theory. 
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INTRODUCTION  
Niche construction is an evolutionary process whereby individuals alter their own 
ecological niche and so can influence the course of their, and other, species’ evolution 
(Odling-Smee et al. 2003). The importance of this process in directing evolution has 
been discussed with respect to “ecosystem engineers” such as birds building nests or 
earthworms aerating the soil in which they live (Jones et al. 1994). An interesting, and 
hitherto solely human, extension of this idea is that of “cultural niche construction” 
(Laland et al. 2001). The ubiquitous nature of human culture has led researchers to 
believe that cultural traits may be a potent source of environmental change that has 
altered the course of human evolution. There is support for this idea in both recent 
empirical and theoretical work (e.g., Durham 1991; Feldman and Cavalli-Sforza 
1989; Tishkoff et al. 2007; Laland et al. 2010; Richerson et al. 2010; Chapters 7 and 
8). Construction of a cultural niche has the potential to impact the lives of human 
populations, changing both the demography of their populations and the culture in 
which they develop and participate. 
Some culturally transmitted traits may influence the mode and extent of 
transmission of other cultural traits. This may occur, for example, if the frequency of 
one trait in a population affects the transmission and/or acceptability of another trait. 
Ihara and Feldman (2004) constructed such a framework in which the level of 
education in a population affected the cultural transmission of belief in fertility 
control. In general, however, “epistasis” or interaction between different traits in their 
transmission may or may not be frequency dependent. 
Here a model using cultural beliefs regarding sex preferences in China is used 
to examine the potential impact of cultural niche construction on the demographic 
structure of human populations. First a cultural model that tracks son preferences and 
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marriage preferences in an epidemic-style model across generations is constructed. 
This model is then used to inform a demographic analysis of modern China that 
examines potential trajectories of the demographic evolution of the population. 
Finally, the use of cultural niche construction models as tools to explore how best to 
improve the demographic trajectories of populations affected by similar sex ratio 
biases is discussed. Previous models of sex-ratio bias have concentrated on one 
cultural trait and its spread (e.g., Jiang et al. 2011; Laland et al. 1995; Li et al. 2000). 
This model examines cultural transmission and constructs a wider cultural niche 
composed of socio-economic status, marriage preferences, and son preferences to 
understand in greater detail the circumstances in which son preference is maintained 
and might be modified. 
 
Sex Ratio at Birth in China 
The sex ratio at birth (SRB) is the ratio of live male births to live female births. 
This has been found to be about 1.05 for most large human populations (Coale 1991).  
In some parts of the world, the SRB can be artificially elevated, sometimes 
dramatically, by practices reflecting a cultural bias toward male children—for 
example, continuing family lineage or providing security for elderly parents. This 
skew in SRB has been reported in a number of countries, most notably India, 
Bangladesh, and China (Das Gupta et al. 2003) and across parts of North Africa. 
A number of serious consequences result from this skewed SRB. Among these 
is a large excess of males in the marriage market, something that has received media 
attention both in China and worldwide (e.g. Branigan 2011) and is predicted to cause 
large demographic shifts leading to an aging population (Battacharjya et al. 2008; 
Jiang et al. 2011). Continued male-biased SRB will lower the birth rate due to the 
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‘”missing marriages” caused by a shortage of women (Attané 2006). The effects of a 
high number of missing females is predicted to be destabilizing, leading to social 
unrest, increased crime rates, and a further decrease in the status of women in society, 
as prostitution and human trafficking become more common (Ebenstein and Sharygin 
2009; Li et al. 2000; Tuljapakur et al. 1995).   
The sharp decrease in total fertility rate in China since the introduction of 
fertility control policies in the early 1980s, coupled with the traditional son 
preference, is likely to cause millions of unmarried men to grow old without an 
economic support network or social security (Das Gupta et al. 2010). Chinese culture 
traditionally favors male children, partly as a result of the patriarchal society in which 
family names and inherited wealth pass through the male family line (Li et al. 2000), 
partly as a result of marriage practices that leave parents in daughter-only families in 
a precarious economic and social condition in old age (Das Gupta 2003; Lipatov et al. 
2011), and partly for other cultural reasons such as the participation of sons in, and 
the exclusion of daughters from, certain funereal rites. The interaction between 
cultural son preference and the fertility-control policy implemented in China since the 
early 1980s has led to the Chinese SRB of about 1.18 in recent surveys. This is 
mediated mainly by the widespread availability of cheap ultrasound technology 
leading to sex-selective abortion (Banister 2004; Coale and Banister 1994; Croll 
2000; Li 2007; Sen 2001; Zeng et al. 1993), even though it is illegal to use 
ultrasound-B for sex selection.  
Policy interventions have been suggested as a result of mathematical and 
simulation models of the demographic effects of son preference (Battacharjya et al. 
2008; Ebenstein 2011; Jiang et al. 2011; Li et al. 2000). Here a model is presented 
that accounts for the transmission of cultural preferences for both marriage practices 
 239 
and son preferences while including the effects of population structure in terms of age 
and socio-economic status (strongly linked to urban or rural location in China). This 
model can give insight into possible policy interventions and the strength with which 
these interventions might be implemented in order to lower the SRB in China toward 
natural levels.  
 
The Cultural Evolution Model  
The model assumes first that there are two major sources of son preference 
leading to sex selection of boys at the expense of girls in China. The first is a 
patriarchal society in which the family name and property pass through the male line 
only. The second relates to social security; daughter-only families can be left without 
financial security in old age due, in part, to virilocal marriage practices. Both factors 
contribute to reduction in the perceived value of girls in the population, with 
patriarchal son preference weighted by the likelihood of being in a situation where it 
may be desirable to sex select for a boy. In this model both the marriage practice trait 
and the son preference trait alter the sex ratio at birth. This changes both the age and 
socioeconomic demographics of the population (see below). Here it is possible to 
imagine the cultural traits of marriage practice and son preference as niche 
constructing traits altering the selective environment in which the sex ratio at birth 
culturally evolves, in turn shaping the transmission of those cultural traits.  
To model the spread of these factors in society, an individual who has a son 
preference is labeled as having trait Π1 and an individual without such a preference, 
trait Π0. Similarly, an individual who believes that uxorilocal marriage is shameful 
has cultural trait Ω1 and one who does not has trait Ω0. The frequencies of Πi and Ωi at 
time t are denoted by πi(t) and ωi(t), respectively.  
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It is then possible to define the “perceived present value” (PPV) of a daughter as 
a fraction of the perceived value of a son and, generally,  owing to the 
prevalence of son preference, though it is not mathematically bounded between 0 and 
1. This is similar in concept to the PPV proposed by Bhattacharjya et al. (2008). The 
PPV and the likelihood of sex selection are strongly and inversely correlated, meaning 
that as PPV goes up, the likelihood of sex selection for a son goes down. Thus, when 
PPV = 1, males and females are equally valued and the probability of sex selection 
drops to 0. PPV is also used in this model as the probability that a couple that can 
have only one more child and do not yet have a son, and are therefore in the “sex-
selection situation” (Li et al. 2000), will choose not to sex select for a son. The 
probability of being in the sex selection situation, in this model, is denoted as y.   
PPV depends on the strength of the patriarchal son preference and also on the 
frequency of preferences concerning uxorilocal marriage, in the following manner: 
 
      ,     (9.1) 
 
where y, the probability of being in the sex-selection situation and can be interpreted 
as some measure of the biological significance of the trait Π0. Here, if PPV is reduced 
such that , say, it is possible to write that where  
represents the increase in son preference engendered by the lower PPV. Here there is 
an assumption that when  (both frequencies are at their maximum 
values), . This implies that the perceived value of girls may still depend 
to a certain extent on the probability of being in the sex-selection situation, y. Note 
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among the frequency of son preference, the chance of being in the sex-selection 
situation, and preferring uxorilocal marriage. 
To find an expression for , the frequency of Ω0 in the next generation, 
the model first assumes that individuals who have trait Ω0, and who do not believe 
that uxorilocal marriage is shameful, will be equally likely to marry uxorilocally or 
virilocally. There is an assumed proportion, W, of individuals who are forced to marry 
uxorilocally despite having trait Ω1 because they are unable to afford a brideprice. In 
this way, W can be viewed as a measure of poverty in the population. Here, all 
uxorilocal marriages contribute to an increase in the PPV for girls, and even 
individuals who marry uxorilocally out of necessity spread the Ω0 trait by example.  
This means that the expected proportion of marriages that are uxorilocal in generation 
t is  
 
 ,         (9.2) 
 
that is, half those with a neutral marriage preference plus those who consider 
uxorilocal marriage shameful but lack the resources to make a virilocal marriage. 
Vertical cultural transmission is assumed to take place before horizontal cultural 
transmission.  
 The frequency of Ω0 in the next generation is then given by  
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by  with the rate of vertical transmission of Ω0.  
Assuming a constant fertility rate among married couples,  is both the 
fraction of marriages at time t that are uxorilocal and the fraction of offspring at time 
t+1 who are from an uxorilocal marriage and thus are subject to vertical transmission, 
by example, of a neutral belief, Ω0, about the marriage practice.  
For the dynamics of π0 the model considers (1) the probability that an individual 
will be in sex-selection situation y and (2) the normal sex ratio for humans in large 
groups, which is the ratio of the number of males born divided by the number of 
females born or . Using s0 allows us to reduce the number of parameters and 
discuss the SRB in China in terms of the normal SRB for large human populations. 
Then  
 
   (9.4) 
 
is the fraction of girls at time  who have trait Π0, where and  are the rates 
of horizontal transmission and vertical transmission, respectively, of Π0. Here, 
 is the probability that a girl is born to a mother in the sex-selection situation 
at time t. Note that if  and f0 < m0, given that , this means 
that the quantity  is typically less than one, even at the natural sex ratio. The 
proportion of male children born to each woman who bears children is  
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.       (9.5) 
 
Hence the sex ratio at birth (SRB) in the next generation is 
 
            (9.6) 
 
On substituting Equation (9.1) into Equation (9.4), the right-hand side becomes a 
function of and  Together with Equation (9.3), this forms a pair of 
recursions that express and  in terms of  and  The 
recursion system can be numerically iterate to equilibrium, or equilibrium can be 
assumed and the nonlinear simultaneous equilibrium equations solved. The stable 
equilibrium from this analysis can then be used to construct the equilibria for PPV 
and using Equation (9.6), for SRB. It is then possible to examine how PPV and SRB 
change with the transmission parameters , , , and the probability of 
being in sex-selection situation, y.  
 
RESULTS  
Using the equilibrium values described above, it is possible to investigate the effects 
of the model parameters on the eventual frequencies of the cultural traits and hence 
the final equilibrium values of the SRB and PPV. The parameters can be fixed at 
reasonable values and varied in turn. In Figures 9.1a and 9.1b, the effects of the rates 
of cultural spread of son and marriage preference on the equilibria, which are denoted 
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as PPV∗ and SRB∗ are clear. From Figures 9.1 and 9.2 it is clear that the most dramatic 
differences in these equilibria values are caused by the horizontal transmission 
parameters ( ) describing both the spread of no son preference (Π0) and no 
marriage-type preference (Ω0) and the probability of being in the sex selection 
situation, y. It is these parameters that are emphasised when examining the possibility 
of policy interventions. 
 
Figure 9.1: (a) The effect of (long dash), (black solid), (grey), (short dash) on the 
perceived present value of girls in the model. , , , ,
 (b) The effect of (long dash), (black solid), (grey), (short dash) 
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on the sex ratio at birth in the model. , , ,
 
 
 
 
Figure 9.2. The effect of the likelihood of being in the sex selection situation, y, on the sex ratio at birth 
in the model. This can be thought of as the strength of the one-child policy or its enforcement. Other 
parameters are fixed at 𝑠! = 1.05, 𝑊 = 0.3, 𝐻!! = 𝐻!! = 0.3, 𝑉!! = 𝑉!! = 0.7 
 
Population Structure and Demographic Models  
The previous model can be extended to include demography. To do this both age 
stratification (as in Li et al. 2000) and socio-economic stratification in the population 
are included. This extension allows analysis of the effects of male-biased sex ratio at 
birth in poor rural areas, where marriage practices may be stricter but money in 
shorter supply, and richer areas, where the one-child policy may be more strictly 
enforced, for example.  
 
Age Structure  
One consequence of the steep decline in birth rates seen in China since the 
introduction of the one-child policy is an increase in the average age of the 
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population. This becomes economically problematic when the older generation is not 
replaced in the workforce by sufficient younger individuals. Perhaps more 
importantly, it raises concerns over the social welfare, health, and wellbeing of the 
older population and the heavy burden of this care on the young.  Thus there is also 
considerable interest in managing the balance between old and young in the future 
Chinese population. This model investigates ways to track age structure through 
cultural evolution of fertility and marriage practices within the constraints of the one-
child policy.  
 The three age classes represent pre-reproductive, reproductive, and post-
reproductive women respectively without any specific assumptions about the exact 
ages at which individuals occupy these classes. Each economic class is assumed to 
have a Leslie matrix (Leslie 1945) that describes the dynamics of age structure of its 
members. The Leslie matrix for each economic class has the structure  
 
 , 
 
where Fa denotes the fertility rate within the age class a,  and are survival 
probabilities for age classes 1 and 2 respectively, and is the vector of the number 
of individuals in each age class at time t.  
From the cultural transmission model outlined above, the number of daughters 
born to each woman in the reproductive age classes is given by  
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,     (9.7) 
 
where TFR denotes the total fertility rate of the population. Given that F1=F3=0 and 
F2 is the only reproductive class, the Leslie matrix becomes  
 
     (9.8) 
 
The dominant eigenvalue for the matrix in equation (9.8) is  
 
                 (9.9) 
 
and the corresponding eigenvector is  
.  (9.10) 
To find a stable age structure for this population, the cultural traits are assumed to 
have reached equilibrium and that PPV∗ can be used from the cultural model above.  
For the stable age distribution, The elements of the eigenvector (Equation 9.10) are 
divided by their sum to obtain the stable proportion of the female population in each 
age class.  
 
TFR *
PPV (t)
1+ s
0
y
!
"#
$
%&
n(t +1) =
0 TFR *
PPV (t)
1+ s
0
y
!
"#
$
%&
0
'
1
0 0
0 '
2
0
!
"
#
#
#
#
#
$
%
&
&
&
&
&
n(t)
!
n
=
"
1
TFR(1+ y(PPV
*
#1))
1+ s
0
v = (
TFR ! TFRy + PPV
*
TFRy
"
2
+ s
0
"
2
,
"
1
TFR(1+ y(PPV
*
!1))
1+ s
0
"
2
,1)
 248 
Horizontal Transmission and Age Structure  
Using the stable age distribution and the cultural equilibrium of PPV (PPV*), it is 
possible to investigate the effects of horizontal transmission of patriarchal son 
preference and beliefs about marriage practices for fixed values of vertical 
transmission, enforcement strength of the one-child policy, and survival rates of the 
age classes. Figure 9.3a shows the effect of horizontal transmission of marriage 
preference, and Figure 9.3b shows the effect of horizontal transmission of son 
preference for a fixed value of horizontal transmission of marriage type preference. 
Figures 9.3c and 9.3d show the same for vertical transmission, on the age structure of 
the population. The ideal age structure for a population is a balance between class 2 
and the other two classes that is economically sufficient to maintain the dependents. A 
high dependency ratio is generally of concern as societies struggle to maintain social 
security of an increasingly aged population unable to work to sustain themselves. It is 
clear from Figures 9.4 and 9.5 that this ideal demography becomes possible for some 
higher values of horizontal or vertical transmission in some cases.  
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Figure 9.3: The effect of (a) 𝐻!! (b) 𝐻!! (c) 𝑉!! and (d) 𝑉!! on the age structure of the population, Age 
class 1 (dash), age class 2 (black) and age class 3 (grey). TFR = 1.5, σ1= 0.98, σ2= 0.88, ,
, , . Estimates for σ values are from 
mortality figures generated from W.H.O. health statistics and health information systems. 
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Figure 9.4. The effect of TFR on the age structure of the population, Age class 1 (dash), age class 2 
(black) and age class 3 (grey). s0= 1.05, y = 0.58, W=0.3, , , σ1= 
0.98, σ2= 0.88. 
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Figure 9.5. (a) The full dependency ratio (DR) for the age class system, (b) the youth dependency ratio 
(YDR) and (c) the old age dependency ratio (ODR), changing with parameters 𝐻!! (black), 𝐻!!(long 
dash), 𝑉!!(grey) and 𝑉!!(short dash). TFR = 1.5, σ1= 0.98, σ2= 0.88,  , 
, . 
 
Socio-economic Structure  
The SRB might change if living standards and opportunities afforded to the 
rural poor in China are improved. This is of particular interest given that individuals 
in many rural areas are poorer and often subject to less stringent enforcement of the 
one-child policy than their urban counterparts. It is also true that the recent economic 
boom in China has meant that migration of one or more family members to cities 
from rural areas in order to increase income is a major feature of many rural Chinese 
households. To examine these effects, a social-mobility matrix is introduced that 
describes the proportion of the population in each of three socio-economic classes 
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(rural poor, urban poor, and urban rich) and the movement from one class to another 
over successive generations.  
For simplicity, it is assumed that people can move only to a higher social class 
and must do so incrementally. These assumptions can later be relaxed or removed if 
necessary. The social-mobility matrix can then be written as 
 
,                (9.11) 
 
where  is the vector containing the number of individuals in each socio-
economic sector at time t and Sj is a population change parameter in the jth socio-
economic class, incorporating both birth and death rates. Negative values of Sj 
indicate higher death than birth rates, and positive values indicate higher birth than 
death rates. Finally, δj denotes the likelihood of moving from the jth socio-economic 
sector to the j+1th sector.  
Just as the simple cultural model generated the birth rate for use in the age-
class model, it is possible to use the overall birth rate from the age-class model in 
each separate socio-economic sector to inform the socio-economic model. The 
dominant eigenvalue for the matrix in equation (9.11) is  
 
         (9.12) 
 
with corresponding eigenvector  
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  (9.13) 
 
This model can be extended by including the wealth parameter, W, from the 
original cultural transmission model. W describes the proportion of the population that 
is unable to afford a bride price (see equation 9.2). As such, W is perhaps better 
described as a measure of poverty within a socio-economic sector. Values of δj 
depend on the level of poverty in the jth sector in the following way: 
 
           (9.14) 
 
where dj is a constant rate of social mobility, a feature of the jth class (this could be 
interpreted as ease of forming useful social networks, for example), and Wj is a 
measure of the level of poverty (as measured by the inability to afford a bride price) 
in the jth sector.   
The model can then be made more realistic by allowing the individuals that 
move from, say, sector i to sector k to bring their cultural beliefs with them into their 
new surroundings for one generation. This is done by adjusting the values of Sj to 
account for the presence of a proportion of the population carrying ideas formed in 
their former socio-economic group. This involves including an equation for the PPV 
in each social sector. It is then possible to re-label PPV as PPVj, π0 as π0j, ω0 as ω0j 
and the learning parameters , ,  and  become  and 
respectively, where j = {1, 2, 3} represents the socio-economic sector. Using equation 
(9.1), a system of equations is obtained, one equation representing the PPV in each 
social sector;  
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       (9.15) 
  (9.16) 
 (9.17) 
where and , with representing the normalized elements of the 
stable socio-economic distribution in the jth sector obtained from the eigenvectors 
corresponding to (9.13). Using these equations, it is possible to gain a better 
understanding of the effect of wealth, social mobility, and one-child policy 
enforcement in different socio-economic sectors on the SRB within that sector and the 
changes that this makes in other social sectors. To this end, one simplifying 
assumption is made to prevent the problem from becoming mathematically 
intractable: it is assumed that the equilibrium values within each socio-economic 
sector are reached sequentially. In this formulation, the PPVs in all sectors of society 
are functions of the parameters in all other sectors. This is an interesting and useful 
exercise as it is possible that increasing, for example, the horizontal transmission of 
ideas in the lowest socio-economic sector and allowing an increase in social mobility 
might reduce the need for direct intervention in higher socio-economic sectors (Figure 
9.6).  This possibility may reduce the overall cost of effective intervention.  
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Figure 9.6. Change in PPV in socio-economic sectors 1 (grey), 2 (black) and 3 (dash) with 
changes in the horizontal transmission of (a) neutral marriage preferences in sector 1, (b) 
neutral marriage preferences in sector 2, (c) no son preference in sector 1 and (d) no son 
preference in sector 2. Other parameters are: s0= 1.05, y1=0.4, y2=0.58, y3=0.8, W1=0.7, 
W2=0.4, W3=0.2, H!
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DISCUSSION 
A male-biased skew in the sex ratio at birth is a growing problem across Asia and 
North Africa (Croll 2000; Das Gupta et al. 2003). The human cost is estimated to be 
between 60 million (Coale 1991) and 100 million (Sen 1990) missing women 
worldwide, with many more societal problems developing as the sex ratio worsens 
(Jiang et al. 2011; Li et al. 2000; Tuljapakur et al. 1995). Although investigations of 
the economic factors that maintain son preference are useful, they must be combined 
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with an understanding of the cultural niche that maintains and spreads sex 
preferences, including any cultural norms that may affect the perceived value of 
women in society and in turn contribute to the demographic make-up of the 
population as a whole. To the extent that a cultural trait maintains tight control on the 
structure of the population, it can also control aspects of mate choice feeding back 
onto the genetic evolution of those occupying that cultural niche. In this case, the 
feedback can change the biological SRB, raising it or lowering it under different 
conditions (Laland et al. 1995).  
This model concentrates on two important causes of son preference in China: (1) 
the cultural spread of a belief that sons are more valuable than daughters and (2) the 
spread of beliefs about marriage practices. It includes both cultural and demographic 
factors, allowing examination of the impact of the bias in SRB on the age structure 
and dependency ratios, which are of growing concern in China. High dependency 
ratios lead to economic and psychological strain on all sectors of society and can 
drive an increase in poverty both in the dependent sectors and in the sector on which 
they depend. The age structure is therefore an important factor in any analysis of the 
social impacts of son preference. This chapter shows that an increase in the 
transmission of neutral marriage beliefs ( ) and absence of son preference (Π0) 
through any channels will have a positive impact, raising the PPV and lowering the 
SRB as well as altering dependency ratios in the system. These findings agree largely 
with those of Jiang et al. (2011), who also showed that an increase in the effectiveness 
of policy interventions aimed at spreading neutral beliefs about son preference 
decreased the sex ratio and improved the outlook for dependency ratios, as compared 
with scenarios that did not involve such intervention. However, it is also of practical 
importance to know how much change can be exacted, and how this change will 
!
0
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manifest, in order to allow successful intervention in economically restricted 
circumstances.  
 
Possible Policy Interventions   
Our analysis implies that models examining human cultural niches in detail can 
be useful as tools to predict how best to change and improve the lives of those who 
have created or inherited those niches. Certain parameter values in the model are 
more likely than others to be more easily changed through cultural intervention by the 
authorities. This means that when considering a possible intervention, there is a trade 
off between the parameters that are easiest to change and what impact that change 
will have on the values of the PPV and the SRB. From Figures 1a and 1b it is clear 
that horizontal transmission of son preference ( ) and vertical transmission of 
marriage practices ( ) have the biggest effects on the equilibrium value of the SRB.  
Horizontal (and to an extent oblique) transmission has the added advantage of being 
the most obvious form of information transfer available to policy makers. It is 
possible to increase the level of horizontal transmission, for example, by increasing 
expenditure on media advocating a pro-daughter message or raising awareness of the 
problem more generally. The model can be used to provide information about how 
much money and how much advertising would be needed to increase awareness of the 
SRB problem sufficiently to reduce SRB. 
To start, it is important to note that horizontal transmission rates are bounded 
such that 0 ≤ H ≤ 1. Using the example of transmission through access to education, it 
is possible to introduce another variable describing the proportion of the population 
with access to school age education. This acts as a new upper limit on the strength of 
horizontal transmission. For example, suppose 0 ≤ H ≤ E, where E is the proportion of 
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the population with access to education or television. The assumption can then be 
made that the spread of information or cultural ideas follows a linear pattern 
dependent on the absolute rate of information transfer, a property of the teaching 
methods employed, the number of hours of exposure to, for example, a pro-daughter 
message and capped at the proportion of the population with access to the message 
(i.e. advertising or education reform can at most change the minds of all individuals 
who are exposed to it).  
Using this logic to construct a bound for the effect of horizontal transmission 
per hour, for example,  
 
         (9.18) 
 
where x is the number of hours per day dedicated to changing Π and Ω cultural 
beliefs, E is the proportion of the population that has access or exposure to the 
education campaigns, and r is the absolute rate of information transfer. Using (9.18) it 
is possible to plot the value of H for changing values of x, E, and r, the results of 
which are shown in Figure 9.7. Equation (9.18) can easily be modified to account for 
different learning processes associated with different teaching methods or types of 
information transfer with a different (per hour) rate of learning for each type. 
H = rxE
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Figure 9.7. The values of H from equation 9.18 generated by hours of advertising, x, and 
access to education or mass media, E=0.5 (solid), E=0.7 (dashed), E=0.9 (dotted), values for 
two values of r, r=0.2 (grey lines) and r=1(black lines). 
 
Using this extension, it is simple multiplication to assess the monetary cost of 
proposed media intervention; the model can allow policy makers to determine the 
value of H for which they can expect a decrease in SRB, or an eventual return to a 
normal SRB. The corresponding value of x is here labelled as . Introducing a cost, c, 
to the production and distribution of advertising per hour, the total cost, ctotal is given 
by . For school-age education, the limiting factor would be children’s 
(especially girls’) access to education. In this case the parameter r, describing the 
absolute learning rate per unit time, could potentially be quite high. An alternative 
involves mass media campaigns, in which case the limiting factor, E, would represent 
the proportion of the population with access to mass media. Although this is 
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potentially a cheaper method of information transfer, the fidelity of transmission is 
also potentially lower.  
 
Age Structure and Socio-economic Model 
The age-structure model shows that the transmission parameters may change, and in 
some cases, even reverse, current demographic trends, via the horizontal transmission 
of no son preference ( ), which is capable of driving the proportion of the female 
population in age class 1 above the proportion in age classes 2 or 3 (Figure 9.3b).  
Many of the problems associated with sex-ratio bias, combined with fertility controls, 
are problems of over-dependence on the shrinking working-age sector of society. To 
examine possible solutions to these problems, the full dependency ratio (DR), the old-
age dependency ratio (ODR), and the youth dependency ratio (YDR) were calculated 
for the cultural demographic model presented above. Figure 9.5 shows the impact of 
the transmission parameters ( , , and ) on these ratios. As the 
transmission of pro-daughter cultural traits increases, both the DR (Figure 9.5a) and 
the ODR (Figure 9.5c) decrease. The increase in YDR with transmission parameters 
(Figure 9.5b) reflects an increase in the birth rate of daughters.  
 
Total Fertility Rates 
Another important avenue of investigation concerns the effects that a change in total 
fertility rate (TFR) would have on the PPV, SRB, and demographic structure (see also 
Jiang et al. 2011). To investigate these effects, all other parameters were fixed and 
TFR was varied between 0 and 2. Here TFR is modelled as a constant but its 
interaction with other factors like age structure may be interesting areas for further 
development. Of particular concern is the possible changes that occur between TFR = 
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1.5 and TFR = 2. This change, together with a lowering of y, the probability of being 
in the sex selection situation, would represent a relaxation of fertility control policies 
in effect in China today. As with the transmission parameters, a change in TFR and y 
seems capable of changing current demographic trends (Figure 9.4) and lowering the 
full-dependency ratio in the system (Figure 9.8). As y decreases, the SRB also 
decreases, eventually returning to natural levels ( ) (Figure 9.2).  
 
 
Figure 9.8. The full dependency ratio for 𝑉!! = 0.4 (dashed), 𝑉!! = 0.6 (grey) and 𝑉!! = 0.8 
(black), changing with 1-y. TFR = 1.5, σ1= 0.98, σ2= 0.88,  , , 𝑉!! = 0.8, 𝐻!! =  𝐻!! = 0.5 
 
The kinds of cultural interventions described above could complement more 
economic interventions such as the “Care for Girls” program, mandated to improve 
survival and development prospects for girls, and other programs, such as those 
proposed by Jiang et al. (2011). Care for Girls works by improving access to 
education for girls from daughter-only families and by providing these families with a 
monetary allowance designed to lessen the impact of poverty in old age. Programs 
like these could interact with other more culturally focused interventions by 
s
0
= 1.05
s
0
= 1.05 y = 0.58 W = 0.3
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increasing access to education and thus peer-to-peer contact, both of which could lead 
to a rise in horizontal transmission and a decrease in SRB, according to the model.  
More financial support for daughter-only families might also give parents the freedom 
to allow or even encourage uxorilocal marriage, increasing the transmission parameter 
. The model presented here suggests that an intervention program such as “a new 
notion of marriage and childbearing into ten thousand families,” which was integrated 
with the Care for Girls program in the early 2000s (Zheng 2007), could be effective in 
increasing PPV and ultimately lowering SRB.  
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DISCUSSION: SOCIAL LEARNING, CULTURE AND SOCIETY 
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Human culture is arguably the most complex phenomenon known to science (Plotkin 
2010). To fully understand culture we must understand the selection pressures that 
shaped brains capable of creating it, as well as the properties of cultural transmission 
and the feedback between biological and cultural evolution that maintains it.  
 Here I would like to draw out three important themes that underlie the 
research presented in this thesis, which help to elucidate this complex system in a 
number of ways. The first is the importance of population structure, including spatial 
structure and assortative mating interactions, in models of the evolution of social 
learning and cultural evolution. This is most obvious in Chapters 2 and 7, which are 
explicitly spatial simulation models, both with non-spatial ancestors showing 
qualitatively different results. However, the effects of the restricted mixing that we 
see in spatial models are also present, to an extent, in the models presented in 
Chapters 8 and 9, with the former investigating the effects of assortative mating on a 
cultural niche construction model and the latter investigating the effects of social 
stratification on sex-ratio bias in modern China.  
The second theme, that runs especially through Chapters 3, 4, 5 and 6, is that 
the fidelity of information transmission, and the strategies through which individuals 
learn, have a profound affect on the characteristics of the cultures that can emerge. 
Such effects include impacts on cultural diversity, longevity of traits, evenness of trait 
distribution and the probability of generating complex cognitive capacities like the 
ability for cumulative culture.  
Third, with respect to the chapters contained in Section 3, three chapters 
dealing exclusively with human culture, I argue that the complexities peculiar to 
modelling human cultural systems require models that are general to allow 
straightforward and valid comparisons, but also require tailored models to 
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accommodate very specific policy-based approaches. Mathematical approaches can 
have different functions, domains and levels of analysis, and pluralism of approach is 
necessary for a complete understanding (Levins 1966).  
 
The Importance of Spatial and Population Structure 
 As described in the introduction, Rogers (1988) proposed a simple model of 
the evolution of social learning that captured what researchers (e.g. Boyd and 
Richerson 1985) had suggested was the root of the adaptiveness of social learning and 
particularly of human culture: that social learning allowed individuals to avoid the 
fitness costs associated with individual learning while still accumulating a useful body 
of knowledge. Rogers’ model focused on a hypothetical species living in one of two 
possible environments and expressing one of two possible behavioural traits, with 
each trait being adaptive in one environmental state, and with the environment 
switching from one state to the other with a fixed probability. In the model there were 
also two learning genotypes: individual learners and social learners. Individual 
learners gained information directly from the environment at some cost to their 
fitness while the social learners copied a randomly chosen individual at no cost. 
Rogers found that social learning failed to increase the fitness of the population above 
that expected of a population of asocial learners (Figure 1.1), a counter-intuitive 
finding that was labelled ‘Rogers’ paradox of non-adaptive culture’.  
As discussed in Chapter 1, Boyd and Richerson (1995) examined Rogers’ 
paradox and concluded that it would arise in any evolutionary game where social and 
asocial learners played against each other and the value of the learned information 
remained frequency independent. This confirmed that the problem was general. 
Enquist et al. (2007) found that critical social learners who copy first and only rely 
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on asocial learning when copying fails and conditional social learners who rely on 
social learning only when asocial learning fails both resolved Rogers’ paradox by 
increasing the mean fitness of the population above that expected of a population of 
asocial learners and pure random social learners. 
Chapter 2 presented an extension of Rogers’ analysis where the original 1988 
model was applied to a grid of individuals who could interact with their eight closest 
neighbours (the Moore neighbourhood) only, with periodic boundary conditions. This 
simple extension offered a further solution to the original paradox, while drawing 
attention to another counter-intuitive finding: that the proportion of pure social 
learners could actually continue to increase in the population even while driving 
fitness below that of the original asocial learner population. 
Conditions under which the conditional social learning strategy is favoured 
over the critical social learning strategy were also seen in Chapter 2, when the 
environment was spatially variable. Conditional social learning could invade when 
asocial learning was unreliable, the environment was highly stable, and when the cost 
of asocial learning was low. Under these conditions, conditional social learners had 
an advantage over asocial learners when asocial learning failed, and when social 
learning was useful (e.g. in stable environments). However, the payoff was relatively 
small, and so only had an effect when learning costs were generally low, hence the 
counter-intuitive result that a social learning strategy could invade a population of 
asocial learners when the cost of asocial learning was low. This is also the region 
where conditional social learners outperform critical social learners. The latter 
cannot become established in stable environments because it is difficult for the 
benefits of social learning to outweigh the low costs of asocial learning. 
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The spatial aspect of this model also showed some circumstances in which 
pure social learning out-competed not only individual learning but both critical and 
conditional social learning strategies too. The root of this surprising finding was that 
the social learning genotype was buffered from the invasion of more fit asocial 
learners in social learning spatial clusters (Figure 2.2a), with a cluster here defined as a 
contiguous group of individuals who have at least one immediate neighbour sharing 
their particular strategy (Langer et al. 2008)) 
The clustering effect in social learning models is a subtle one. Social learners 
are essentially parasites, gleaning useful information from asocial learners and 
suffering little or no cost for doing so, if the information is correct. In the context of 
this model, this free information is recycled again and again, becoming out-dated as 
the environment changes. This means that as social learners cluster together, the 
individuals at the centre of the cluster, surrounded by other information parasites will 
quickly decline in fitness in a changing environment. However, as soon as one asocial 
learner appears, by mutation, inside the cluster, the fitness of its social learning 
neighbours jumps above the population average for asocial learners. This means that 
asocial learners are unable to re-invade once social learning is established, even 
though the global fitness of social learners is very low.  
Edge effects around the clusters themselves are also of interest and drive 
effects like expansion and contraction of clusters. The social learners at the edge of the 
clusters interact with social learners inside and asocial learners outside. This means 
that they can, in effect, ferry new information into the centre of the social learning 
cluster. The leading edge of a social learning cluster therefore has extremely high 
fitness and so allows the spread of social learning despite low fitness at its centre 
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(Figure 2.2a). This low fitness persists, lowering the average fitness of the population 
as social learning extends its reach.  
Clustering in evolutionary models in general seems to allow costly behaviour, 
usually open to exploitation by defectors, to persist in the population for a number of 
generations. This can be seen not only in social learning models but also in closely 
linked cooperation and niche-construction models (Nowak & May 1992; Hauert 2001; 
Silver and DiPaolo 2006). Chapter 2 highlights the possibility that social learning can 
propagate maladaptive information in a structured population especially in the centre 
of contiguous groups of social learners. 
In the case of spatially structured models of niche construction (Silver and 
DiPaolo 2006) these spatial clusters were formed of a core of homozygote niche 
constructors (labelled as AAEE) with this homozygote core surrounded by a ring of 
individuals forced to interact and interbreed with the non-niche-constructing majority 
(aaee homozygotes). This process of mixing formed a layer of heterozygote 
individuals in the boundary regions of the clusters. The heterozygotes were able to 
support the immigration of A alleles into the boundary layer by manufacturing the 
resource which favoured this allele. This process allowed the accumulation of A alleles 
in the boundary layer, and through statistical association with these favoured A alleles, 
E alleles were able to increase in frequency where they would otherwise be driven to 
extinction. In this way the costly trait existed for a short time in poor conditions while 
the heterozygote layer improved the environment enough to subsequently favour its 
expansion. In other words, the niche-constructing traits hitchhiked to fixation through 
association with the recipient alleles that their activities favoured through selection. 
This model showed that the effects of spatial structure allowed niche-constructing 
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alleles to evolve and spread in circumstances that the more traditional non-spatial 
models were unable to detect. 
Chapter 7 continued this work with a spatial model of cultural niche 
construction, where a cultural bias for or against the niche-constructing trait was 
assessed with regard to the impact on the evolution of both niche construction and 
hitchhiking resource-dependent traits. This model focused on the same ‘di-allelic’ 
system with resource-dependent locus A, but the second niche-constructing locus E 
was conceptualized as a cultural rather than genetic trait, subject to cultural 
transmission biases. The model in Chapter 7 also added a further locus B, which 
represented a potentially costly genetic trait that could increase the underlying 
capacity for niche constructing. This can usefully be conceptualized as a capacity, 
such as a larger brain, that allows the individual to increase the rate or effectiveness of 
niche construction at some cost. 
This cultural model yielded similar results to Silver and DiPaolo’s model 
(2006), with the niche constructors initially forming clusters by chance, allowing the 
statistical associations to form between the recipient A allele and the niche-
constructing cultural trait E. This happened because the assortative mating between 
neighbours meant that the increased resource frequency created by the E individuals 
favoured A alleles and thus favoured E through a positive feedback effect. The 
consequences of including spatial structure are also apparent here as the random global 
mating in the non-spatial model did not allow the build up of the statistical 
associations between A and E required for them to become sufficiently linked to drive 
this co-evolutionary cycle. The analysis also showed that the hitchhiking could still 
occur when levels of oblique transmission were low or moderate but that the effects 
broke down when oblique transmission was high, relative to rates of vertical 
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transmission. The cultural-niche-constructing practice could also overcome some 
counter selection especially when a cultural bias in favour of the trait was in effect. In 
almost all cases considered, the effects of spatial structure were to increase the 
possibility of a niche-constructing trait spreading, and to allow the hitchhiking of 
recipient traits at other loci, over an extremely broad range of conditions, including 
costly alleles at the B locus that enhanced the niche-constructing capability. Thus 
niche-constructing traits could not only drive themselves to fixation but could increase 
their potency in the process. 
The spatial model in this case reflects the kind of agriculture- or technology-
driven ‘gene-culture co-evolution’ to which humans are thought to have been 
frequently subject (Laland 2010; Smith 2007; O’Brien and Laland in press). The 
heterozygote boundaries of niche-constructing clusters can easily be envisaged as an 
advancing wave of agriculture or technological adoption, such as that discussed by 
Kandler and Steele (2009) in their analytical reaction-diffusion models of similar 
processes. The important general point here is that spatial models have revealed 
potentially important processes that non-spatial models failed to detect.  
Related models of the evolution of cooperation also show changes in 
evolutionary dynamics in spatial extensions of non-spatial models. Many models of 
cooperation are based on traditional games like the prisoners’ dilemma, snowdrift 
game or public-goods game. Here, we examine spatial extensions to models based on 
the prisoners’ dilemma and on the less well-known snowdrift game. The prisoners’ 
dilemma is traditionally a symmetric two-person game where the players have two 
possible moves: cooperate or defect. Ultimately the payoff structure of the game 
(Table 10.1a) means that it pays to defect regardless of what your partner does. The 
payoff matrix (Table 10.1a) shows that in a one-shot interaction, the only ESS is 
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defection, not cooperation. However, when the game is altered to allow repeated 
interactions, and to allow agents in the game a perfect memory of their previous 
interactions, then strategies that can support the evolution of cooperation in certain 
circumstances emerge. In Axlerod’s tournaments (Axelrod 1981), agents participated 
in just such an iterated prisoner’s dilemma game. The tournament revealed that TIT-
FOR-TAT, where agents retaliated when their opponent failed to cooperate but not 
before, was a good strategy - it won the second tournament despite the fact that 
entrants to the second knew about its success in the first. It was later shown that a 
TIT-FOR-TWO-TATS strategy (the sample strategy given to contestants by the 
organisers of the tournament to illustrate how to write a strategy), which would not 
defect until provoked by two defections from its opponent, could have beaten the 
original winner had it been entered (Axelrod 1984). One natural extension of this 
simulation framework was to introduce structured populations, making the traditional 
evolutionary games explicitly spatial. 
 
Table 10.1: The payoff matrices for two evolutionary cooperation games 
(a) Prisoners’ dilemma Cooperator Defector 
Cooperator b-c (Reward) -c (Sucker) 
Defector b (Temptation) 0 (Punishment) 
 
(b) Snowdrift game Cooperator Defector 
Cooperator b-  (Reward) b-c (Sucker) 
Defector b (Temptation) 0 (Punishment) 
 
Table 10.1: The payoff matrices for two evolutionary cooperation games where b is the benefit of the 
resource obtained through cooperating and c is the cost associated with cooperation. The matrix shows 
c
2
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the payoff awarded to an individual playing the strategy shown in the first column when playing against 
that shown in the first row. (a) Shows the payoff matrix for the prisoners dilemma where it pays to play 
the same strategy as your opponent, and (b) shows the payoff matrix for the snowdrift game where it 
pays more to play the opposite of your opponent’s strategy in any given round.   
 
One of the advantages of introducing this kind of spatial structure is that, as 
with other models, although the structure can be interpreted minimally as a 
geographic distance, it can also usefully be seen as a demographic structure of any 
sort that restricts free global interactions between individuals. This is an especially 
interesting distinction to make in this case since the kind of cooperation that we see 
outside of humans is often localised or directed towards group members or kin e.g. 
(Seyfarth 1984; Wilkinson 1984). In that way any conclusions that are drawn from the 
spatial models can be generalised and extended to include restricted interactions 
between other sub-groups within the population as a whole and can shed light on the 
effects of in- and out-groups on the evolution of cooperation.  
Spatial effects in the evolution of costly behaviour like cooperation are 
generally thought to increase the likelihood of invasion and maintenance of strategies 
that would be more open to exploitation in well-mixed populations. While spatial 
models of the evolution of social learning seem to suggest that spatial structure may 
result in the spread of social learning despite the lowering of the average fitness in the 
population (Chapter 2), cooperation is not always supported by spatially structured 
populations, and is at times hampered by the presence of spatial structure, depending 
on the payoff structure of the game (Fu et al. 2010; Hauert & Doebeli 2004; Hauert et 
al. 2006). Nowak et al. (1994) show that spatial structure in stochastic simulations of 
iterated prisoners’ dilemmas allowed cooperators to coexist with defectors without the 
need for complex strategies. This, in part, occurred because the cooperators were able 
to form spatial clusters, as with the social-learning and niche-construction models, 
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this time avoiding exploitation by defectors. The impact of spatial structure on the 
maintenance of cooperation in a population is critically sensitive to the underlying 
update rule, as well as the payoff functions and structures. In the prisoners’ dilemma, 
for example, the payoff structure (Table 10.1a) shows that it pays to mirror your 
opponent’s move in any given interaction. This means that individuals in agent-based 
simulation models naturally congregate and segregate into groups acting in a similar 
way. The consequence of this grouping is that individuals form spatially explicit 
clusters dominated by particular strategies, helping the evolution of cooperation in 
these circumstances. The effects of spatial structure in these circumstances are 
especially strong.  
In the spatial prisoners’ dilemma, the chance of cooperators surviving in the 
population is independent of the actual number of original cooperators, but depends 
critically on their ability to form at least 3x3 clusters in space (Hauert 2001; 
Killingback et al. 1999; Langer et al. 2008). It remains to be seen to what extent these 
findings based on clustering are robust to more realistic assumptions about individual 
dispersal.  
Although the clustering effect in Prisoners’ dilemma models is pleasingly 
intuitive, the introduction of spatial structure leads to very different results in other 
strategic settings. This is illustrated nicely with the snowdrift game, another 
established window on cooperation. This game can be envisioned as two people 
trapped either side of a snowdrift. Each has two options, they can dig the snow or they 
can wait. If both dig, both get past the snowdrift, sharing the cost of digging. If both 
wait neither gets past. However if one person digs and the other waits, both get past 
the snowdrift but one shoulders the entire cost of digging the snow. This payoff 
matrix (Table 10.1b) leads to quite different dynamics to the prisoners’ dilemma. In 
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this case, it pays to do the opposite to your opponent in any given interaction. This 
force opposes the formation of clusters of either cooperators or defectors. 
Hauert and Doebeli (2004) demonstrate a change in dynamics in the case of 
the snowdrift game as compared to the prisoner’s dilemma. In the spatial snowdrift 
game the effect of spatial structure is to reduce the amount of cooperation sustained in 
the population compared to the non-spatial model and in some cases cause 
cooperation to go extinct. The clusters that form in the snowdrift game are diffuse, 
expanding ‘dendritic structures’ which expand as individuals vie to border those 
exhibiting a strategy opposite to their own. The ‘pays to do the opposite’ finding here 
bears some resemblance to the findings of Kylafis & Loreau (2008), who found that it 
only pays to niche construct to produce a resource when the manufactured resource is 
not otherwise available in the environment. The patterns that emerge from spatial 
models of cooperation, as has been shown in spatial models of ecology in the past 
(Rohani et al. 1997; Doebeli and Ruxton 1998), can be very interesting. They can be 
chaotic in certain cases with kaleidoscopic patterns emerging from non-stochastic 
runs of prisoners’ dilemma simulations (Nowak & May 1992) or enter limit cycles of 
cooperation and defection (Hauert et al. 2008). Detailed examinations of other 
strategies that can compete within the hawk/dove or snowdrift type of model show 
that spatial effects can also support strategies that non-spatial models cannot and that 
incorporating social learning and cultural transmission of strategies can also support 
more cooperation in these systems (Killingback & Doebeli 1996). 
Interesting comparisons can be drawn between the spatial models of social 
learning, niche construction and cooperation with regard to the shapes, sizes, functions 
and processes affecting the clustering of costly behaviour. The subtle differences in 
the mechanisms that bring and keep these clusters together can also help to elucidate 
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the differences in the microscopic processes at work in each system. For example, 
groups of co-operators forming in spatial prisoners’ dilemma games are held together 
by inward evolutionary forces, caused by the advantage to cooperating individuals of 
having cooperating neighbours. Conversely, social learning clusters are held together 
by the inability of asocial learners to survive where social learners surround them. 
Further examining the structure of these clusters could help us to identify the different 
processes causing successful or unsuccessful invasions of particular strategies into 
populations (Langer et al. 2008).  
The spatial-niche-construction models restrict the benefits of niche-
construction to the immediate locale of the constructor. It would be a natural - and 
fascinating - extension to consider allowing niche constructors to produce (or deplete) 
resources for (or produced by) their neighbours. Such an extension potentially takes 
such models into the sphere of spatial cooperation models and at the same time 
addresses the concern that models of cooperation have neglected ecological processes 
(Nowak et al. 2010). The inclusion of spatial and population structure in models 
examining the evolution of niche construction and cooperation, in particular, has also 
enabled more empirical and experimental testing of the models. Many tests have now 
been performed using bacteria in media allowing or restricting free mixing of 
individuals and sharing of resources. This paradigm has been used to examine the 
evolution of cooperation e.g. (Kummerli et al. 2002; LeGac & Doebeli 2010) and 
niche construction (e.g. Kerr et al. 2002) and would have been difficult or impossible 
to interpret correctly in the light of purely non-spatial models.  
The primary advantage of extending models to include the effects of spatial 
(or demographic) stratification is realism, and therefore, validity (although a critic 
could justly complain that the cellular automaton approach is a very crude 
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approximation of natural spatial structure (Holland et al. 2007) or that the patterns 
generated by non-stochastic models are not robust to perturbation (Hanski 1994 but 
see Rohani et al. 1996)). Nonetheless, it is abundantly obvious that we live in a spatial 
world. We interact differentially with individuals who live and work in our 
neighbourhoods, we interact less with those who do not. This is, of course, by no 
means a strict rule and further generalisations of the models discussed above could 
usefully look at a more ‘small world’ type of stratification (Watts 1999) where the 
likelihood of interacting with distant members of the population is greater than zero or 
that incorporate levels of dispersal that better capture biological reality. There is now 
considerable evidence that many societies operate in a ‘small world’ way (Watts 1999) 
and evidence from ethnographic studies of information flow in a number of settings 
suggest that people teaching or demonstrating skills to others restrict their 
demonstrations either knowingly or inadvertently to kin. For example, the adze stone 
tool knappers in Indonesian Irian Jaya restrict access to their highly structured stone 
tool apprenticeships to their sons or nephews (Stout 2002), Kpelle children in Liberia, 
while not consciously taught, learn preferentially from their own parents due to near-
constant spatial proximity (Lancy 1996), and Aka Pygmies in the Congo restrict their 
learning role models to parents, grandparents or highly skilled others (Hewlett and 
Cavalli-Sforza 1986). Both the formal and informal restrictions on learning role 
models in these cases mimic, to an extent, the spatial structure the models impose.  
The models discussed here are simulation models but this does not have to be 
the case: some spatial systems can be modelled using equations like reaction-diffusion 
equations or spatially implicit analytical models (e.g. Levins & Culver 1971). These 
models have the advantage of eliminating the problem that spatially explicit agent-
based models necessarily disallow continuous time processes. Discrete time and 
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updating rules in these models have been shown to change results of evolutionary 
simulations considerably (Huberman & Glance 1993). The advantage of using the 
simulation approach, though, is that it is relatively easy to extend non-spatial, 
analytical descriptions of different systems to account for the effects of spatial 
structure without redesigning an entire model from scratch and without reducing the 
ability to compare between spatial and non-spatial results.  
The fact that the results from spatial models differ, sometimes substantially, 
from their non-spatial ancestors, coupled with the fact that spatial stratification is 
observable in most animal systems means that these models may more accurately 
reflect the environment in which animals, ourselves included, learn and evolve. This, 
in turn, may mean that the most informative models are by necessity spatially explicit 
ones. 
The Implications of Mechanism and Strategy for Culture 
Chapter 3 presents a model of the evolution of teaching. The definition of teaching 
used here is a variant of the functional definition of teaching proposed by Caro and 
Hauser in 1992 where a tutor is said to teach if it modifies its behaviour in the 
presence of a pupil, at some cost, thereby promoting the pupil’s learning. Proposed 
refinements of this definition have imposed additional criteria, such as feedback from 
pupil to tutor, or restrict teaching to the transfer of skills, concepts and rules (Franks 
and Richerson 2006; Leadbeater et al. 2006; Hoppitt et al. 2008). The definition 
implies that teaching can usefully be described as a costly behaviour that functions to 
increase the fidelity of information transmission. Although this functional definition 
of teaching is widely used and accepted in the animal behaviour literature (Thornton 
and McAuliffe 2006; Franks and Richardson 2006; Leadbeater et al. 2006), more 
recently it has attracted some controversy for ignoring the cognitive processes 
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underlying teaching and focussing too narrowly on the functional aspects (Byrne 
2011). The controversy arises largely from a difference in research focus. The 
functional definition, in Byrne’s view, hinders research into the origins of the 
complex cognition required for human teaching, and a more cognitive definition of 
teaching including the need for mental state attribution, clear intention on the part of 
the teacher and deep understanding of their actions, would make research into non-
human animal teaching impossible (Caro and Hauser 1992).  
The advantages of using the functional definition of teaching in the model 
presented in Chapter 3 are multi-fold. First, the definition proposed by Caro and 
Hauser (1992) sets out three simple and observable criteria (a change in behaviour in 
the presence of a pupil, a cost to this change and increased efficiency of learning on 
the part of the pupil), which lend themselves easily to both measurement and 
mathematical treatment. Second, using this definition allows the model to describe 
non-human teaching and with extensions, to elucidate the evolution of more complex 
human teaching. Third, and importantly, as the evolutionary origins of human 
teaching are unknown, cognitive definitions are in danger of making unsupported 
assumptions about the evolution of other human cognitive traits and the ability to 
teach. This is especially important when modelling with the aim of uncovering these 
evolutionary origins and identifying aspects of human cognition, like the capacity for 
cumulative culture that may have coevolved with teaching. 
High-fidelity information transmission has been shown to be critical in 
maintaining important features of human culture like cumulative cultural evolution 
(Enquist et al. 2010; Ehn and Laland 2012; Lewis and Laland in press), and in 
maintaining animal traditions (Whiten et al. 2007) (although other transmission 
mechanisms like emulation are often invoked in discussions of animal traditions) 
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(Hopper et al. 2008; Tomasello 1999). Chapter 3 shows that in models of teaching 
that allow for cumulative cultural knowledge gain, the fitness benefits of teaching 
increase with the ability for cumulative culture, and that individuals engaging in 
cumulative culture in a population where teaching is very effective reap higher fitness 
benefits than those in low teaching efficacy populations, again showing an important 
link between teaching and cumulative culture and hinting at a possible co-evolution 
between cumulative culture and teaching. This link between teaching (and other high-
fidelity mechanisms) and cumulative culture has recently been demonstrated 
experimentally (Dean et al. 2012). By virtue of our capacity for language, 
pedagogical cueing, teaching through imitation, manual shaping, and mental state 
attribution, which allows tutors to adjust their teaching to the state of knowledge of 
the pupil (Premack 2007; Tomasello and Call 1997), the fidelity of human teaching is 
likely to be high relative to the fidelity of teaching in other animals who teach through 
simple means, such as opportunity providing (Tomasello 1994; Csibra 2007; Csibra 
and Gergely 2006). 
Although it is likely that the full taxonomic distribution of cases of animal 
teaching is incomplete (Hoppitt et al. 2008; Thornton and Raihani 2008; Laland and 
Hoppitt 2003), it is undeniable that the generality and pervasiveness of human 
teaching is in striking contrast to teaching in other animals. While some researchers 
have claimed that teaching is not in fact ubiquitous in human societies (Whiten et al. 
2003; Whiten and Milner 1984) it is clear that this distinction refers to directly spoken 
formal instruction and does not take account of non-verbal instruction and more 
subtle forms of teaching like pedagogical cueing (Hewlett et al. 2011). For example, 
Hewlett and Cavalli-Sforza (1986) show that while the Aka Pygmies are not formally 
educated, they learn by observation combined with ‘instruction’ through ‘the few 
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things the educator did or said to transmit the skill or knowledge’. Although teaching 
in post-industrial societies is ritualised, formal and in the vast majority of cases, 
verbal, this may not be the case for teaching in most human societies. Nonetheless, 
teaching in some form seems to be present. 
In contrast to human teaching which covers a staggering array of topics and 
skills, animal teaching is typically narrow in scope often concentrating on one trait or 
trait type (for example, food processing in meerkats). Nonetheless we do see teaching 
behaviour, however narrowly applied, in a number of animals. The taxonomic 
distribution of these putative cases of teaching seemingly does not follow the 
taxonomic distribution of animal intelligence as measured in lab-based experiments.  
The findings outlined in Chapter 3 shed light on the taxonomic distribution of 
teaching in three important ways. First, they explain the narrow scope of animal 
teaching and suggest that the specific behaviours that are taught by animal teachers 
are the few that satisfy the stringent criteria suggested by the model. If the 
behavioural traits are too difficult to pick up either through inadvertent social learning 
or through asocial learning, at invasion, teachers are unlikely to have the information 
available to pass on to their pupils and the advantage to teaching disappears. If the 
behavioural traits are too easy to pick up through means other than teaching, there is 
little point in investing time and energy in teaching, as other cheaper forms of 
learning would be just as effective. This explains why there is no straightforward 
relationship between brain size measures or cognitive capabilities and the ability to 
teach: animals good at inadvertent social learning and innovation will pick up 
information through means other than teaching. Moreover, there typically needs to be 
a substantive fitness advantage to acquiring the taught information for teaching to be 
favoured. For example, in the case of meerkats, there are high risks of injury from 
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dangerous prey items like scorpions, which constitute about 4.5% of the adult meerkat 
diet, if individuals do not learn how to safely process them (Thornton and McAuliffe 
2006). The fitness benefit of learning to process these items is therefore likely to be 
large.  
Second, the model found that high relatedness in a population is key to the 
evolution of teaching, with the likelihood of teaching evolving increasing with the 
degree of relatedness between pupil and teacher. The increase in relatedness between 
pupil and teacher also increases the likelihood that an individual with a teaching 
genotype will be taught and increases the inclusive fitness benefits of teaching. This 
could help to explain the presence of teaching in social insect species like tandem 
running ants and social bees (Franks and Richardson 2006; Leadbeater et al. 2006; 
Hoppitt et al. 2008; Thornton and McAuliffe 2006) who are generally thought to have 
higher relatedness among foraging individuals (Cornwallis et al. 2010).  
Third and finally, the model suggests that a low per capita time investment in 
teaching would also facilitate the evolution of teaching. Cooperative breeding (which 
is often linked to high relatedness, see Cornwallis et al. 2010) can cut the per capita 
time cost of teaching and increases the inclusive fitness benefits. Relative to 
non-cooperative breeders, cooperative-breeding helpers engage in more costly and 
prolonged provisioning of young (Thornton and McAuliffe 2006; Langen 2000). It is 
possible that in cooperative breeders, the sharing of costs amongst multiple tutors 
corresponds to a significantly lower time cost to an individual teacher, which in turn 
makes teaching more economical and more likely to evolve. Teaching may be 
favoured only where the tutor’s operational costs are low, and indeed there is 
evidence that investment in teaching is proportional to health-related state variables in 
meerkats (Thornton and Raihani 2008). It may be no coincidence that teaching is 
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disproportionally observed in cooperative breeding species (Thornton and Raihani 
2008). 
Fidelity of information transmission was also an important factor in the 
models presented in Section 2, which examined the implications of the Social 
Learning Strategies Tournament for cultural evolution. The tournament (Chapter 4) 
drew attention to the possibility that, in addition to asocial learning, copy error 
represents another possible avenue through which new information could enter a 
population. This is in ways analogous to mutation in genetic evolution: the vast 
majority of mistakes are deleterious but some confer fitness benefits (Muller 1950; 
Lande 1994). This raises a possibility: to the extent that copy error represents a useful 
source of new information, this may act as a selective pressure against high fidelity 
transmission. However it is clear that in the melee, which is arguably the most 
biologically plausible simulation condition in the tournament, new information was 
provided largely by the asocial learning that some strategies exhibited. This meant 
that copy error was not needed in order to track the environment. In the cases where 
copy error did occur, it was less likely to generate high-payoff information than 
accurate copying since the payoffs for behaviours were exponentially distributed and 
demonstrated behaviours were typically selected by effective strategies for their high 
payoffs. Thus, except in circumstances where there is no other source of new 
information present, or the rate of environmental change is high, it is likely that 
selection will favour high-fidelity transmission.  
More generally, the tournament generated a number of surprising results. First, 
the tournament showed that copying was adaptive under a broader range of conditions 
than was predicted by other theoretical work (Boyd and Richerson 1985; Rogers 
1988; Feldman et al. 1996; Enquist et al. 2007). By choosing high payoff behaviour, 
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individuals inadvertently filtered the information available in the population, so that 
in the pool of behaviours made available to copy through exploitation, high-fitness 
variants were over-represented. Second, the tournament showed that in the presence 
of some source of new behavioural variants, social learning did not lead to the fitness 
depression seen in Rogers’ paradox models. This was, in part, the result of the 
availability of a wider repertoire of behaviours. The repertoire meant that individuals 
could switch to new, higher fitness behaviours in times of environmental change. This 
led to the result that copying could pay, even in a highly changeable environment.  
There is some evidence that the strategies that were successful in the 
tournament are found in more natural settings, for example in social insect learning 
(Grüter et al. 2010). Foraging social insects face a scenario much like the one posed 
in the tournament simulation environment. Foraging insects must choose whether to 
learn the location of a new food patch by watching others (in the case of honey bees 
through watching waggle dances), learn by searching for foraging patches 
individually or use their memories of previous flights to visit a foraging patch the 
location of which they were already familiar with. These actions correspond to 
learning through OBSERVE, learning through INNOVATE or playing EXPLOIT 
respectively. Grüter et al. (2010) found that both honey bees (Apis mellifera) and 
wood ants (Formica rufa) learn (either through independent foraging or observation 
of conspecifics) and exploit the resources they find until they become unprofitable, at 
which time they cease exploiting and resume learning. For example, honeybee 
foragers attend to waggle dances significantly more when a previous patch has 
recently declined in quality as a result of environmental change than at other times 
(Seeley and Town 1992; Biesmeijer and Seeley 2005). In the tournament this kind of 
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action would correspond to timing learning moves to environmental changes and a 
drop in payoffs, something that was critical to overall success in the tournament.  
The tournament analysis presented in Chapter 5 sheds some light on the 
evolution of certain features unique to human culture. The analysis showed that many 
features of human culture such as high diversity of cultural traits, high trait longevity 
and rapid turnover in behaviour (evocative of fads and fashions) can emerge from a 
simple model of social learning as reliance on social learning increases, provided 
there is some source of new information. In fact, the tournament has proven an 
effective means of exploring a number of questions and paradoxes concerning cultural 
evolution. By illustrating the striking utility of copying across such a broad range of 
conditions, and drawing attention to the adaptive filtering performed by individual 
agents, it helped to explain why social learning is widespread in nature. By isolating 
the factors that lead strategies to be successful, the tournament has made a series of 
predictions as to the patterns of strategic copying likely to be observed in nature (e.g. 
copying should increase when payoffs drop, but rapidly drop off once effective 
behaviour is found).  
A focus on the winning strategy leads to the insight that mental time travel, 
combined with the ability to estimate rates of environmental change, may be a vital 
feature of human copying, since it not only allows individuals to discount old 
information but also allows individuals to assess the likely utility of current 
information in the future (see Chapters 5 and 6). The winning strategy computed 
whether further learning would likely lead to new behaviour with high payoff being 
brought into its repertoire. These analyses also help to explain how a highly culturally 
dependent species like humans might accumulate large amounts of cultural 
knowledge, when copying is generally thought to lead to behavioural homogeneity. 
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The key here is a distinction between cultural knowledge and behaviour. Provided 
copying errors or innovation introduce new behavioural variants, copying can 
simultaneously increase the knowledge base of a population, and reduce the range of 
exploited behaviour to a core of high-performance variants, which efficiently track 
changing environments. Similar reasoning accounts for the observation that copying 
can lead to knowledge being retained over long periods of time yet trigger rapid 
turnover in behaviour. Low-level performance of sub-optimal behaviour is sufficient 
to retain large amounts of cultural knowledge in copying populations, over long 
periods. Indeed, a high level of copying was associated with an increase in the 
retention of cultural knowledge by several orders of magnitude.  
The tournament also showed that the timing of learning moves (shown to be in 
part mediated by efficient and intelligent use of memory in Chapter 6) was critical. 
Those strategies that scored badly in the tournament used social learning randomly 
with respect to time, failing to match their learning moves to the changes in 
environmental conditions. In this case there was a negative correlation between use of 
social learning and tournament score. In short, social learning only paid when it was 
used at strategically chosen times. Since both strategic timing and memory-use have 
been shown to increase fitness benefits accrued to social learners they can join the 
ranks of solutions to the paradox of non-adaptive culture. The implications of this 
finding are potentially wide reaching. It may be the case that social learning has 
increased the fitness of the human species, contributing to our huge ecological and 
demographic success, precisely because we have a highly enhanced capability to use 
social learning strategically not only with respect to who we choose to copy, but 
critically with respect to when we choose to copy. It is likely that without the 
cognitive capacity for high-fidelity transmission, teaching, imitation, language and 
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mental time travel, our species may never have reaped the full benefits of cultural 
transmission and social learning.  
 
Modelling the Complexities of Human Culture  
Chapters 7 and 8 are general models of niche construction, one in a finite 
population of stochastic, spatially distributed agents and another in an infinite-sized 
population with deterministic dynamics. Generating general models enables 
researchers to investigate a number of phenomena using a common framework, 
makes comparison between systems possible, enabling researchers to compare the 
effects of similar parameters on different systems meaningfully, while more precise 
models allow accurate quantitative results and hypothesis testing.  
In the case of population biology, Levins (1966) claimed that there were three 
approaches to modelling: to sacrifice generality to realism and precision, to sacrifice 
realism to generality and precision and finally to sacrifice precision to realism and 
generality. The models presented in this thesis make simplifying assumptions about 
how animals learn and transmit genetic predispositions to engage in learning or niche 
construction, at the cost of realism. For example, the assumption in Chapter 3 that 
teaching is a monogenetic trait is incorrect, but the model assumes that it is a good 
approximation of the truth and that small deviations from realism cause only small 
deviations in conclusions. The first approach of sacrificing generality to realism and 
precision was used in Chapter 9 and is the approach that most lends itself to models 
informing policy. The shortcomings of this approach are the same for models of 
cultural evolution as they were for population biology, both in terms of generating 
values for the numerous parameters such detailed modelling requires, and in 
generating solvable equations. As Levins points out, such complex models are rarely, 
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if ever, analytically soluble. However, the problem of solubility becomes less 
important as more powerful computers become available to make numerical estimates 
of solutions, and happily it is the case that models that were completely intractable 
when Levins wrote his 1966 paper are now tractable on little more than a desktop 
computer.  
It is not always necessary, however, to have precise models and in the chapters 
where it is more interesting to look at qualitative rather than quantitative results, 
precision must necessarily be sacrificed. The model in Chapter 8 is a general model of 
cultural niche construction with applications to a number of systems. The discussion 
in Chapter 8 draws attention to three such applications: the coevolution of religion 
and fertility, the cultural evolution of son preference in China and the cultural 
evolution of human large-scale conflict. Using this model it is possible to identify 
(within the bounds of the model’s assumptions) the long-term dynamics and 
evolutionary outcomes of the systems. 
 One of the most interesting outcomes of this model is the way in which its 
findings contrast with the findings of Rowthorn (2011). Rowthorn modelled the 
evolution of fertility and religion, claiming that the endogamy typical of religious 
groups combined with higher fertility meant that (if there is, in fact, such a thing) any 
genetic predisposition to religion must inevitably fix in the population. In the 
discussion of his findings, Rowthorn (2011) notes that this may lead to a society in 
which most individuals are religious and where those individuals who, despite having 
a predisposition toward religion, are not religious, are likely nonetheless to have the 
associated traits of social and political conservatism. Rowthorn’s model suggested 
that human society is on an irreversible path towards the only possible outcome: 
complete religiosity coupled with complete conservatism.  
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The model presented in Chapter 8 relaxed some of the more stringent 
assumptions of Rowthorn’s model, the most important of which was complete 
assortative mating. It was found that even a slight relaxation of the assumption of 
complete endogamy in religious groups led to very different results. Analysing the 
model involved examining a wide parameter space and running millions of simulated 
parameter sets. The analysis found that a number of alternative equilibria existed. 
These included coexistence of religious alleles and non-religious alleles as well as the 
extinction of religiosity, the opposite of Rowthorn’s finding. It would seem that 
Rowthorn’s strong assumptions, coupled with a model that did not sufficiently 
explain the feedback between interacting traits, generated a prediction that was in fact 
just one of a number of possible evolutionary outcomes.  
One recent study of religious endogamy and interfaith marriages (Heaton 
1990) showed that the rate of men marrying outside their religion was greater than 
zero (note, since the model presented in Chapter 8 arbitrarily assigned males as the 
‘choosing’ parent, the rate of men marrying outside their religion in each particular 
religious group is taken into account here). The rate of interfaith marriages among the 
religions surveyed ranged from 8.6% among members of the Reformed Church 
(translating into an endogamy rate of 91.4%) to 38.2% among Presbyterians 
(translating to an endogamy rate of 61.8%). The value range 0.618 !  α1, α2 !  0.914 
for the assortative mating parameters (α1, α2) fits closely with the range for which the 
model predicts polymorphisms (0.6 < α1, α2 < 1).  
 The success of the cultural evolution literature in explaining important aspects 
of human society and behaviour has the potential to lead the field in new directions. 
Cultural evolution is now becoming an extremely useful tool for explaining the 
complex forms that our cultures take (e.g. Bowles 2000; Lipatov et al. 2011; Shennan 
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2011; Lansing and Fox 2011). An interesting test case for cultural evolution is the 
persistence of son preference in much of Asia and North Africa despite a dangerously 
high sex ratio at birth (SRB). In Chapter 9, I present a model of the cultural evolution 
of sex-ratio bias and marriage practices in China. The model was created with a view 
to providing insights into how best to return the sex-ratio in China to, or close to, 
natural levels. The model aimed to describe possible policy interventions such as 
initiating pro-daughter advertising campaigns, increasing access to education in low 
socio-economic sectors or relaxing the stringent controls on reproduction in urban 
China, and quantify their relative effects on the SRB according to the assumptions of 
the model. The utility of this model and others like it (e.g. Li et al. 2000; Lipatov et 
al. 2011) rests critically on the anthropological data that informs them. Three 
fundamental aspects of the model presented in Chapter 9 are the estimates made by 
anthropologists and economists of (1) the SRB as it currently is in affected areas, (2) 
the expected SRB in the absence of discrimination, and (3) the number of ‘missing 
women’ resulting from differential food and medical care in early life, infanticide and 
sex-selective abortion.  
 Estimating the number of missing women, though not directly relevant to the 
model presented in Chapter 9, is nonetheless extremely important as it is this figure 
along with investigations into the societal problems associated with excess males (e.g. 
Ebenstein and Sharygin 2009; Li et al. 2000; Tuljapakur et al. 1995) that encourage 
researchers and policy makers to investigate and target the problem. The estimates of 
SRB come primarily from census data, sometimes from inter-census surveys where 
they are available, and from other, smaller-scale surveys conducted by research 
groups and demographers. Census data remains the most complete and accurate 
source of data on the SRB but both Chinese and external demographers have played a 
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crucial role in tracking the spectacular rise of the SRB in China since the 1960s (Croll 
2000). Accurate estimates of the SRB past and present enable more accurate estimates 
of the effect of policy interventions on the future SRB.   
One of the most contentious issues involved in estimating the number of 
missing women is first estimating the expected SRB (s0) in the absence of gender 
discrimination against girls. In 1990 Amartya Sen used the prevailing sex ratio in sub-
Saharan Africa as an approximation of the expected sex ratio throughout Asia and 
North Africa where the skew in SRB is most pronounced. This was a sensible starting 
point and was designed to give the readers an idea of the severity of the 
discrimination he was describing. Sen estimated that there were 107 million missing 
women worldwide, an estimate that has been revised upwards to 108.9 million since 
1990, using more up to date estimates of his parameters. Coale (1991) suggested that 
the demographic differences between sub-Saharan Africa and Asia were too large to 
use one to estimate the other legitimately. Factors like the death rate, birth rate and 
naturally lower sex ratios in sub-Saharan Africa meant that the s0 value in Asia was 
likely higher than that estimated by Sen (1990). In order to account for these 
demographic factors, Coale suggested using ‘Regional Model Life Tables’ to estimate 
the likely value of s0 in the affected countries. In all four Model Life Tables (East, 
West, North and South) there is a higher male mortality rate relative to female 
mortality, which erodes the naturally higher number of males at birth leading to a 
roughly 1:1 sex ratio in later life (although the exact timing of this convergence is a 
function of mortality and age structure).  
The model analysis presented in Chapter 9 uses a value of s0=1.05. This value 
is a defensible one, since Klasen and Wink (2003) showed that most countries without 
this kind of gender discrimination have values that lie between 1.03 and 1.06 and that 
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China specifically has a value of exactly 1.05, based on the use of the ‘East’ model 
life tables. The model itself remains open to the use of other values, which would 
change at least the quantitative outcomes of the model. The estimated number of 
‘missing women’ is then generated by using the value of s0, and natural female 
mortality rates to calculate the missing proportion of women which is 6.7% in China 
(Klasen and Wink 2003).  
The model describes the interaction between marriage practices and son 
preferences in a number of socioeconomic sectors in modern China. While the 
analysis considers policy implications, the model also adds something to the general 
cultural evolutionary literature. While Carotenuto et al. (1989) and Li et al. (2000) 
introduced cultural evolution to standard demographic Leslie matrix models, the 
model in Chapter 9 used similar methods to add both age and socio-economic 
structure to the cultural evolution model. This meant that the model could investigate 
how a change in the cultural beliefs of one socioeconomic sector could change the sex 
ratio in others. It was also able to investigate the effect of increasing access to 
education for girls in the lowest socioeconomic sectors for women in the highest. The 
fact that socioeconomic status is highly correlated with urban/rural location in China 
coupled with the fact that urban/rural location is strongly correlated with the strength 
of enforcement of the one child policy, means that ignoring socioeconomic status, and 
the different rules to which rural and urban families are subject, would belie the true 
complexity of the situation in China. The model in Chapter 9 implies that targeting 
advertisement campaigns at high socioeconomic status, urban families is less likely to 
change the national sex ratio than improving access to education for girls in low 
income rural areas. This distinction would be impossible to make without specifically 
modelling the effect of age, socioeconomic status and cultural transmission. It is 
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possible that there are many other human cultural systems that would benefit from 
this combination of analyses, and still more that would benefit from other 
combinations of traditional models and cultural evolutionary analysis.  
A potential application of this kind of combination is in traditional SIR 
epidemiological models of sexually transmitted diseases like HIV, which consider 
risk categories of individuals – those who frequently engage in risky behaviour and 
those who do not. Individuals within these risk categories contract the disease at 
different rates. Recruitment to risk categories and turnover in population sizes in those 
categories are treated as constant probabilities (Garnett 2002; UNAIDS 2009). 
However, movement of individuals between groups engaging in risky behaviours is 
more likely to be mediated, as with other cultural practices, by a combination of 
vertical, horizontal and oblique influences on cultural transmission. A similar 
modelling approach could be used to model the cultural transmission of anti-retroviral 
use or use of condoms in treating or controlling the spread of the disease. There are a 
large number of potential cultural influences on the transmission of HIV (Hrdy 1989) 
and other sexually transmitted diseases and it is possible that modelling them using 
appropriate cultural transmission models could significantly improve our estimates of 
the epidemiology of these diseases and predictions about their spread. The reality is 
that the cultural environment an individual lives in ultimately influences almost every 
aspect of their behaviour and we will not understand human behaviour without at least 
a cursory understanding of the cultural pressures shaping it.  
More generally, the models presented in Chapters 8 and 9 show that while 
general models are useful in understanding the dynamics of cultural evolution and 
possible evolutionary endpoints, investigating specific problems associated with 
policy implementation typically requires a finer focus on the exact interactions 
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between age, socioeconomic status, access to education and other important 
traditional customs. 
The human species and its ancestors have undergone a huge transformation 
over the last six million years. We have moved from a life history very like 
Chimpanzees, Gorillas or Orang-utans, to one that is hugely rich and complex, so far 
removed from our ancestors that some members of our species actually doubt our 
evolutionary connection to the other great apes. The work presented in this thesis 
supports the view that this transformation began with social learning and cultural 
evolution (Boyd and Richerson 1985; Richerson and Boyd 2005). Our ability to refine 
and improve the way we learn from each other through teaching, imitation and mental 
time travel, along with the ability to shape our cultural and ecological surroundings as 
they shape us, is the very foundation of what makes us unique as a species. As we 
face large-scale conflicts between cultural groups, and devastating destruction of our 
planet through culturally mediated over-consumption, it is possible that understanding 
and shaping our cultural landscapes is the biggest challenge that now lies before our 
species.  
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